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Abstract
Gender, Genre, and the Victorian Dramatic Monologue describes how female and
male poets used the dramatic monologue to create a dialogue about gender and
subjectivity. I first chart the evolution of the dramatic monologue by explaining
changing Victorian literary critical values as evident in the use of the terms subjective and
objective. As opposed to earlier literary interest in objectivity, later Victorian poets use
the monologue to experiment with new subject positions, valuing individual perspectives
most. I trace this pattern in the way Victorian poets across the period use the developing
monologue to create often simultaneous and overlapping conversations about
subjectivity. In the first conversation, poets such as Levy, Mew, and “Michael Field”
(Bradley and Cooper) use the Magdalen figure to create a powerful subject position
through the fusion of the sexualized and objectified female body and the embodiment of
divine female power. In the second conversation, poets feature the prostitute as the
ultimate example of an other consumed in an intimate, yet impersonal, relationship in
order to explore whether individuals can achieve critical distance, the ability to observe
and judge objectively, or whether observation requires a violent mastering of the other,
turning the other into an object. Such poems include Dante Gabriel Rossetti‟s Jenny,
Webster‟s A Castaway, and Browning‟s Fifine at the Fair. In the third conversation,
Christina Rossetti and Mary Coleridge, among others like Hopkins, Swinburne, and
“Field,” all experiment with the poetic genre to probe the very paradox at the core of this
project—the abject position made subjectively powerful. In the fourth conversation,
turn-of-the-century poets like Levy and Kendall create individual speakers with multiple
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subjectivities, and poets like Webster embrace similar multiplicity through allusive
techniques that provide positions of power.
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Introduction: Literary Networks and the Victorian Dramatic Monologue
The Victorian period was a time of immense social change, beginning with the
1832 Reform Act, which opened the vote to middle-class men, and culminating in
women‟s suffrage in 1919. Legal changes like newly granted suffrage, the
acknowledgment of a group‟s ability to reason fairly and to act in the best interest of
populace, mark a shift in cultural paradigms. To grant women the vote, Victorian
lawmakers first had to recognize women as trustworthy, intelligent, and capable of
directing the country, recognition that countered a long medical, legal, and social history
supporting beliefs of women‟s physical and intellectual inferiority. In so doing, the
Victorians embarked on a project of redefining humanity and subjectivity. New laws
recognizing this group‟s agency and abilities reflected and changed the way people in the
society understood humanity, including their own identities and their ethical
responsibilities.
The dramatic monologue was uniquely suited to represent new models of
subjectivity because the way its form portrays a speaker‟s mind. Although we might be
able to find biographical details that link a speaker and a poet, generally, the speaker of a
dramatic monologue is a separate creation—a mask, as Ralph Rader explains.1
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Influenced by formalist and reader-response approaches, Rader differentiates
between the mask lyric, the dramatic lyric, the expressive lyric, and the dramatic
monologue. He focuses on whether the poet creates a speaker‟s character separate from
his or her own poetic identity—as we understand it, of course—and on whether the poet
creates an auditor‟s character separate from the assumed reader:
There (in the dramatic monologue) we are pleased to feel that the world of
the poem is exactly like the real world; in the dramatic lyric we have a
clear sense that the experience in effect takes place in the real world, the
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Furthermore, this speaker is usually in a specific situation that we can picture—in that
cottage with the fire waning, on stone streets at dawn, or surrounded by works of art with
the painting of the Duchess just having been draped with cloth. As we will see, there are
many different accounts of the genre‟s development and of its primary characteristics. In
this project, I will suggest that one of its main functions has always been to allow for the
study of the individual‟s subjectivity in contact with an other. Because of the contact of
the speaker and interlocutor, self and other, the form portrays contrasting models of
relationships, each with ethical implications.
In the following chapter, I will analyze the language—i.e. subjective and
objective—that many Victorian poets and critics used to describe their epistemological
and ethical concerns. Then, in the second chapter, I will use poetic treatments of the
Magdalen character to illuminate the conversations about objectivity and subjectivity that
emerge through the developing poetic form. The last three chapters outline three poetic
conversations, each of which posits different models of subjectivity. In each

world we and the poet are in. That the actor in the dramatic lyric is felt to
be in the same world we are is easily shown. No one would think a
scholar foolish, for instance, who tried to discover when Hopkins saw the
windhover, whereas only a very foolish scholar would try to find the
portrait of the Duke‟s Duchess. For that matter, we know that Keats heard
the nightingale, and Hardy gives us outside the body of the poem the date
when he heard the thrush; and no one would be surprised to hear that
Arnold wrote his great lyric looking at a moonlit Dover Beach one
evening on his honeymoon trip to Europe. (143)
Rader claims that the auditor in the poem proves fundamentally important for defining
the poem‟s genre: “In the dramatic monologue proper, however, the speaker is always
precisely located in the sharply focused concrete setting that can be seen as in a
photograph” (140). However, just what is the “dramatic monologue proper”? We will
continue to explore this question below.
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conversation, poets gravitate to a particular form of subjectivity and then experiment with
the monologue, especially in terms of the self/other relationship, to portray it.2
In this project, I am employing several postmodern theories of subjectivity that
interrogate the possibilities of self-knowledge and of self-expression. When I focus on
subjectivity, I have to acknowledge the ways that subjects are subjected by power
structures. However, I would argue that the individual can always act, even if only
within the available, often competing, structures of knowledge and expression—
structures that always position the individual at some distance from any kind of
authenticity. We can see examples of theories of this sort of action in the work of writers
like bell hooks and Paulo Friere. The very acts of thinking, reflecting, and
communicating have to take place within and through conceptual and practical structures.
However, the individual has agency to use and to manipulate these structures. He or she
2

In her introduction to Victorian Women Poets: An Anthology, Margaret
Reynolds describes the importance of annuals and anthologies in the publication history
of Victorian women writers. She suggests that these annuals allowed women writers to
interact:
This constant looking at each others‟ work, valuing and assessing each
others‟ talent, marks not only the personal experience of the Victorian
women poets, but spills over into their poetry too. There are numerous
poems addressed by one poet to another as if carrying on a conversation
with one another. Hemans‟ “The Last Song of Sappho” . . . is an obvious
example, but there are many others: L.E.L.‟s Last Question,” Kemble‟s
“To Mrs. Norton,” Charlotte Brontë‟s two poems to her sisters, . . .
Rossetti‟s “L.E.L.,” Amy Levy‟s “To Vernon Lee,” and Michael Field‟s
“To Christina Rossetti.” (xxx)
In a recent plenary address, Dr. Linda Hughes advocated reading “sideways,” a method
she bases on network theories. This method involves reading a text in its original form in
publication and contextualizing the reading with related texts and images. For example,
one could read a poem published in a magazine in conjunction with surrounding images
and texts, even if they seem at first to be disconnected cognitively. I am interested in
building upon such approaches to Victorian literature to imagine men and women in
conversation through various publications.
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can define the world through such structures, rather than merely being defined by them. I
would like to describe the monologue as an ideal vehicle for this sort of manipulation,
especially because it provides an elegant portrait of a moment of self-knowledge and selfexpression. Poets can use this vehicle, then, to explore the available structures of thought
and expression.
Poetic dialogue multiplies the possibilities for poets—especially those using the
monologue—to manipulate epistemological and rhetorical structures. Thus, dialogue can
be productive, and engaging in it can be reconciliatory, uniting individuals in a common
pursuit. In this way, the poet in the act of expression is like an architect. The architect
cannot create matter itself, but he or she can manipulate it, organize and re-create it, in
the form of structures that might not be themselves utterly new, but that redefine the
environment and reshape the world for the individual who inhabits them. Furthermore,
the act of architectural design itself re-creates design history by interpreting past
structures and creating the opportunity for future innovations. The poet can likewise
organize and re-create words through the design of the poem—as well as through
building upon the history of poetry itself—while otherwise unable to think or to
communicate outside of these epistemological, conceptual, and rhetorical structures.
There is a long history of genre criticism on the dramatic monologue that defines
its boundaries and charts its evolution.3 One foundational article (1947), by Ina Beth

3

Early criticism on the dramatic monologue, published between 1900 and 1930,
focuses on clearly expressing the genre‟s fundamental elements. Relatively few articles
since then have articulated new approaches to the dramatic monologue, and only three
full-length studies exist: Robert Langbaum‟s The Poetry of Experience: The Dramatic
Monologue in Modern Literary Tradition (1986), Laura Marie Williams‟s 1999
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Sessions, describes the genre by using seven very specific criteria: “1) speaker, 2)
audience, 3) occasion, 4) interplay between speaker and audience, 5) revelation of
character, 6) dramatic action, and 7) action taking place in the present” (508). She breaks
the genre into subgroups (perfect example, imperfect, formal, and approximate)
according to how well they fit these criteria. Robert Langbaum‟s critical flexibility has
prepared the critical community to address more openly the difficulties of defining the
genre. Should we define it according to writers‟ projects, readers‟ experiences, or social
factors? Langbaum‟s study on the relationship between Romantic poetry and the
dramatic monologue created a foundational narrative of “the poetry of experience”:
For having seen the poetry which set out to be different from romantic
poetry, we can find in the core that remains unchanged the essential idea
of romanticism. That essential idea is, I would suggest, the doctrine of
experience—the doctrine that the imaginative apprehension gained
through immediate experience is primary and certain, whereas the analytic
reflection that follows is secondary and problematical. The poetry of the

dissertation on women poets writing the dramatic monologue, and Glennis Byron‟s
Dramatic Monologue (2003). Langbaum emphasizes the canonical male poets who use
the form and their male Romantic predecessors. Williams describes dramatic
monologues written by women poets, but she does not primarily place them within a
broader history of the genre. Although Byron does include some non-canonical women
poets in her study, her broad approach does not allow for focused analysis of the
interrelations of many of the male and female poets who used the genre in the period.
She notes, “the most significant future changes [in scholarship on the dramatic
monologue] may result from the adjustment of the generic grouping to include women‟s
poetry” (28). My project extends Langbaum‟s, Williams‟s, and Byron‟s by focusing
more specifically on the changes to the genre in the Victorian period, especially in its
uses by both male and female poets, rather than in its literary history represented by male
poets alone.
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nineteenth and twentieth centuries can thus be seen in connection as a
poetry of experience—a poetry constructed upon the deliberate
disequilibrium between experience and idea, a poetry which makes its
statement not as an idea but as an experience from which one or more
ideas can be abstracted as problematical rationalizations. (35-36)
He explains that this focus on “immediate experience” leads to the development of the
monologue:
The combination of sympathy and judgment makes the dramatic
monologue suitable for expressing all kinds of extraordinary points of
view, whether moral, emotional or historical—since sympathy frees us for
the widest possible range of experience, while the critical reservation
keeps us aware of how far we are departing. The extraordinary point of
view is characteristic of all the best dramatic monologues, the pursuit of
experience in all its remotest extensions being the genius of the form. We
are dealing, in other words, with empiricism in literature. The pursuit of
all experience corresponds to the scientific pursuit of all knowledge; while
the sympathy that is a condition of the dramatic monologue corresponds to
the scientific attitude of mind, the willingness to understand everything for
its own sake and without consideration of practical or moral value. We
might even say that the dramatic monologue takes toward its material the
literary equivalent of the scientific attitude—the equivalent being, where
men and women are the subject of investigation, the historicizing and
psychologizing of judgment. (96)
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While I agree that the monologue allowed for “the scientific attitude of mind,” I would
contend that many poets also immediately saw its potential for “practical [and] moral
value,” particularly female poets writing at the turn of the century. Langbaum looks at
the subtle differences in poets‟ responses to enduring poetic and epistemological
problems. Sessions‟s formalist account and Langbaum‟s epistemological one represent
two very different models of literary criticism that have led to recent blended accounts,
such as the one I have developed.
Recent critics have been more interested in building upon Langbaum‟s approach,
drawing long lines of evolution for the form that stretch past earlier demarcations and that
allow for more flexible definitions than those allowed by existing taxonomies. W. David
Shaw describes the genre:
a poem of one-sided conversation in which the swerve of lyric apostrophe
away from rhetoric often deflects the speaker from his ostensible purpose
of persuading or manipulating a silent auditor. As an important example
of what I. Armstrong calls the “double poem,” the monologue both
subverts and reconstructs its culture by its Socratic testing of convention
and its humane appeal from morality or custom to a sense of how life
might be lived more ethically. Like the short story or the novel, the
dramatic monologue is an immensely protean genre that at different times
exhibits all of the features I have just touched on. Because unconscious
motives are stronger than conscious ones, speakers in monologues also
tend to exhibit bad faith or unconscious deception rather than outright lies
that they are conscious of perpetrating. (“Lyric Displacement” 303)
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He argues, “The vocative is the defining trope of the Victorian monologue, which
naturalizes the apostrophes of Coleridge‟s conversation poems by transforming them into
a speaker‟s seduction of a silent listener” (308). Shaw describes the layers that form
through the speaker, interlocutor, audience, and poet:
But behind the vocative we can still hear the apostrophes of lyric poetry,
and the more audible these apostrophes become, the more aware we also
are of the ventriloquist who speaks through his puppets. By functioning as
a trope of deflection that “complicate[s] or disrupt[s] the circuit of
communication” (Culler, p. 135), apostrophes and vocatives raise
important questions about who is being addressed in a monologue and
about who is being heard. The dead musician whom the speaker
apostrophizes in Robert Browning‟s “A Toccata of Galuppi‟s” (1855) is
not a living person but a ghost, a spectral presence. And that monologue‟s
apostrophes also make us aware of another ghost: the ghost of the poet,
who is the phantom behind the mask. (308)
For Shaw, these layers fracture the poem dialogically: “In principle, the monologue is
not „monological‟ at all, in Bakhtin‟s sense. Its form is „dialogical,‟ a supple and agile
interplay between impersonated characters and the poet who impersonates them. To
apostrophize a ghost is also to animate it” (311). This interplay is part of the Victorian
response to Romantic lyrics:
The naturalization of lyric apostrophe is part of a Victorian attempt to
provide a local habitation and a name for the Romantic poet‟s communion
with nature-spirits and ghosts. . . . The dramatic monologue becomes an
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ascendant genre in post-Romantic literature partly because it is better
equipped than lyric poetry to oppose the dogmas of a secular and scientific
age in which an antiquated belief in “doing-by-saying” (including a belief
in oracles, prophecies, and knowledge as divination) is in rapid and
widespread retreat. (323, 325)
In the following chapters, I will build on Shaw‟s notion of ghosting by identifying the
ways poets create ghosts of the other in the self and of the self in the other.
Studying poetry by Romantic poets like Hemans and Landon, Isobel Armstrong
provocatively claims women‟s place as creators of the genre:
A number of poems by women testifying to a refusal to be regarded as an
object have been described by feminist critics, but by using a mask a
woman writer is in control of her objectification and at the same time
anticipates the strategy of objectifying women by being beforehand with it
and circumventing masculine representations. This is the theme of
Christina Rossetti‟s poem about masking, “Winter: My Secret.” It should
come as no surprise, then, that it was the women poets who “invented” the
dramatic monologue. (326)
I am not seeking to identify in this project the “inventors” of the genre, but I would like
to build upon these flexible models of criticism. Because I am discussing subjectivity
and gender theories through the monologue, I find it necessary to analyze the monologue
through its literary history, its social history, and its generic history. Futhermore,
building on the work of recent critics, I will evaluate its epistemological, formal, and
ethical functions. Like Armstrong, I find that women poets using the monologue
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gravitate toward speakers who have been objectified (i.e. Magdalen and Xantippe).
However, when they write such poems, they are participating in conversations with other
poets—such as Browning—who have also used the monologue to explore objectification.
As we will see in the critical arguments of U. C. Knoepflmacher and Cynthia Scheinberg,
it can be quite difficult to categorize the power available in an objectified position. Does
silence give a sort of voice to the interlocutor/other? Does it draw the reader‟s attention
and elicit sympathy? Christina Rossetti and Mary Coleridge certainly find abjected
positions empowering, as we shall see. They explore these positions through
manipulating the form.
For the purposes of this project, I will define the monologue as a poem that
usually has a speaker, an audience, and an occasion—to use Sessions‟s language—but
these characteristics are the first to be modified in experimental versions of the form.
Rather than breaking from the form, these experiments redefine it, helping it to evolve.
For example, May Kendall transcends the categories in “Woman‟s Future” by creating a
monologue that has a speaker, but part of the audience has been internalized in
misogynistic voices that figure in the speaker‟s psyche, and the occasion has been
expanded to include all women sewing in all drawing rooms. I am much more interested
in maintaining critical sensitivity to such experimentation than I am in defining in
concrete terms the limits of the form. However, I will assume that the monologues that
Browning and Tennyson created early in the period, such as “My Last Duchess,
“Porphyria‟s Lover,” and “Ulysses,” stand as the initial exemplars against which later
poets write. I will also assume that these poems were written in conversation with other
early creators of the form, such as Hemans and Landon.
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In order to describe Victorian poetry‟s self-reflexivity (8)4, Armstrong focuses on
texts‟ complexities and their “unsettled nature” (10):
To see the text as a complex entity defining and participating in an area of
struggle and contention is to make intentionality a much wider and more
complex affair and to include the contradictions and uncontrolled nature of
language within the text‟s project. . . . Post-Derridean criticism, however,
tends to ignore the aspect of active struggle in a text. Volosinov, taking up
a different form of the Hegelian tradition that then one from which
deconstruction stems, puts the struggle with language at the centre of a
text, and such a concentration on language should help in the rereading of
Victorian poetry. (10, 11)
Focusing on this struggle allows her to observe, “The double poem is a deeply skeptical
form. It draws attention to the epistemology which governs the construction of the self
and its relationships and to the cultural conditions in which those relationships are made”
(13). I would like to build upon her approach to the genre by examining the “text as a
complex entity defining and participating in an area of struggle and contention.”
Furthermore, in this project, I will build a narrative of the genre‟s literary history based
on the patterns of struggle, rather than based on dates of composition.
Although the first chapter moves somewhat chronologically and the third focuses
on a pivotal time—the 1870s—this project is not primarily organized chronologically.
There are two threads in the chronological evolution of the monologue that I would like
4

Armstrong explains, “The history of Victorian poetry is the gradual assent to
self-reflexive art and the struggle against such an assent” (8).
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to track: the increasing importance of subjective art toward the end of the period and the
experimentation with the genre by late Victorian women writers. However, I will focus
on outlining four simultaneous conversations, each of which contains similar examples of
formal experimentation with the subject and object positions in the monologue, broadly
defined. For example, I will claim in the third chapter that Webster responded to
Rossetti‟s Jenny through A Castaway, and Browning responded to both through Fifine at
the Fair. I will soon explain this argument in more detail. I do not pretend that Webster,
Rossetti, and Browning actually sat down to have a conversation about these poems,
although I would love for that to have been the case. I also do not want to claim
absolutely that Browning would not have written Fifine without both Jenny and A
Castaway preceding it. I want to broaden the idea of a conversation to what I will
describe as the intersections of nodes of poetic networks, the moments in time in which
poets, sometimes without even knowing each others‟ work, reach a similar conclusion.
In our case, they create a similar model of subjectivity.
Like pictorial models of the Internet (see Figure 1), I imagine Victorian poetry as
a network of nodes that touch in certain points, perhaps in moments of intertextuality or
of commonality in approach.5 I am interested in the points that seem most active.

5

Julia Kristeva, while describing Mikhaǐlovich Bakhtin‟s work, explains the
concept of intertextuality: “[A]ny text is constructed as a mosaic of quotations; any text is
the absorption and transformation of another” (Desire in Language 66). As Leon
Roudiez notes
This French word was originally introduced by Kristeva and met with
immediate success; it has since been much used and abused on both sides
of the Atlantic. The concept, however, has been generally misunderstood.
It has nothing to do with matters of influence by one writer upon another,
or with the sources of a literary work; it does, on the other hand, involve
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Perhaps these poets wrote in different moments in the Victorian years; perhaps they did
not know each other‟s work. Regardless, their efforts coalesce in the developing history
of the genre. In this way, we can read their work as a conversation, an active node of
connection in the larger literary network. Each conversation, as I am formulating it in
this project, represents such a node. It is important to clarify that I am describing each
conversation as a node, rather than describing each poem or each poet as a node. I chose
this organization because if we represent each poem as a node, it becomes more difficult
to define agency. As we have seen, Armstrong offers a model of textual struggle that
could be helpful here; I certainly want to pay attention to such struggle. I also want to be
able to respond to the poets who were actively engaged in these conversations,
particularly those who wanted to manipulate the boundaries between speaker and author,
such as Christina Rossetti, Mary Coleridge, and, we might argue, Augusta Webster.
Thus, representing each poem as a node limits our critical possibilities. We could
describe each poet as a node in the network, but some poets are represented more than
once and in different conversations. For example, Webster participates in the second and
the fourth conversations, and Levy participates in the first and the fourth ones. In order
to maintain the opportunity to explore textual struggle and to allow for authorial
intention—when such readings seem supported biographically—I have chosen to

the components of a textual system such as the novel, for instance. It is
defined in La Révolution du langage poétique as the transposition of one
or more systems of signs into another, accompanied by a new articulation
of the enunciative and denotative position. (15)
For a thorough discussion of theories of influence and of intertextuality, see Influence
and Intertextuality in Literary History, edited by Jay Clayton and Eric Rothstein.
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Fig. 1: Hierarchical Structure of the Internet
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represent the conversations as nodes. This allows for a diversity of approaches in each
conversation while maintaining the possibility for interconnection.
As we have seen, this project will begin with a history of Victorian uses of the
terms subjectivity and objectivity in literary criticism. Most apparent in the writings of
Robert Browning and John Ruskin, these terms respond to shifting notions of ontology
and epistemology. The very frequency of the terms subjectivity and objectivity reveals
the Victorians‟ dedication to tackling such central human issues and their anxiety about
the need to address them. In many ways, this project is an attempt to follow Victorian
poets as they navigate such issues. Poets writing later use the monologue to experiment
with new subject positions, signaling an aesthetic turn to subjective art and individual
perspectives. In Chapter Two, I trace this pattern in the way poets use the developing
monologue form to portray the Magdalen figure. They create a powerful subject position
through the fusion of the sexualized and objectified female body and the embodiment of
divine female power. Poets like Amy Levy and Charlotte Mew use the Magdalen figure
to traverse socially imposed stereotypes—the sexual temptress and the morally pure
mother figure—in this process exploring how women can gain agency through multiple
identities. Focusing on Magdalen allows me to give shape to the literary history I am
describing through a character that vexes the categories of subjective and objective. In
each following chapter, I describe a poetic conversation that posits a differing model of
subjectivity through the dramatic monologue, shaping theories of subjective and
objective art. These models include contrasubjectivity, abject subjectivity, and
intersubjectivity.
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These overlapping conversations work together in the mutual development of the
monologue. I would offer two models of their interconnection. First, we could imagine
that each conversation is an ellipse in a Venn diagram (see Figure 2). In Figure 2, the
conversations are represented by numbers (1-4), and their overlapping areas are
represented by letters (a-k). I would like to describe the project in terms of this diagram
in order to clarify the relationships between the conversations. Building upon the image
of the Internet in Figure 1, Figure 3 allows us to magnify the nodes to see how they might
be connected through a web-like system. The terms objectivity and subjectivity define
critical concepts that become central concerns for each conversation. The complicated
history of these terms in Victorian literary culture provides a shared language for poets
creating monologues. Therefore, the middle overlapping area (k) in Figure 2 corresponds
to the concepts all conversations have in common, concepts detailed in Chapter One. In
Figure 2, we might understand this shared connection as the lines themselves.
The first conversation, on Magdalen and the monologue, overlaps with the
second, on contrasubjectivity, through their shared focus on the self-objectified prostitute
(area a). However, these conversations differ in their approach to this character. The
first conversation focuses on the combination of identities in Magdalen, with all of her
mythic history, while the second conversation focuses on the implications of the
relationships of Magdalen and her erotic partners, creating a complicated subject/object
dichotomy these poems explore. The first conversation overlaps with the third one, on
abject subjectivity, through their shared focus on the abjected individual able to find new
perspective through abjection (area d). However, the poems in the first conversation
allow the individuals portrayed more agency than do the poems in the third conversation
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Fig. 2: Overlapping Conversations6

6

This model is based on an image from the Venn diagram tool created by Juan
Carlos Oliveros for genomic and proteomic research.
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Fig. 3: Interconnected Nodes

through their continual redefinition of subject positions. The first conversation overlaps
with fourth one in their shared exploration of multiple identities and internalized
discourses (area e). These two conversations differ because the fourth conversation
develops the negative consequences of internalized discourses, especially misogynistic
discourses.
The second, third, and fourth conversations also share important points of
interconnection. The second conversation connects with the third one (area b) in their
shared focus on the isolation of the individual. In the second conversation, the self must
define itself against the other. A similar inherent distance between self and other exists in
some elements of the third conversation, such as in the model of abject sublimity
Christina Rossetti develops. The second conversation overlaps with the fourth one (area
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f) in the assumption that one‟s identity depends upon the agonistic relationship of the self
and the other. As we shall see, however, these two conversations reveal responses to this
assumption that, while not necessarily exclusive, are opposed; one models the expulsion
of the other, and the other models the absorption of the other. The third conversation
overlaps with the fourth one (area c) in their shared focus on the explosion of a central
identity, which is abjected or multiplied, respectively. Thus, these conversations are not
inherently isolated. They rise in polyphony to describe the evolution of the genre through
innovative models of self and other. Using network models allows us to break out of
strictly temporal or personal models of relationships, such as those developed in studies
of poetic influence. It allows us to view the history of the genre in something close to
multiple dimensions, providing us with more dynamic critical vision.

“See yourself in my soul!”:
The Crisis of the 1870s
The poetic crisis of the 1870s responded to discussions about gender that grew
particularly heated in this year. In 1868, Eliza Lynn Linton published her scathing “Girl
of the Period,” arguing that the paragons of femininity of the past have been replaced by
the current fashion-obsessed “loud and rampant modernization” (360). Perhaps in
response to Linton, in the same year, Frances Power Cobbes published “Criminals, Idiots,
Women, and Minors,” and a year later, John Stuart Mill published On the Subjection of
Women, texts that share the view that the current system dehumanized and degraded
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women. These arguments proved highly effective in moving the culture toward new
rights for women, such as in the Married Women‟s Property Act of 1870 and women‟s
unofficial admission to Cambridge in 1872, cultural changes that reverberated in the next
few decades. In 1885, the London Times ran a series of letters to the editor about the
propriety of female nudity in the Royal Academy of Art, started by the letter from “a
British Matron” (“A British Matron”). Partially a reaction to the new female art students,
the letters reveal a central anxiety about women‟s objectification in the society. The
generic changes my project charts occur primarily in these decades, in which all
representations of women came under public scrutiny, partially because more women
were using the dramatic monologue to write back and partially because a cultural
paradigm shift had fractured the stability of gender representation for both male and
female poets.7 In this way, the cultural and poetic crises of this period mirror one other.

7

See, for example, the effigies of the New Woman featured in the Cambridge
protests in 1897 against women‟s full membership in the university (Cornell University).
The votes for women‟s membership were easily defeated (Cornell University).
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Browning‟s Don Juan in Fifine at the Fair shouts at his wife, Elvire, “See yourself in my
soul!” (808). The crisis of gender representation in the 1870s originates in this issue: Can
women see themselves in a man‟s description? Can a man imagine an ethical, nonviolent relationship with a woman? What happens when men consider women as
versions of types originating in male souls? Furthermore, is empathy possible without
projecting the self onto the other? 8

The banner above reads, “Get you to Girton Beatrice Get You to Newnham Here‟s No
Place for You Maids.” As in Linton‟s “Girl of the Period,” an appellation quickly
shortened to “GOP,” figuring the female body as unnaturally modified in modern times,
ridiculously and clownishly stripped down from her former grandeur proved a popular
strategy against the growing women‟s movement.
8
As we shall see, these questions respond directly to similar concerns in
Romantic poetry. In fact, we might say that the dramatic monologue as formulated by
Browning and Tennyson continues Romantic explorations of psychological self-creation
and other-destruction. There is not a clean break between “Romantic” and “Victorian,”
or lyric and dramatic monologue in this way of describing the genre‟s history. These are
fluid and interpenetrating categories that respond to issues of subjectivity and gender.
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Dante Gabriel Rossetti‟s publication of Jenny in 1870 marks an important
moment in the poetic conversations about gender and genre. He uses the poetic form
adeptly to explore the limits of empathy, pioneering the portrayal of what I have termed
“contrasubjectivity,” self-creation against the other. Augusta Webster‟s A Castaway
explores the social pressures that create the industry of prostitution while her speaker
disdainfully describes her encounters with faceless, voiceless men, encounters through
which she believes she is actually doing their wives a favor. Through this tension,
Webster answers Rossetti by giving Jenny a voice and silencing her pitifully needy
customers, meanwhile positioning poetry to respond to social problems and to give
agency to even the most miserable women in the nation. At the heart of the crisis of the
1870s is the question of whether individuals can gain critical distance, or whether poetry
reveals the speaker‟s subjectivity and the presence of persistent violence in relationships,
particularly between men and women. When Rossetti read the last few lines of
Browning‟s Fifine at the Fair (published in 1871), in which Juan confesses to having
given money to Fifine in pity (just as Rossetti‟s speaker gives Jenny gold), the lines
“convinced [Rossetti] that Browning had joined the conspiracy against him, and he flung
the book from him and broke off a friendship of twenty-five years‟ standing” (DeVane, A
Browning Handbook 366). Browning did, I argue, respond to the crisis differently than
Rossetti, by creating scenes that track the process of Juan‟s objectification of women. In
the poem, Juan tries to convince Elvire that his admiration for Fifine, a tightrope walker
at the fair, is purely an objective appreciation for her beauty. However, Elvire knows
immediately his true interest in the girl and tries repeatedly to walk away from him. The
final act of dropping coins, which bounce in Fifine‟s tambourine, brings Jenny into the
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poem and proves the failure of Juan‟s attempt, implicating him in a relationship of
commodification. In many ways, Browning does not deviate from his earlier work in this
poem, which continues his focus on the ethical concerns in “Porphyria‟s Lover” and “My
Last Duchess.” However, in these earlier poems, the violence of representation is
physical, the women silenced by force and positioned post-mortem for the male speakers‟
pleasure. In this poem, the women are alive and Browning has his male speaker face
them, through Don Juan‟s monologue to Elvire and Fifine, in order to trace the process of
linguistic dehumanization that creates gender violence in the genre, a process of
metonymy and mythopoeia, the women‟s identity ignored and replaced.

“Living had failed and dead had failed / And indeed I was alone”:
Finding Agency in Abjection
Beginning just before and stretching through the 1870s, many poets began to
experiment with the speaker position of the dramatic monologue. While the previous
conversation focused on the objectification of the other, or the objectification of the self
by the other in the case of A Castaway, this conversation focuses on the self made an
object to the self. These poets attempt to determine how abjecting the speaker in order to
negate conventional notions of identity can create a new form of subjectivity. This
movement also shifts the genre closer to the lyric, attenuating the shadowy differences
between them. Building upon Shaw‟s argument, we might consider abjection the ghost
other in the self that makes the self unfamiliar. Altering the form of the dramatic
monologue allows the poets to imagine a different coherence of the self, using a genre
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that typically calls into question the authenticity of the lyric voice and shows ruptures in
psychology.
The abjected speaker provided another means by which to imagine a speaking
position empowered psychologically, though vulnerable physically.9 Although abjection
often precludes a speaking position or a desiring self, many Victorian poets experimented
with abjected speakers in order to question the autonomous self in other models of
subjectivity. By enabling an escape from power structures, abjection broadened the focus
of the discussion about gender and genre to a more comprehensive view of the ways
power functions. Curiously, the dates of this generic experimentation coincide with those
of the Contagious Diseases Act, suggesting that abjection had become a wide-spread
cultural discussion with political implications. To what degree should women be
represented as mere bodies, vessels from which to eradicate disease, rather than as full
subjects in a nation that respects their autonomy and their right to the security of their
own bodies? Acting out a sort of self-dehumanization and self-annihilation allows poets
to explore the previously silent side of relationships, such as the objectified position of
the Duchess in “My Last Duchess,” while imagining how abjection offers a new recourse
to agency. A response to power inequality, this approach disassembles asymmetrical
power by offering an escape from oppression.
For instance, Christina Rossetti wrote a series of poems from 1846-56 that
exemplify this abject movement. In “From the Antique,” “Song,” “Sappho,” and
9

We might connect this function of abjection to the jilted women of Felicia
Hemans‟s and Mary Robison‟s early versions of the dramatic monologue form. Like
Armstrong, we could use such connections to chart various lines of the monologue‟s
development.
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“Cobwebs,” the speakers hope to escape physical, religious, and social structures. In
“After Death,” “Echo,” and “A Chilly Night,” the speakers cannot reach their
interlocutors and, at times, view their own bodies as Other. For Rossetti, meaning does
not disappear with the loss of selfhood; it begins. In “A Chilly Night,” the speaker wants
to join in a common language with her ghostly mother, but in the end, she exclaims,
“Living had failed and dead had failed / And I was indeed alone” (49-50). Her
recognition of the alterity of the Other leads to her sense of alienation, but also to her
expansive, alternative existence. Rossetti‟s speakers desire the freedom of the abject, the
abasement of selfhood and loss of identity. Paradoxically, the speakers desire a state that
would free them of desire and, thus, fulfill their desire. Through negation, the speaker
leaves the coherent self to inhabit a space outside of the body, one of enhanced vision. In
Gerard Manley Hopkins‟s “terrible sonnets,” the speaker describes his body‟s pain and
soul‟s emptiness. Rather than sketching a traditional spiritual narrative of stasis,
dejection, and fulfillment, these poems focus on the speaker‟s spiritual emptying.
According to their biographers, Rossetti‟s and Hopkins‟s poetry of the abject was written
during times of immense personal pain. However, some of the poems that alter the
speaker position through abjection seem to express a sort of energetic exultation, rather
than patient fortitude.
From the negated space Rossetti imagines in “Cobwebs,” Algernon Charles
Swinburne builds static worlds like the one in the “Garden of Prosperine.” This negated
space pulses with energy for Swinburne, who creates limitless opportunities for
rebuilding new formations of the speaker position. Similarly, Edith Emma Cooper and
Katherine Bradley, writing as “Michael Field,” often create situations in their poems in
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which abjection ironically empowers the speakers. For instance, in “Embalmment,” the
queen embalmed in honey wants to be near her lover, but not to sleep. Mary Coleridge
finds power in abjection, seeking these moments personally and poetically. As we shall
see, her composition of the “The Witch” coincided with personal events through which
she contemplated abjection, the abjection of the self in sexual encounters and romantic
relationships and the abjection of the body in death. Futhermore, her active use of
intertextual methods expresses the same drive, her voice abjected beneath incorporated
canonical voices.

“Oh, lift me over the threshold, and let me in at the door!”:
Polyphony, Intertextuality, and Multiple Subjectivities
The next generic innovation occurs later in the period, between 1870 and 1910,
when poets begin multiplying the voice of the speaker and negating the interlocutor,
imagining differently the problems of relationship and objectification. Rather than
abjecting the speaker to envision new power, these poets bring outside voices into the
primary speaker‟s psyche and into the text through intertextuality, creating a polyphonous
form. This is another type of ego-explosion, one based on a premise that subjectivity is
not developed through defining the self against the other, but through an internalized
relationship with the other.
Occurring at once, many different cultural events produced this shifting model of
subjectivity. In these later decades, the growing suffrage movement and the British
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empire spawned debates about race and class in the nation. As a result, the nation
seemed more and more like a conglomeration of various voices. Furthermore, the
widespread public use of telegraph offices in the 1870s and the increasing number of
telephone installations in the 1890s (Mitchell 82-83) suggest that British society at this
moment quite literally reverberated with voices—multiplying from every corner.
Polyphonic evolution in the dramatic monologue seems a natural reaction to the shifting
cultural setting and, consequently, to the changing shape of subjectivity.
Although I read Victorian poetry as a large conversation with multiple intertextual
points, many of these poets chose intertextuality as an aesthetic project in itself. For
instance, Augusta Webster used poetic methods she developed from her interest in
intertextuality. Intertextuality sets up an implicit character study that posits her female
speakers against her precursors‟ male speakers. Furthermore, the presence of earlier texts
in Webster‟s poems, like “Caliban” in “Circe” and Jenny in A Castaway, suggests that
she understands her poetic identity as multiple. Intertextuality, then, is another form of
polyphony, one that maps the shape of poetic subjectivity.
Internalized intertextuality results in a certain kind of polyphony many female
poets especially practice, an agonistic form that positions one voice as an agôn filled with
competing discourses. In “Michael Field,” Cooper and Bradley best represent the drive
to don a mask in the service of polyphonic poetry. Their jointly written poems weave
together multiple voices in a single poetic speaker while highlighting the process of
polyphony; “A Girl” finds “our souls so knit, / I leave a page half-writ” (10-11). For
“Field,” poetry provided a way to draw other voices into one‟s own, while also
recognizing the ways a single voice splits off into multiple voices. May Kendall and
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Amy Levy experimented with intersubjectivity, multiple voices brought into the
individual‟s subjectivity. They were most interested in the ways that they could modify
the monologue to portray the incorporation of the voice of those who might be
interlocutors in other, more traditional monologues. The literary self-reflexivity inherent
in this re-envisioning of past poetic conversations reveals ongoing Victorian
configurations of the genre, which developed through cultural and poetic crises into an
instrument for charting subjectivity, with the flexibility to evolve in the hands of new
poets.
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Chapter One: Epistemologies of Poetic Observation: Subjectivity and Objectivity in
Victorian Literary Criticism
In his “Introductory Essay” to Percy Bysshe Shelley‟s letters, Robert Browning
describes the poetic ideal of approximating an “absolute vision” (17) that combines the
“objective poet,” “one whose endeavor has been to reproduce things external,” (11) and
the “subjective poet,” one “impelled to embody the thing he perceives” (13).10 Victorian
theories abounded about objectivity and subjectivity, so much so that in his “Of the
Pathetic Fallacy,” John Ruskin denounces the terms absolutely:
German dullness and English affectation, have of late much multiplied
among us the use of two of the most objectionable words that were ever
coined by the troublesomeness of metaphysicians—namely, objective, and
subjective. No words can be more exquisitely, and in all points, useless;
and I merely speak of them that I may, at once and for ever, get them out
of my way and out of my reader‟s. But to get that done, they must be
explained. (1282)
Literary criticism of the Victorian period reveals a shift in value that hinges upon the
changing notions of subjectivity and objectivity, a shift paralleled by the evolution of the
dramatic monologue. Before progressing to my evolutionary model of these terms, I
need to define them. Subjectivity carries with it two concepts that, while related, move
any discussion in two separate directions. In 1821, Samuel Taylor Coleridge first used
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I have used the Broadview Anthology of Victorian Poetry and Poetic Theory as
the source for all Victorian poets and critics cited in this chapter.
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the term subjectivity to describe “consciousness of one‟s perceived states.” This usage
shifted Robert Southey‟s original use of the term in 1812, “the idea the mind abstracts
from [an] impression,” from the result of the mind‟s process—the abstraction of an
impression—to an awareness of one‟s rational process at work, the “consciousness of . . .
perceived states.” I would like to build upon these early definitions to outline other
related definitions of the term. The second meaning, derived from the first, describes the
state of viewing the world from within one‟s own mental framework—for example,
judging subjectively means judging according to personal standards and values created
through one‟s experiences or derived from one‟s belief systems. Objectivity, by contrast,
implies the ability to judge based on criteria originating outside of one‟s own mental
framework, e.g. by accepting a communal standard instead. Subjectivity also relates to a
third concept, that of subject-hood, or occupying a subject position.
Together these imply an idea of subjectivity that contains three levels. The first
level requires awareness of the self. In the next level, the individual reflects on sense
experiences in the world, making the individual actively self-conscious. Finally, the
individual judges the world from his or her perspective—a unique vantage point—
according to specific values, commitments, and sense abilities.11 Of course, accounts of

11

In Subjectivities: A History of Self-Representation in Britain, 1832-1920,
Regenia Gagnier defines subject as “subject to itself,” “„Other‟ to others,” “a subject of
knowledge,” and “a body that is separate (except in the case of pregnant women) from
other human bodies” (8). Subjectivity corresponds to these definitions of subject and
represents that “opposed to objectivity” (8). She explains that all of these definitions
influence self-representation: “Furthermore, in writing or self-representation (like
autobiography), the I is the self-present subject of the sentence as well as the subject
„subjected‟ to the symbolic order of the language in which one is writing—the subject is
subject of language, or intersubjectivity (i.e., culture)” (9).
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subjectivity will differ according to one‟s understanding of the possible results of
responding to the world, e.g. creating an empirical account of it, gaining spiritual
knowledge from it, etc. In other words, the shifting Victorian responses to objectivity
and subjectivity correspond to shifting ideas of those possible results, whether empirical
or spiritual. Although objectivity usually describes a position of judgment, it also implies
a theory of the mind that parallels that of subjectivity. First, the individual is a part of a
community. Next, he or she brings individual reflections of the world into alignment
with that community. Finally, the individual judges the world according to specific
principles, along with the group. Thus, the differences between subjective and objective
aesthetics reflect a greater difference, a divergence between schemas of epistemology.
Isobel Armstrong argues that the Victorian period was “post-Kantian.” Her
definition will be helpful to this outline of Victorian interests in objectivity and
subjectivity:
This meant, in the first place, that the category of art (and for the
Victorians this was almost always poetry) was becoming “pure.” Art
occupied its own area, a self-sufficing aesthetic realm over and against
practical experience. It was outside the economy of instrumental energies
(for in Kant art and technology spring into being simultaneously as
necessary opposites). And yet it was at once apart and central, for it had a
mediating function, representing and interpreting life. These
contradictions were compounded by post-Kantian accounts of
representation, which adapted Kant to make both the status and the mode
of art problematical by seeing representations as the constructs of
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consciousness which is always at a remove from what it represents. Thus
the possibility of a process of endless redefinition and an ungrounded,
unstable series of representations was opened out. So the Victorian poets
were the first group of writers to feel that what they were doing was
simply unnecessary and redundant. For the very category of art itself
created this redundancy. (4)
Victorian poets were probably drawn to the monologue because it further complicated
representation. The monologue‟s construction draws attention to these issues because
truth is presented through its representation by a speaker, who serves as the
representation of a mind in the poem. Thus, the reader cannot find an unmediated truth in
any monologue; to make meaning, he or she can only set the representations together, the
speaker‟s representation of truth and the poet‟s representation of that representation.
Furthermore, because of its formal construction, the monologue dramatizes the interplay
of objectivity and subjectivity within the relationship of the self and other. Although
many monologues contain a speaker and an auditor or interlocutor, some poets modify
the form by removing the auditor/interlocutor or by reconstructing the speaker‟s
psychology through abjection or polyvocality. However, despite formal changes
throughout the genre‟s history, one feature of the monologue remains constant: the
relationship of the self and other. We do not see such concentrated attention to this
relationship in any other form. Only the dramatic monologue creates a discourse of the
self through the dependence of the self upon the relationship of self and other through—
for example—the other‟s role (auditor/interlocutor) in the speaker‟s construction of
language, the self as the other in abjection, or the other in the self in polyvocality.
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We might visualize this relationship of self/other and subjectivity/objectivity
through a double helix form. As readers, we subjectively enter the poem, judging the
characters and the actions from our personal perspectives. Because our subject position
differs from that of the speaker, we also judge the speaker from an objective vantage
point, according to the schemas with which the poet frames the monologue, such as—in
Browning‟s poems—Christian narratives (“Fra Lippo Lippi,” “The Bishop Orders his
Tomb,” “Soliloquy of the Spanish Cloister”) or love narratives (“Poryphria‟s Lover,”
“Love Among the Ruins,” “My Last Duchess”). At the same time, the monologue‟s
structure brings us within the mind of the speaker, thus layering the subjectivity of the
reader and speaker. Every word the reader repeats in his or her mind brings the spirit of
the speaker to life. Thus, at the very moment we begin to judge the speaker objectively,
we join the speaker in a bond of subjectivity. As Robert Langbaum explains, “the poetry
of experience is, in its meaning if not its events, autobiographical both for the writer and
the reader” because “the reader can identify [with the speaker] to make the poem an
incident in his own self-development as well” (52). Of course, as Cynthia Scheinberg has
argued, the reader might not be able to identify with the speaker; in that way, the very
construct of the poem can be used self-consciously to draw attention to ways of knowing
the self.12
Poets‟ focus on individual experience has been traced through Romantic poetry in
Langbaum‟s important project as “literature‟s answer to science, . . . a doctrine of
experience, an attempt to salvage on science‟s own empiric grounds the validity of the
12

See “Recasting „Sympathy and Judgment‟: Amy Levy, Women Poets, and the
Victorian Dramatic Monologue.”
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individual perception against scientific abstractions” (27). When the Victorian poets
reinterpreted this poem of experience, they developed the dramatic monologue, which
blended the objective and subjective. As Armstrong explains, Victorian poetry doubles
the lyric so that it becomes “not only the subject‘s utterance but the object of analysis and
critique” (12):
By seeing utterance both as subject and as object, it was possible for the
poet to explore expressive psychological forms simultaneously as
psychological conditions and as constructs, the phenomenology of a
culture, projections which indicate the structure of relationships. I have
called this objectification of consciousness a phenomenological form
because phenomenology seeks to describe and analyse the manifestations
of consciousness rather than its internal condition. Thus such a reading
relates consciousness to the external forms of the culture in which it exists.
The gap between subjective and objective readings often initiates a debate
between a subject-centered or expressive and a phenomenological or
analytical reading, but above all it draws attention to the act of
representation, the act of relationship and the mediations of language,
different in a psychological and in a phenomenological world. (13)
As readers, we understand that the speaker is not a living person, but a character made of
text, compiled phrases of types cultivated from generations of people‟s lived experiences.
Thus, the subjectivity we feel that we are sharing with the speaker separates into bundles
of objective judgments about humanity. In this way, the readers‟ subjective and objective

36
experience doubles in the double helix structure with the representation of the speaker‟s
subjectivity in text that presents recognizable character types.
As we have seen, Sessions offers the following criteria for a “perfect example” of
the dramatic monologue: “1) speaker, 2) audience, 3) occasion, 4) interplay between
speaker and audience, 5) revelation of character, 6) dramatic action, and 7) action taking
place in the present” (508). By contrast, an “approximate” example of the monologue
contains a speaker, but lacks some other elements. I would argue that Victorian poets
immediately capitalized on the form‟s flexibility, usually not adhering to Sessions‟s
“perfect example.” As we have seen in the introduction, formal characteristics served as
signifiers in a poetic language. Poets reconfigured models of subjectivity by
manipulating the form (e.g. re-envisioning the speaker‟s position, reducing or increasing
the interplay, or internalizing dramatic action in a character‟s psyche). Removing the
audience in the poem, for example, changes the way the reader engages with the poem.13
To a degree, the double helix form described above collapses. The reader cannot as
easily identify the speaker as a character separated from other characters, making it
difficult for the reader to judge the speaker objectively. As a result, the subjective
experience of the poem is enhanced for the reader even as the unique subjectivity of the
speaker—usually portrayed in the contrast between the speaker and the audience—is
threatened. Thus, by manipulating the monologue‟s formal elements, poets helped to
shape the conversation growing in the period about objectivity and subjectivity, concepts
that corresponded to theories of the mind. These theories of the mind have important
13

See Dorothy Mermin‟s The Audience in the Poem for more discussion about the
evolution of this dramatic feature.
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implications for the possible relationships between individuals; in this way, they chart the
possibilities for ethical communities.
For Ruskin (1856), if one is truthful, any subjective description is, by nature,
objective, because others can verify its veracity. For instance, he explains that some
people claim that blue “can only be felt when the eye is turned to the object, and as,
therefore, no such sensation is produced by the object when nobody looks at it, therefore
the thing, when it is not looked at, is not blue” (1282). Such an idea is repulsively
esoteric for Ruskin. In his opinion, if the thing is blue, it is blue for everyone all of the
time. However, he is not entirely fair in his summary of the complex theories he
describes. Ruskin derives the example of the mind‟s interpretation of the color blue from
Hume‟s Enquiry into Human Understanding14 and the immaterialist theory from Bishop
George Berkeley. Berkeley‟s theory of observation and sight, developed in the
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Hume uses the example of the color blue to describe the mind‟s ability, in some
isolated cases, to relate an idea obtained through experience to another idea originating in
the mind:
Suppose, therefore, a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years, and
to have become perfectly acquainted with colours of all kinds except one
particular shade of blue, for instance, which it never has been his fortune
to meet with. Let all the different shades of that colour, except that single
one, be placed before him, descending gradually from the deepest to the
lightest; it is plain that he will perceive a blank, where that shade is
wanting, and will be sensible that there is a greater distance in that place
between the contiguous colour than in any other. Now I ask, whether it be
possible for him, from his own imagination, to supply this deficiency, and
raise up to himself the idea of that particular shade, though it had never
been conveyed to him by his sense? I believe there are few but will be of
opinion that he can: and this may serve as a proof that the single ideas are
not always, in every instance, derived from the correspondent impressions;
though this instance is so singular, that it is scarcely worth our observing,
and does not merit that for it alone we should alter our general maxim.
(319-20)
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eighteenth century, was still very influential when Ruskin was writing. In fact, in 1842,
Samuel Bailey published A Review of Berkeley‘s Theory of Vision, refuting Berkeley.
Defending Berkeley, John Stuart Mill and James F. Ferrier joined the debate, an elaborate
conversation about vision, perception, language, and understanding published in the
Westminster Review and Blackwood‘s Magazine.15 Berkeley writes in Principles of
Human Knowledge,
Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind, that a man need
only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, to
whit, that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all
those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any
substance without a mind, that their being (esse) is to be perceived or
known; that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by
me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit, they
must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some
eternal spirit: it being perfectly unintelligible and involving all the
absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part of them an existence
independent of a spirit. To be convinced of which, the reader need only
reflect and try to separate in his own thoughts the being of a sensible thing
from its being perceived. (115-16)

15

For more discussion, see Margaret Atherton‟s description of Berkeley‟s
reception in the nineteenth century. See also George Pitcher‟s edited collection of these
texts by Bailey, Mill, and Ferrier.
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For Berkeley, a thing‟s existence requires a viewer or creator.16 If not perceived, the
thing “must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some eternal
spirit.” If one considers Berkeley an empiricist, this scientific approach requires
verifying data from a specific vantage point (i.e. the scientist) in order that the description
of the thing observed can be considered within a logical framework: the scientist, looking
at the object from this perspective, reported that it had these specific traits. Berkeley‟s
approach circumvents two logical fallacies: the scientist cannot judge the object based on
a priori knowledge and the scientist cannot deductively piece together “truths” about an
absent object. Knowledge for Berkeley works only inductively; otherwise the scientistcum-pantheist must grant each object a personal spirit of being that functions beyond
verifiability. A fundamentally humanist philosopher, Berkeley believes that life
functions through and for the individual.
Without mentioning Berkeley, Ruskin defines the argument thus:
[I]t does not much matter what things are in themselves, but only what
they are to us; and that the only real truth of them is their appearance to, or
effect upon, us. From that position, with a hearty desire for mystification,
and much egotism, selfishness, shallowness, and impertinence, a
philosopher may easily go so far as to believe, and say, that everything in
the world depends upon his seeing or thinking of it, and that nothing,
therefore, exists, but what he sees or thinks of. (1282)

16

David Hume similarly argues that all knowledge originates in experience from
which the brain forms impressions and then ideas. Consequently, “a blind man can form
no notion of colours” (318).
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For Ruskin, then, Berkeley‟s empirical position is merely the “egotism” of a man
demanding to be the center of the universe. Ruskin argues that the world does exist even
without an observer noting it, to which Berkeley might reply that this might be so, but
there is no proof and this sort of existence is meaningless to humans without such proof
as our senses provide.17 Ruskin continues, “[B]lue does not mean the sensation caused
by a gentian on the human eye; but it means the power of producing that sensation; and
this power is always there, in the thing, whether we are there to experience it or not, and
would remain there though there were not left a man on the face of the earth” (1282). For
Ruskin, every object has the power of action that defines the essence of the thing.
Humans do not derive meaning from experiencing these objects, but instead, from
recognizing the essence of their power. Accordingly, Ruskin warns, “if you do not see
them blue when you look at them, it is not their fault, but yours” (1283).18 For Berkeley,
knowledge is objective in that it involves testing the truth of a thing, but it is subjective
17

As Boswell relates it, Samuel Johnson responded similarly to Berkeley:
After we came out of the church, we stood talking for some time together
of Bishop Berkeley‟s ingenious sophistry to prove the non-existence of
matter, and that everything in the universe is merely ideal. I observed that
though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it.
I never shall forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his
foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it,— „I
refute it thus.‟ This was a stout exemplification of the first
truths…or…original principles…without admitting which we can no more
argue metaphysics, than we can argue in mathematics without axioms. To
me it is not conceivable how Berkeley can be answered by pure reasoning.
(qtd. in Winkler 1)
Ruskin similarly wants to refute Berkeley‟s immaterialism with the collective force of
human response to the material world.
18
Jerome Hamilton Buckley explains that Ruskin‟s “basic concepts of the true
and the beautiful and rested upon a sure, though never clearly articulated, faith in the
reality of spirit, in the power of the human mind to trace the patterns that unified the
aspirations of a diverse culture” (160).
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because the methods for judgment are situated in the individual‟s senses. Ruskin, by
contrast, argues for a kind of collective knowledge. If we have accumulated knowledge
about something through the gathered wisdom of the community, it is true:
Hence, I would say to the philosophers: If, instead of using the sonorous
phrase, It is objectively so, you will use the plain old phrase, It is so, and if
instead of the sonorous phrase, It is subjectively so, you will say, in plain
old English, It does so, or It seems so to me, you will, on the whole, be
more intelligible to your fellow creatures; and besides, if you find that a
thing which generally does so to other people (as a gentian looks blue to
most men) does not so to you, on any particular occasion, you will not fall
into the impertinence of saying, that the thing is not so, or did not so, but
you will simply (what you will be all the better for speedily finding out)
that something is the matter with you. (1283)
Consequently, Ruskin will not believe in a difference between objectivity and
subjectivity because such a belief both refuses the innate central essence of objects in the
world and suggests that, to some degree, the world is unknowable because we can only
know it perspectivally. To this end, he determines to “meet our German friends in their
own style” (1283) by arguing,
[W]e also, who suppose ourselves the objects of every arrangement, and
are certainly the subjects of every sensual impression, thus uniting in
ourselves, in an obverse or adverse manner, the characters of obness and
subness, must both become metaphysically dejected or rejected, nothing
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remaining in us objective, but subjectivity, and the very objectivity of the
object being lost in the abyss of this subjectivity of the human. (1283)
According to Ruskin‟s intentionally garbled paraphrase of the German argument, in order
to describe something objectively—a descriptor that for Ruskin equates to describing it
“accurately” because the description is verifiable according to its likeness to the object‟s
essence—the observer must “become metaphysically dejected or rejected.” According to
Jürgen Habermas, Immanuel Kant—the “German” whom Ruskin felt he had to
combat—
focused on objectivity, that is, on the necessary subjective conditions of
possible knowledge of nature. For Kant believed that accounting for the
validity of the most exact empirical judgments (that is, the theoretical
propositions of contemporary physics) would at the same time account for
the transcendental bases of experience in general. (23)
Although their philosophies differed greatly, Kant, like Berkeley, was not challenged by
the process of interpretation that might separate the objective and subjective because, in
the sublime process—for example—imagination fails to capture the force or magnitude
of the moment. The mind contains within it the ability to be overwhelmed. When one‟s
objective capabilities are exceeded by the enormity of the situation or the contemplation,
the individual can join, for a moment, the supersensible that cannot be experienced—let
alone represented—in any other way. As Werner S. Pluhar describes,
[W]e must settle for a metaphysics that confines itself to the synthetic a
priori principles (along with their universal applications) that are
presupposed by, and hence stay within the range of, what experience is
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possible for us. Hence, immanent metaphysics, which the Critique of
Pure Reason shows us to be capable of, will be a metaphysics of nature.
Such a metaphysics cannot tell us anything about the supersensible: about
objects in themselves, about a God, or even about ourselves as subjects in
themselves (souls), as distinguished from how we appear to ourselves
through our “inner sense”; in particular, it cannot tell us whether, despite
the necessity inherent in nature‟s universal laws (the mechanistic laws
regarding efficient causes), our will has the kind of freedom that is needed
for morality. All we can do, as far as the Critique of Pure Reason goes, is
think a “nature in itself,” a God, and such freedom. (xxxviii-xxxix)
For Berkeley, the connection between the mind‟s processes and divine revelation is much
clearer. As he explains in A New Theory of Vision, rather than threatening his spiritual
beliefs, his theory validates the human biological mechanisms that allow us to learn about
our world and that reveal their divinely organized purpose:
Upon the whole, I think we may fairly conclude, that the proper objects of
vision constitute a universal language of the Author of nature, whereby we
are instructed how to regulate our actions, in order to attain those things
that are necessary to the preservation and well-being of our bodies, as also
to avoid whatever may be hurtful and destructive of them. It is by their
information that we are principally guided in all the transactions and
concerns of life. (81)
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Conversely, there is a metaphysical truth for Ruskin that unites the subject to objective
vision, leading him to fear that the empiricists‟ dependence on subjectivity displaces the
metaphysical reality with “the abyss of this subjectivity of the human.”19
When Gerard Manley Hopkins later develops his poetry of inscape, his mission
parallels Ruskin‟s.20 For instance, in “as kingfishers catch fire,”
each hung bell‟s
Bow swung finds tongue to fling out broad its name;
Each mortal thing does one thing and the same:
Deals out that being indoors each one dwells;
Selves—goes itself; myself it speaks and spells,
Crying What I do is me: for that I came. (3-8)
Each “mortal thing” has an essence for Hopkins that resounds in the life that being lives.
Even an inanimate object shakes the surrounding air with the declaration of its existence.

19

Recently, Amanda Anderson has argued that the Victorians had “a prevalent …
preoccupation with distinctly modern practices of detachment, a preoccupation
characterized by ambivalence and uncertainty about what the significance and
consequences of such practices might be” (The Powers 3). Anderson contends that,
inheriting the ideals of the Enlightenment, the Victorians endeavored to cultivate
detachment. She describes “a dialectic between detachment and engagement, between a
cultivated distance and a newly informed partiality” (6). Anderson focuses on both nonfiction and fiction in her work, so the debate about subjective and objective observation
in poetry does not enter into her argument. I would like to build upon her argument,
using Hardy‟s image of advancement: “never in a straight line, but in a looped orbit,”
“drawing back for a spring” (1445). As later Victorian poets begin to reconsider the
values of subjective stances, the epistemological ground of the earlier Romantic
subjective poetics has tilted. New theories about ontology and spirituality give a new
foundation to the later Victorian philosophical return.
20
For Hopkins, this theory also originates in the writings of Duns Scotus and his
notion of God‟s presence in all things. As Hopkins wrote in his journal, “when I took in
any inscape of the sky or sea I thought of Scotus” (qtd. in Phillips xiv).
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For Hopkins, it is this performance that validates and verifies the metaphysical meaning
of existence. When “the just man justices” (9), he “Acts in God‟s eye what in God‟s eye
he is—/ Christ” (11-12).21 The poet‟s job, then, is to record the existence of the small
pieces of God in the world, the objects that cry out the truth of their own existences. By
contrast, Berkeley believes that the spiritual power of the world is located in the
interpretative power of the individual, not in the material world itself.
Ruskin believes the poet should be an objective observer, nurturing the health of
the individual and of the community. The pathetic fallacy, then, is “caused by an excited
state of the feelings, making us, for the time, more or less irrational” (1284). This fallacy
signals a sort of derangement for Ruskin, admitting a “temperament … of a mind and
body in some sort too weak to deal fully with what is before them or upon them” (1285).
Ideally, the poet can overcome the force of passion “and the whole man stands in an iron
glow, white hot, perhaps, but still strong, and in no wise evaporation; even if he melts,
losing none of his weight” (1285). Keats and Shelley fall into the second order, that of
“the man who perceives wrongly, because he feels,” “generally themselves subdued by
the feelings under which they write, or, at least, write as choosing to be so” (1286). The
ideas are “diseased or false,” but a sort of truth remains if the “feeling is true” (1286).

21

As this line shows, Hopkins‟s concept of human inscape requires the individual
to live up to his or her most virtuous state. Aristotle advocates this sort of fulfillment in
his On Rhetoric: “The deeds are signs of the person‟s habitual character, since we would
praise even one who had not accomplished anything if we believe him to be of the sort
who could” (85). A speaker‟s prepon, or propriety, depends upon the ability to
communicate a character according to his or her hexis (moral state): “[F]or lives do not
have the same character in accordance with [each and] every moral state. If, then, a
person speaks words appropriate to his moral state, he will create a sense of character”
(236).
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Ultimately, for Ruskin, “the greatness of a poet depends upon the two facilities, acuteness
of feeling, and command of it” (1288). Ruskin‟s ideal poet is both objective and
subjective because to see the world accurately means to observe the true essence of an
object, to portray a right reaction to stimuli, to reflect self-consciously on this experience,
and to weigh one‟s feelings against others‟. To be subjective is to be objective—to join a
chorus of voices who verify the universality of life and of feeling.
Early writers of the dramatic monologue at this time take part in this conversation
by exploring minds enthralled in passionate emotions—losing the distanced vision of
objectivity in the rush of subjective reflection—including poems like Alfred Tennyson‟s
“Mariana,” “St. Simeon Stylites,” and Maud. Tennyson explains,
This poem of Maud or the Madness is a little Hamlet, the history of a
morbid, poetic soul, under the blighting influence of a recklessly
speculative age. He is the heir of madness, an egoist with the makings of
a cynic, raised to a pure and holy love which elevates his whole nature,
passing from the height of triumph to the lowest depth of misery, driven
into madness by the loss of her whom he has loved, and, when he has at
length passed through the fiery furnace, and has recovered his reason,
giving himself up to work for the good of mankind through the
unselfishness born of a great passion. The peculiarity of this poem is that
different phases of passion in one person take the place of different
characters. (qtd. in Collins and Rundle, 254)
Robert Browning focuses on extreme forms of this subjective deviancy in his poems such
as “My Last Duchess,” “Soliloquy of the Spanish Cloister,” “Porphyria‟s Lover,” and
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“The Laboratory.” As we saw in the introduction, representations of subjectivity in the
monologue change throughout the period.
In Browning‟s “Preface” to Percy Bysshe Shelley‟s poetry, the objective poet sees
the world from the perspective of humanity, while the subjective poet reaches the heights
of an attuned philosophic pitch. In a similar way, Elizabeth Barrett Browning‟s Aurora
Leigh describes the importance of poetic “double vision” (V.184), necessary in this “fullveined, heaving, double-breasted Age” (V.216). Revealing the poet‟s expanded
perspective, this “double vision” blends the subjective and objective to incorporate
external vision with perspectival epiphany. As evident in Ruskin‟s passionate response
to the “German” arguments about subjectivity and objectivity, the debate about
epistemologies challenged accepted notions of the poet‟s function in society and of the
best form of healthy communities. If individuals are always already subsumed into their
own subjectivities, unable to respond to the world in similar ways for similar reasons,
what is the common ground for society? In the middle of the century—from Browning‟s
(1852) publication of his preface, through Ruskin‟s (1856) essay on the pathetic fallacy,
and Barrett Browning‟s (1856) publication of Aurora Leigh—this crisis grew and the
poetry of the period increasingly reflects it.
Ruskin‟s essay deviates from earlier voices in the debate that claim the
importance of subjective poetry. Summarizing some of these earlier arguments clarifies
the movement of the critical conversation. Arthur Henry Hallam‟s “On Some of the
Characteristics of Modern Poetry” (1831) to which Ruskin seems to respond, takes a
different view of poetic subjectivity. In his essay, Hallam argues that Keats‟s and
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Shelley‟s poetry could not become popular because popularity necessitates readers‟
identification—readers must identify and feel with the poet:
For since the emotions of the poet, during composition, follow a regular
law of association, it follows that to accompany their progress up to the
harmonious prospect of the whole, and to perceive the proper dependence
of every step on that which preceded , it is absolutely necessary to start
from the same point i.e. clearly to apprehend that leading sentiment of the
poet‟s mind, by their conformity to which the host of suggestions are
arranged. (1193)
Because regular readers cannot “start from the same point” in order to verify the
experience empirically, as Ruskin might advocate, or to at least verify the feeling‟s truth,
Keats and Shelley will never be popular. To Hallam, the magnificence of the poetry of
Keats and Shelley is due to their ability to embody in their poetry the senses they have
experienced, the mark of a subjective poet for Browning. Hallam explains,
Susceptible of the slightest impulse from external nature, their fine organs
trembled into emotion at colors, and sounds, and movements, unperceived
or unregarded by duller temperaments. Rich and clear were their
perceptions of visible forms; full and deep their feelings of music. So
vivid was the delight attending the simple exertions of eye and ear, that it
became mingled more and more with their trains of active thought, and
tended to absorb their whole being into the energy of sense. Other poets
seek for images to illustrate their conceptions; these men had no need to
seek; they lived in a world of images; for the most important and extensive
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portions of their life consisted in those emotions which are immediately
conversant with the sensation. (1192)
The inward focus he attributes to Keats and Shelley means that their poetry cannot be
popular because the readers cannot relate and because the culture has shifted into one that
requires this relationship between poet and reader. Armstrong explains,
Unlike Kant, for whom “reflection” might be glossed as epistemological
ideas (in the third critique at least) and “sensation” as the unique
representations of the data of experience by consciousness, Hallam was
not exact and left unquestioned a dichotomy between thought and
sensation which was filtered through Schiller into categories which
actually construct the division they describe. For Kant and for Schiller
(who simplified Kant) the aesthetic mediates ideas and immediate
experience, but for Hallam unique, unmediated sensation is the aesthetic.
Its uniqueness, and thus resistance to appropriation and abstraction is what
appealed to him. The essay rescues itself from incoherence time and again
by its paradoxical conviction that to destabilise fixed positions is a
reconstructive act. (66-67)
Hallam‟s process of literary evolution follows logically. Hallam outlines the culture‟s
move from a “youthful period,” one of the “expansive and communicative tendency in
mind which produces unreservedness of communion and reciprocity of vigor between
different orders of intelligence,” into a “period of degradation”: “With the close of the
last century came an era of reaction, an era of painful struggle to bring our overcivilised
condition of thought into union with the fresh productive spirit that brightened the
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morning of our literature” (1194). Hallam argues that the kind of Romantic intellectual
vigor he now observes belatedly emerged from the alignment of the “poetic impulse” and
the “general impulse of the nation”; by contrast, the “spirit of modern poetry” reflects
“that return of the mind upon itself and the habit of seeking relief in idiosyncrasies rather
than community of interest” (1195). This current movement results in “a checking action
for conservation against a propulsion toward change” (1195). Although Hallam notes
that some tie this movement to the Industrial Age, specifically, that the “diffusion of
poetry must be in the direct ratio of the diffusion of machinery” (1195), he disagrees. He
expresses concern that these changes to the expectations of poetry‟s function in society
reveal a larger danger:
But this notable argument forgets that against this objective amelioration
may be set the decrease of subjective power, arising from a prevalence of
social activity, and a continual absorption of the higher feelings into the
palpable interests of ordinary life. (1195)
The “continual absorption of the higher feelings into the palpable interests of ordinary
life” destroys the ability to feel deeply, degrading the literature of the period, as well as
the health of the society. In contrast with Hallam‟s, Ruskin‟s argument seems quite
populist: Experience is universal, and so should poetry be. The best poetry is that which
speaks to the greatest number of people, reflecting their personal experiences. Between
Hallam‟s article in 1831 and Ruskin‟s in 1856, many critics published on this issue,
revealing a gradual shift to Ruskin‟s position that—in turn—seems affected and
impossible by the 1870s.
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In John Stuart Mill‟s “What is Poetry?” (1833), he argues that poetry is “the
exhibition of a state or states of human sensibility” (1213). Poetry “is the natural fruit of
solitude and meditation” (1216).22 The poet must turn to his or her internal life to write.
As a result, although poetry may respond to human truths shared by others, poetry “is
truth”: “The truth of poetry is to paint the human soul truly” (1214). By nature, poets
must not pose for their audience or struggle to fit the audience‟s expectations. Poetry
must stay within the bounds of its production. Consequently, although “eloquence is
heard,” “poetry is overheard” (1216). The truth of poetry originates in its just
representation of the mind. While Ruskin argues for poetic vision that replicates truths
others can verify, Mill defines poetry as internally focused as a result of its production
and by nature of its unique purpose as a literary form. Thus, the world that poetry
describes must be filtered first through the mind:
Descriptive poetry consists, no doubt, in description, but in description of
things as they appear, not as they are; and it paints them, not in their bare
and natural lineaments, but seen through the medium and arrayed in the
colors of the imagination set in action by the feelings. (1215)
Like Hallam, Mill describes poetry that originates in the mind of the poet, who shares
these silent musings with readers who never can exactly replicate the moment of
meditation. However, such poets, and thus, such poetry still exist for Mill.
22

According to Jerome Buckley, Mill “was guided from the first by a quite
„unscientific‟ faith in natural goodness and a trust in the basic rationality of man, which
made him quite unable to grasp the anti-intellectual implications of the new biology. But
his shortcomings and errors as a systematic philosopher detracted not at all from the
candor of his judgment, the force of his attacks on bigotry and prejudice, or the strength
of his plea for the liberated intellect” (189).
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Anticipating Ruskin‟s argument, in “Recent English Poetry: A Review of Several
Volumes of Poems by Alexander Smith, Matthew Arnold, and Others” (1853), Arthur
Hugh Clough suggests that perhaps poetry better serves its own purposes when it reaches
a wider audience. He first questions how poetry might attain the popularity of the novel,
asking whether it should
deal more … with general wants, ordinary feelings, the obvious rather
than the rare facts of human nature? Could it not attempt to convert into
beauty and thankfulness, at least into some form and shape, some feeling,
at any rate, on content—the actual, palpable things with which our everyday life is concerned …? … Could it not console us with a sense of
significance, if not of dignity, in that often dirty, or at least dingy, work
which it is the lot of so many of us to have to do, and which some one or
other, after all, must do? (1255)
Clough argues that poetry can tie communities together in a celebration of the beautiful,
reminding people that they have a spirit that is worth uplifting:
Cannot the Divine Song in some way indicate to us our unity, though from
a great way off, with those happier things; inform us and prove to us, that
though we are what we are, we may yet, in some way, even in our
abasement, even by and through our daily work, be related to the purer
existence. (1255)
The novelist, by contrast, “does try to build us a real house to be lived in and this
common builder, with no notion of the orders.” Consequently, the novelist “is more to
our purpose than the student of ancient art who proposes to lodge us under an Ionic
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portico” (1255). Poets should uplift the spirit by first describing the situation in which
the readers actually live. 23
Clough‟s poetry attacks socially constrictive practices, validating everyday
experience outside of the performance of morality. For example, in “Duty—that‟s to say
complying,” performing a role outside of authentic experience might be proper socially,
but ends in the murder of individuality:
Moral blank, and moral void,
Life at very birth destroyed,

23

Clough categorizes the poetic approach he advocates as hardier, more fit to
represent the needs of the people of England. In this way, Clough continues the
feminization rhetoric which began in the eighteenth century, coding Englishmen as more
masculine than their European counterparts:
There is something certainly of an over-educated weakness of purpose in
Western Europe—not in Germany only, or France, but also in more busy
England. There is a disposition to press too far the finer and subtler
intellectual and moral susceptibilities; to insist upon following out, as they
say, to their logical consequences, the notices of some single organ of the
spiritual nature; a proceeding which perhaps is hardly more sensible in the
grown man than it would be in the infant to refuse to correct the sensations
of sight by those of the touch. (1266)
E. J. Clery describes eighteenth-century rhetoric as gendered in the feminization debate
that negotiated civic humanism‟s view of virtue as masculine and corruption as feminine
(6) and its opponents‟ attempt to rewrite national progress as positive and feminine (12).
The opponents to the civic humanism argument that equated the feminine with corrupt
progress and national degradation connect femininity in their discourse to economic
innovation by suggesting that true masculinity and therefore civilization requires treating
women as equal because of their weaker state (6). Feminization became linked with
characterizations gained by women‟s influence, as Clery notes, such as “sociability,
civility, compassion, domesticity and love of family, the dynamic exercise of the passions
and, above all, refinement, the mark of modernity” (10). Clery, using Thomas Laqueur‟s
work, explains that gender had a central place in eighteenth-century rhetoric because the
conception of gender as a one-sex model, in which women were lesser forms of men,
changed to a two-sex model (10). Thus, understanding women as separate from a male
continuum provided a way to consider femininity as a positive natural attribute (Clery
11).
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Atrophy, exanination!
Duty!—
Yea, by duty‟s prime condition,
Pure nonentity of duty! (39-44)
Ironically, the performance of social norms alienates the individual, while a life of
noncompliance returns the individual to real living, which can bond people together in a
healthier community.
Matthew Arnold, too, argues for a dynamic poetry that responds to real life
(1853). He laments the disappearance of “the disinterested objectivity” and the
introduction of “the dialogue of the mind with itself” (1270). For Arnold, losing
“disinterested objectivity” means losing the “particular, precise, and firm” for “a
representation which is general, indeterminate and faint” (1270). Poetry‟s function in
society is to bring joy through representing actions:
The Poet, then, has in the first place to select an excellent action; and what
actions are the most excellent? Those, certainly, which most powerfully
appeal to the great primary human affections: to those elementary feelings
which subsist permanently in the race, and which are independent of time.
(1272)
Art should emanate from the action of real lives in order to uplift society.24 In this way,
the particular experiences of humans translate to the general stories of humanity, the

24

Arnold‟s poetry often does not reveal the same optimism. Poems like “Dover
Beach” and “The Buried Life” suggest that beneath the social bonds to which we cling
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narratives that swell into myth, inspiring and directing those to come. “The dialogue of
the mind with itself,” by contrast, spins poetry centrifugally downward into the
individual‟s psyche, into the nuances of idiosyncratic particulars.25 Walter Bagehot
decidedly agrees with Arnold, claiming that “the business of the poet, of the artist, is with
types; and those types are mirrored in reality” (1312). Poets are to “describe what is in
them, but not peculiar to them—what is generic, not what is special and individual”
(1312). Browning represents Bagehot‟s category of grotesque literature because his
poetry “takes the type, so to say, in difficulties” (1316). Hallam, Ruskin, Clough, Arnold,
and Bagehot all express grave concerns about poetry‟s progress into the individual mind,
into the realm of the subjective. At the same time, all five authors optimistically call
poets to use poetry to illustrate the individual‟s experience in order to bring attention to
the universal. This sort of universal vision encompasses the experiences of all people,
absorbing everything into a central unity. The ideal poet is both subjective and objective,
able to feel deeply and see clearly and capable of stepping outside of the particulars of his
or her life to connect experience to the rest of society. At this point, most poets and
lies a fundamental alienation we can never quite overcome, epitomized by “ignorant
armies clash[ing] by night” (37).
25
Armstrong compares Kant‟s and Arnold‟s approaches to the aesthetic:
Kant‟s category of the aesthetic, of course, is behind Arnold‟s grand style.
The freedom which subsists in the disinterested play of mind over the
object, its severance from the practical and instrumental, this is familiar
Kantian ground. Arnold‟s grand style, standing over and against morals
and religion but nevertheless being them, transcending the inessentials of
politics and passion, achieves the detachment of Kant‟s aesthetic while
associating it with ethics, something about which Kant was far more
doubtful. Indeed, Arnold‟s grand style is the aesthetic. It enacts the
aesthetic state, the end product, the work of art‟s results, rather than
working on the experiences which produce that result. Hence its concern
with effect. (211)
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critics seem to consider this sort of “double vision” necessary socially and possible
poetically.
The controversy regarding Dante Gabriel Rossetti‟s Jenny (1870) marks a shift in
the way critics evaluated the possibilities of objective poetry. Robert Buchanan argues in
“The Fleshly School of Poetry: Mr. D.G. Rossetti” (1871) that Jenny is too personal—too
subjective—while Rossetti responds in “The Stealthy School of Criticism” (1871) that he
was using a technique that would allow him to imagine another person‟s mind—thus
blending the subjective and objective. The “inner standing-point” (1343) Rossetti
advocates seems precisely at issue here. Buchanan doubts the possibility of objectivity
that allows an author to inhabit a character‟s mind while judging it from the outside. As
we have seen, when Rossetti read the last few lines of Browning‟s Fifine at the Fair, he
became “convinced that Browning had joined the conspiracy against him, and he flung
the book from him and broke off a friendship of twenty-five years‟ standing” (DeVane, A
Browning Handbook 366). Browning sharply censured Rossetti to Isa Blagden: „“Yes—I
have read Rossetti‟s poems,‟ he wrote Isa Blagden, „you know I hate the effeminacy of
his school, —the men that dress up like women, —that use obsolete forms, too, and
archaic accentuations to seem soft‟” (qtd. in Knoepflmacher 157). When Browning
responds through Fifine at the Fair (1872), he has changed his earlier stance on the
viability of blending objective and subjective art. He lays bare the mechanisms of
feigned objectivity through his use of the dramatic monologue in the poem, validating
Ruskin‟s fear of “the very objectivity of the object being lost in the abyss of this
subjectivity of the human” (1283).
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At the end of the Victorian period, a balance of objective and subjective art seems
no longer possible. Instead, the only truth available is in the particularities of the
individual‟s experience, especially in the concentrated expression of experience available
through an author‟s created character. Accordingly, critics such as Amy Levy and Alice
Meynell endorse the value of the subjective poet, especially the idiosyncratic, minor poet.
For example, Levy (1883) praises James Thomson thus:
He is distinctly what in our loose phraseology we call a minor poet; no
prophet, standing above and outside things to whom all sides of a truth
(more or less foreshortened, certainly) are visible; but a passionately
subjective being, with intense eyes fixed on one side of the solid polygon
of truth, and realizing that one side with a fervour and intensity to which
the philosopher with his birdseye view rarely attains. (1358)
The value of Thomson‟s work is his ability to tell a very subjective, internal, individual
truth. His pain—because it is his individual pain—reveals something previously
unknown about the human condition: “No, this is not the highest utterance, the word of
the great artist struggling towards completion; rather is it the under, courser cry of the
imperfect human being, crushed beneath a load which he is not formed to bear” (1361).
Levy values Thomson‟s poetry for the very same limited vision Ruskin would have seen
as flawed and socially useless.
Meynell explains that Tennyson‟s work has come to be seen as not subjective
enough (1917), while modern readers (in 1880) appreciate in Browning‟s poetry the
characteristics that Bagehot thought “grotesque” and considered evidence that Browning
“takes the type, so to say, in difficulties.” According to Meynell, Tennyson‟s “quality of
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ease, has come to be disregarded in our day” (1424); readers complain that Tennyson‟s
poetry reveals “too much show of the hiding of his art” (1425).26 Current readers want
authentic poetry—poetry too raw to be carefully sculpted—allowing them to participate
in the interpretive process. Readers “seem to find much merit in the manifest difficulty;
they will not have a key to turn though closely and tightly, in oiled wards; let the
reluctant iron catch and grind, or they would even prefer to pick you the lock” (1424).
By contrast, with Tennyson, “[i]t is not only, with him, that the wards are oiled, it is also
that the key turns loosely” (1424). The readers Meynell describes seem to find this ease
of interpretation unsatisfying personally and philosophically. To such readers,
Tennyson‟s poetry presents a truth that does not require the type of strenuous lock
picking they find necessary in their personal progression through lives experienced as a
series of formidable bolted doors.
Browning‟s strength comes from his willingness to respond to life as it is. In this
way, Browning represents a “scientific” mind, one able to remain steadfast in the goal of
testing out life‟s truths: “A mind less serene, whole, scientific, and independent might
oftener be touched, or hurt, or discouraged into seeking a lofty and lovely ideal which is
rare in his poetry. Not that Browning cannot conceive it, but that he is too closely and
intently at work with things as they are to attend to it” (1431). What seemed quite
subjective in Browning‟s poetry to Bagehot has become objective and scientific to
26

Tennyson‟s transparent aesthetic proves fundamentally British for Meynell. In
fact, his honesty sets him apart from other British poets and literary critics: “French
poetry in our Swinburne, of French criticism in our Arnold, Tennyson shows the effect of
nothing French whatever” (1425). Consequently, his British leadership compliments his
poetry, his work eschewing the temptations of other cultures and thereby strengthening
the nation.
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Meynell. While to some degree “greatly to be lamented,” his willingness to internalize
the act of writing poetry—to use obscure references and complicated rhythms—
authenticates his struggle with and through language. The readers can then join him in
the struggle, prying apart the phrases to get at some internal truth. So, in the later
decades of the Victorian period, literary critics estimate poetry‟s function differently than
did Clough, Arnold, and Ruskin in the middle of the century. Later critics still believe
that poetry should uplift the people, but the kind of objectivity previous critics considered
possible and positive—the sort that takes the reader through particular feelings and
validates universal experience—seems trite and idealistic now. The only truth is the one
individually experienced. Poetry binds these experiences together to portray a myriad of
truths, each authentic, and each verifiable through the process of interpretation. Writers
of the dramatic monologue develop models for subjective poetry by increasingly
experimenting with allusive methods and building upon the “different phases of passion
in one person [that] take the place of different characters” that Tennyson develops in
Maud. Later speakers are polyvocal, actually embodying different characters at once.
In these examples of literary criticism across the period, we can see the debate
progress. For Ruskin, subjective art seems simply idiosyncratic and socially immature,
objective art elevated to a sort of universal language that validates our experiences in the
world and bonds society. Then, suddenly, subjective art seems most real and reliable
because of its double authenticity. First, it portrays a real individual‟s experience of the
world, and next, it offers a different kind of verifiability through the experience of
interpretation. This movement from valuing the objective to praising the subjective
parallels the shift between what we have labeled High Victorian to fin de siècle
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aesthetics. A change in paradigm underpins this shift in aesthetic theories. Later critics
like Meynell and Levy think the world works differently. They do not accept the premise
that verifiability means a sort of universalizing principle—if I see correctly, what I see as
blue, everyone sees as blue. They do not accept that there is an a priori truth discovered
by the majority. Instead, objectivity results in distanced vision unnatural to the human
experience and therefore inauthentic. Thus, Meynell and Levy return to a framework like
Berkeley‟s—I can only rightly recognize the existence of the world around me through
my own senses. Likewise, they reject a priori truth for a system more akin to JeanFrançois Lyotard‟s decentralized network of relationships exemplified in petit récit.
In this way, late-Victorian poetry represents a sort of return to the individual.
However, the epistemological and ontological frameworks supporting these ideas have
changed dramatically. The subjective aesthetic elevated in Romantic poetry supports a
centralized system of inspiration, the point of contention being the source of that
inspiration and the means of its transmission—transcending or emanating—such as in
William Wordsworth‟s Ode: Intimations of Immortality and Samuel Taylor Coleridge‟s
Dejection: An Ode.27 The human heart, whether through joy or sympathy, works the

27

At the beginning of the Ode, Wordsworth describes his feeling of loss. He can
no longer connect to nature as he once could, and the tight rhyme scheme, combined with
the polyrhythmic form, emphasize the loss of connectedness to regular natural rhythm.
In stanzas one through four, the speaker endeavors to locate the problem, to determine
why for him “there hath pass‟d away a glory from the earth” (18). The fourth stanza ends
with the speaker‟s mournful cry: “Whither is fled the visionary gleam? / Where is it now,
the glory and the dream?” (56-57). Coleridge answers these questions in Dejection: An
Ode, a poem written mostly in iambic pentameter with an intricate rhyme scheme. Like
the speaker in the Ode, Coleridge‟s speaker wants nature to “startle this dull pain, and
make it move and live!” (20). The speaker responds to the weariness in the Ode,
sympathizing with the sense of loss, but then shifts and suggests, responding to
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same way for Coleridge and Wordsworth to connect the poet with natural meaning.
Carol T. Christ similarly explains this characteristic of Romantic poetry: “Because the
Romantics believed in the universality of the imagination, their creation of a poetry that
portrays the movement of the individual mind resulted in a particularity with a
correspondent universality” (12). For Coleridge, subjectivity is the position of a human
as part of a natural system always already linked to it through the capacity for joy. For
Wordsworth, subjectivity is transcendental connectivity to the divine.
By the time Walter Pater, Oscar Wilde, and Amy Levy are writing, the return to
the individual‟s experience has a different valence. The moment is not valued because of
the way it reveals Truth to the world, but because of the way it continuously captures and
elicits human experience. These “spots of time” hold meaning in their positivist, not
representative, value. Christ links Victorian subjectivity to Romantic subjectivity
through particularity: “The observation of minute particulars comes to signify both the
solipsism the Victorians feared and their last attempt to discover a universal order in the

Wordsworth directly (“O Edmund!” [25]), that “we receive but what we give” (48).
Inspiration emanates for Coleridge from internal joy, “the spirit and the pow‟r” (67) to
reflect on natural forms.
Wordsworth responds to Coleridge‟s conjecture about inspiration in the additional
seven stanzas of the Ode. Using neo-Platonic theory, Wordsworth suggests that as we
age, we drift away from our closeness to Heaven, shifting from the child he
apostrophizes, “Thou best Philosopher, who yet dost keep / Thy heritage, thou Eye
among the blind” (110-11), to the adult, the “Creature / Moving about in worlds not
realiz‟d” (147-48). When the closeness of Heaven drifts from the earth-bound body, it
leaves behind a “primal sympathy” (184) and through “human suffering” (187), we see
nature and feel the “[t]houghts that do often lie too deep for tears” (206). For
Wordsworth, “Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting” (58), and so the loss he has felt,
the sensitivity that has passed away from his experience of nature, is an unavoidable
change in subjectivity as his soul struggles to respond through the layers of humanity that
thicken with age.
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world of things” (13). I would like to argue that the way these observations occur reveals
a blending of various vantage points of poetic observation that result in multiplied
subjectivity. Decentralized subjectivity, if we return to the tripartite definition at the
beginning of this chapter, radically alters Romantic schemas of epistemology. In the
earlier definition, subjectivity assumes a centralized subject position. Here, it posits a
different model. The individual is still a subject in his or her own life and accepts
experience as the totality of the access to existence; however, experiences do not bond to
create a central representation of him or of her. Rather, the individual is the messy
conglomeration of different experiences, and thus, is multiple. Subject-hood multiplies
with different vantage points because there is no longer a Self central to the world.
Instead, subjectivity—one‟s reflection on one‟s own mind‟s process—splinters with
different experiences and interpretations of sense data. This is the beginning of a posthumanist philosophy later developed more fully in existentialist, post-structuralist, and
constructivist theories. It dominates fin de siècle poetry because as an aesthetic position,
it suggests that the only route to the world is through the individual‟s experience.
Objectivity and disinterestedness play no part here—there is only the sense experience of
the individual, the constant burning with a “hard, gem-like flame” (Pater 1353). The rest
of my project tracks this shift, including the models of subjectivity and objectivity
proffered by Victorian poets of the dramatic monologue.
Language itself is a continual balance between subjective and objective vantage
points. Through the relationship between a speaker and hearer, the dramatic monologue
portrays the way that communication requires imagining a hearer, someone who can
make meaning of the utterance. In fact, Amanda Anderson claims, “As a genre that
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displays at once the situatedness of speech and the solipsism of the individual speaker,
dramatic monologue often seeks to reveal the many distortions, imbalances, and
manipulations, both conscious and unconscious, that attend any speech act” (Tainted
141). The critical history of theories about the relationship between speaker and
interlocutor stretches from the nineteenth century into our own time. For Mikhail
Mikhaǐlovich Bakhtin, language presupposes hearer and superaddressee. The stages of
objectification include 1) expression: the actualization of consciousness and 2) reflecting
the attitude of ourselves as objects. Outsidedness happens in self-reflexivity, or selfobjectification:
To express oneself means to make oneself an object for another and for
oneself (“the actualization of consciousness”). This is the first step in
objectification. But it is also possible to reflect our attitude toward
ourselves as objects (second stage of objectification). In this case, our
own discourse becomes an object and acquires a second—its own—voice.
(110)
Likewise, for Emmanuel Levinas, language “presupposes interlocutors, a plurality”:
This discourse is therefore not the unfolding of a prefabricated internal
logic, but the constitution of truth in a struggle between thinkers, with all
the risks of freedom. The relationship of language implies transcendence,
radical separation, the strangeness of the interlocutors, the revelation of
the other to me. In other words, language is spoken where community
between the terms of the relationship is wanting, where the common plane
is wanting or is yet to be constituted. It takes place in this transcendence.
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Discourse is thus the experience of something absolutely foreign, a pure
“knowledge” or “experience,” a traumatism of astonishment. (73)
This model resembles Bakhtin‟s in the way language requires entering into a relationship.
According to Steven Hendley, Habermas shares the sense of language requiring a self,
other, and third party, which for him, leads to the groundwork for justice (21). Victorian
poets seem to understand language‟s power in similar terms. Through the experience of
communicating, the speaker in a dramatic monologue must recognize the existence of the
hearer and superaddressee, to use Bakhtin‟s language—the others who make meaning of
the communication. Perhaps building upon Habermas and Bakhtin, W. David Shaw
identifies in his description of the monologue‟s double irony a similar dynamic in
monologue form, which contains an other, who functions as a censor, and a third person:
“But what if the process if destabilized? If I subdue the Third who subdues the Other,
does the Other still subdue me or do I subdue the Other? Can the god Setebos whom the
Quiet overthrows still subdue Browning‟s Caliban, or is Caliban now able to subdue
Setebos and other authority figures like Prospero?” (“Masks of the Unconscious” 441).
Victorian poets gravitate to the dramatic monologue because it allows them to construct
language relationships that reveal modes of subjectivity and that dramatize their ethical
concerns.
The poet takes part in the relationships with the reader, multiplying the
possibilities of the language games. The double helix structure of subjectivity and
objectivity in the dramatic monologue makes it an ideal medium for dramatizing the
theories of epistemology Victorian literary critics find so important. For the critics, these
theories offer new purpose to poetry, claiming for it a central place in the development of
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modern society. As we shall see in the next chapter, the Magdalen character allows poets
to emphasize the tensions between subjectivity and objectivity that makes the monologue
a powerful tool for exploring and dramatizing models of subjectivity and modes of
ethical relationships.
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Chapter Two:
“Proud Mary‟s Gone Mad”:
Magdalen and the Monologue
When the title character in William Blake‟s “Mary” puts on simple clothing to
defuse the growing jealousy in her community, a child exclaims, “Proud Marys gone
Mad” (33). Although she tries to avoid being the “Angel” (5) or the “whore” (17), Mary
is caught within the townspeople‟s characterizations of her. The poem ends with “proud
Mary” in a state of madness, unable to find an identity in which she feels powerful but
still accepted. Later in the nineteenth century, in the moment when a palpable shift
occurred between valuing objective art and subjective art, poets using the dramatic
monologue began to experiment with the Magdalen character, who often assumed the
role of the speaker, dramatizing a powerful shift from object to subject. The Victorians
inherited the Romantics‟ fascination with Mary figures. The dual figures of Madonna
and Magdalen, depicted by Blake, among others, reappear in Tennyson‟s “Mariana” and
Maud, Rossetti‟s Jenny, Browning‟s Fifine at the Fair, Webster‟s “A Castaway,” and
then, in later years, in Michael Field‟s “The Magdalen,” Amy Levy‟s “Magdalen,” and
Charlotte Mew‟s “Ne Me Tangito” and “Madeleine in Church.” Tracking these poetic
configurations in the late Victorian period, I will demonstrate how these poetic
conversations directed the evolution of Victorian literary criticism.
Victorian writers inheriting Romantic representations of the complex Magdalen
character interpret the solution differently. Rather than portraying women lost in a search
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for identity and surrounded by distorted images of their femininity, later poets reveal how
agency is possible through the negotiation of these gendered discourses of identity. This
realization comes in the 1870s to poets like Levy and Mew after a conversation between
Rossetti, Browning, and Webster about the Magdalen character and the nature of
subjectivity. Because these chapters are organized by conversation, not chronology, the
first conversation does not fully take place before the second one. Rather, this first
conversation provides a frame for the second one. It provides a broad view of the
development of the Magdalen figure, but it also deviates from the second conversation in
the chosen depictions of this figure in the monologue. Through the next conversation,
Webster, Rossetti, and Browning created a model for contrasubjectivity. I am defining
contrasubjectivity as a process of self-consciousness in which people define themselves
through contrast, positing their humanity against another person‟s. I would like to focus
here both on an early form of multiple subject positions through the character of Mary
and on the ways late Victorian writers reinvent a new form of intersubjectivity, in which
people understand themselves so intimately tied to other people that they internalize other
voices and build their self-conceptions from a series of social discourses.
The multifaceted Magdalen character has featured in a variety of narratives
throughout its history. It originated in the New Testament in stories that gave rise to a
Victorian reincarnation as the female sinner. Susan Haskins explains,
With the disappearance of . . . “heretical” writings, Mary Magdalen,
heroine of the Gnostics, chief disciple, “companion to the Saviour,” his
“spouse,” “consort,” and “partner,” vanished too, to re-emerge in orthodox
eyes briefly as a witness to the resurrection, and “apostle to the apostles,”
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but, more significantly for the history of Christianity, and women, more
enduringly as a repentant whore. (57)
Mary of Magdala remains an extremely controversial figure, especially because of the
Gospel of Mary of Magdala, a Gnostic text. The name of Magdala, a town on the Sea of
Galilee (“Magdalen”), describes the town‟s fortifications. “Magdĕlā” is Aramaic for
“tower.” Mary Magdalen‟s first name links her, of course, to another central female
figure in the New Testament, Jesus‟s mother. Although most scholars do not believe that
the historical Mary Magdalen depicted in the gospels was a prostitute, the medieval
authors and the Victorians certainly saw her this way. Her connection by name to the
Virgin Mary served them in two ways: 1) it clarified the differences between the women,
with virginity as the ultimate foil to sexual depravity and 2) it suggested that holiness was
possible for the fallen woman because, after all, she shares Mary‟s name and her capacity
for spiritual vision. However, her ability to change—to become a type of the Virgin
Mary—was very much at issue. As Amanda Anderson explains, many prominent
Victorians debated whether the fallen woman could be rescued, as William Acton argued,
or whether “prostitution itself [was] an extensive economic and social system, into which
the fallen woman was entirely absorbed” (Tainted 49). As if to distance “Mary” from
“Magdalen,” common usage cut off “Mary” altogether. Through the long period
spanning the history of this character, the Aramaic word for “tower,” then, effectively
became the word for “prostitute.”
We might read this fascinating shift in a number of ways. For example, the
Magdalen is an overt monument to impropriety, a tower of sin. At the same time, the
Magdalen is a woman ironically without protection, without the tower to protect the
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maiden from lusty suitors. In this reading, the Magdalen subverts the image her name
represents. She escapes from the tower, the place of normative power and protection,
creating her own system of support blatantly in opposition to the norm, economically and
morally. Some critics, like Felicity Nussbaum—writing about the eighteenth century—
have read the prostitute thus, as an economic free agent who subverts patriarchal
narratives delineating acceptable means of economic gain and the uses of the body.
Although many Victorians instead saw the Magdalen as the woman in distress, needing
help to re-ascend to her lofty place as pious, chaste, Victorian woman, some poets used
the Magdalen figure in way that resembles Nussbaum‟s formulation, by creating a space
for non-normativity, a competing tower providing an outsider‟s perspective of normative
Victorian power.
Because of her involvement in the sale of her body, describing the Magdalen
figure as a social agent proves complicated. Can a woman who objectifies herself find a
new subjective position through her objectification? Can a woman step outside of a
dominant system using the system‟s definition of her, or has her subjectivity already been
shaped absolutely by this system? 28 Poetic responses to these questions vary, but the
extreme example of the woman whose symbolic value is enmeshed in important religious
types and whose body has commercial value certainly exemplifies shifting ideas of
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Anderson addresses this issue in more detail in Tainted Souls and Painted
Faces. In this text, she
demonstrate[s] [that] the discourses on fallenness, which clearly serve to
codify behaviors, negotiate political threats, and wage political protest,
also constitute an intricate and overdetermined engagement with some of
the most vital and consequential Victorian ideas about agency,
representation, and social transformation. (6)
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subjectivity and objectivity. Defining the agency possible for any individual proves
challenging. A short statement about agency and subjectivity will help to clarify my
approach to the Magdalen figure, an approach that reflects a modified position between
poststructuralism and liberal feminism. Building upon the work of Beauvoir, Foucault,
and Butler, among others, we could argue that the social forces surrounding us shape our
subjectivity, truly rendering us subjected. However, building upon the work of Cixous,
Rich, hooks, and Freire, we could also argue that individuals can find ways to mediate
these forces, to navigate the possible paths of action and thought, in order to find some
agency. The history of the Magdalen figure I will chart runs somewhat similarly. For
Blake, Mary‟s madness is her escape from the bounds of the social forces that determine
her social value and, eventually, her understanding of herself. By contrast, Levy and
Mew endow Magdalen with the power to see these forces and to navigate them. She has
the power to rise above the possible narratives of her identity and to manipulate and
exploit them.29
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In reading the Magdalen character in this way, I am building upon Anderson‟s
argument about Victorian prostitution. She explains,
If feminine virtue could symbolize or help promote normative models of
inherent, autonomous, or self-regulating identity, fallenness represented
manifold challenges to those models and did not bespeak simply a form of
aggressivity or sexuality that threatened to disrupt a symbolic purity.
Moreover, the relation between the categories of purity and fallenness
took highly complex forms, with purity sometimes figuring and shoring up
coherent, normative forms of identity, sometimes figuring alternate or
ideal conceptions of identity, and sometimes displaying—as selflessness
or sympathy—the attribute of attenuated agency that typically defines
fallenness. (Tainted 15)
I am most interested in the monologue‟s capability of portraying such “alternate or ideal
conceptions of identity.” Anderson claims that the monologue “invites one to analyze
intersubjective relations between the lines, so to speak, and here provides the opportunity
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My theoretical framework also builds upon Pierre Bourdieu‟s work with “body
hexis.” As cultural notions of ontology changed in the Victorian period—with
constructivist theories battling religious teleological theories of being—more character
types became possible. The individual could find agency in the extent to which he or she
could negotiate and modify these new types. For Bourdieu, “hexis” comprises
communication through multiple signifying gestures, such as clothing choice, dialect,
pronunciation, behavior, and language use. He explains,
The close correspondence between the uses of the body, of language, and
no doubt also of time is due to the fact that it is essentially through bodily
and linguistic disciplines and censorships, which often imply a temporal
rule, that groups inculcate the virtues which are the transfigured form of
their necessity, and to the fact that the “choices” constitutive of a
relationship with the economic and social world are incorporated in the
form of durable frames that are partly beyond the grasp of consciousness
and will. (89)
Virtues, then, are communicated through behavioral norms that represent pathways to
social and economic worth in a community and become themselves cultural capital. For
this reason, I have paired my readings of the complex performances of Magdalen
characters in late Victorian monologues with corresponding visual representations.
These images help to reveal the discourses of femininity the speakers negotiate. Frank

to show with particular vividness the several ways projected anxieties about agency
overpower encounters with fallen women” (Tainted 141). In this chapter, I will examine
such anxieties through the work of women poets.
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Mort calls for “accounts of how these resistances [gendered modes of understanding sex]
were formed just as complex as our work on official discourse” (6). He cautions,
“Resistances did not just drop from the sky, nor were they formed by spontaneous
eruptions from below. They were dependent on the languages available, which could
endow such struggles with meaning” (6). I will begin to delineate the “languages
available” in monologues featuring Magdalen in order to develop a nuanced account of
the changing theories of subjectivity. For Victorian women living in the midst of cultural
change and confronted with competing definitions of their physical, emotional, and
intellectual abilities, Madonna and Magdalen could embody at once traditional norms for
women‟s successes or failures and subversive power possible by redefining those norms.
Among the numerous examples of the Magdalen figure in Victorian art and
literature, I will focus on those in monologues by women at the end of the period, when
many of the movements for women‟s rights were being realized. The form allowed these
poets to portray complicated accounts of women‟s power, especially in the intersection
points between agency and objectification. The form allowed them to explore how
subjectivity functions in this vexed environment in which women had little access to
agency, but they navigated the avenues to power available to them through what agency
they had and through their limited, but sometimes strangely liberating, objectification.
Particularly influential to Victorian writers, Romantic writers like Blake used the figure
to examine a multiplicity of female identities, which they portrayed through poetry and
painting. Bradley and Cooper, writing as “Michael Field,” built upon Blake‟s work
through a series of ekphrastic poems that reveal the loss of vitality in the biblical
Magdalen. Through the structure of these poems, Bradley and Cooper distanced the
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reader from the mind of the Magdalen character, creating a subjective emptiness that
Levy and Mew later filled when they rewrote Magdalen poems from the Magdalen‟s
perspective. Levy and Mew returned to the multiple subject positions Blake created;
however, rather than multiplying her body, they internalized the positions in the
Magdalen speaker‟s subjectivity. In this way, poetry both responded to and guided the
critical conversations described in the previous chapter. As Victorian literary criticism
moved from valuing ethical objectivity to valuing the authenticity of subject positions,
Victorian poetry moved from objectively evaluating the Magdalen as social pariah and as
sex symbol to subjectively portraying the Magdalen‟s mind.

Blake‟s “Maries”:
Inherited Traditions of the Magdalen Figure
Blake actively engaged in the aesthetic discourse about androgyny in the late
eighteenth century by depicting bodies that split and coalesce. As Thomas Laqueur has
explained, the debate about whether androgyny could occur without violently subsuming
one ego into another corresponds to ongoing debates in the period about the nature of
gender and sexual difference. However, Laqueur argues that the one-sex and two-sex
models co-existed in the nineteenth century, creating ethical debates corresponding to
these paradigm shifts (193):
I will argue here that [the two-sex model] was produced through endless
micro-confrontations over power in the public and private spheres. These
confrontations occurred in the vast new spaces opened up by the
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intellectual, economic, and political revolutions of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. They were fought in terms of sex-determinant
characteristics of male and female bodies because the truths of biology
had replaced divinely ordained hierarchies of immemorial custom as the
basis for the creation and distribution of power in relations between men
and women. But not all confrontations of sex and gender were fought on
this ground, and one-sex thinking flourished still. The play of difference
never came to rest. (193)
As we have seen, such shifting discourses about gender threatened the stability of models
of subjectivity, precipitating the experimentation this project traces. Because these
heated discussions of the Romantic period resulted in the Victorian movements for social
justice for women, it is important to note how poetry participated in them. When lateVictorian poets like Mew and Levy brought innovations to the Magdalen tradition, they
clearly built upon Blake‟s work. Their modifications reveal the new model of
subjectivity they offered through these poems.
Many critics of the Romantic period contend that the very notion of androgyny
privileges males and places women as Other, “an idealized mother, a second self, a
submerged double, an inspirational muse or mentor, or a demoniac femme fatale,” as
Diane Hoeveler describes her (2).30 Alicia Ostriker argues that Blake‟s androgyny
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In 1981, Hoeveler referred to the “ideal of androgyny” (qtd. in Vesely 10), and
her recognition of androgyny‟s inherent sexism, in its subsuming the feminine into the
male, represents the change in the greater debate by feminists about Romantic androgyny.
For more discussion on Blake and androgyny, also see Tom Hayes‟s “William Blake‟s
Androgynous Ego-Ideal.”
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presents the desire for containment and erasure of female identities (Connolly ix).
Blake‟s emanations and spectres do seem to follow a binary pattern of male normativity
and female alterity. However, Blake also seems to have worked to maintain individual
identity. After all, his multiplied bodies reify the sense of continual Otherness; his
literary and artistic projects reinforce schism and difference.31 In Blake‟s texts,
humanity‟s post-lapsarian split into gendered identities creates the need for an ego-ideal.
In facing the Other from the splintered position of a gendered identity (in the two-sex
model), one gains a further division of identity—a pluralism that results from one‟s
inability to conceive of the Other—creating subject wholeness through multiplicity.32
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Connolly historicizes Blake‟s language related to incorporation. She argues
that the cosmic language related to Albion reinforces, as Dörrbecker explains, an
eighteenth-century conception of plants and comets with sunspots originated in solar
volcanoes (156). Connolly connects this belief to the idea of androgyny, and the
possibility that “once separated those bodies can forget their derivative origin and claim
primacy” (156). See William Blake and the Body for a thorough discussion of these
issues.
32
These multiple subject positions permeate Blake‟s textual and visual work,
reinforcing his belief in multiplicity as symptomatic of human existence and necessary
for his poetic vision. Blake responds to the gender rhetoric of his day, in which the
female body can become Other in the two-sex model and national identity further shatters
into gendered discourse, by envisioning aesthetic, spiritual, and national unification that
preserves the autonomy of the individual. In The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, as Mary
Lynn Johnson and John E. Grant explain, “the chief idea in Blake‟s counter-system is the
expansion of sense perception” (82), what they call “a vision of infinity” (82). The
preface to Milton reinforces the notion of incorporation and eternity by stating that Jesus
provides “Worlds of Eternity” that one can reach through Imagination (1.20). Likewise,
in Jerusalem, the speaker refers to Imagination as portal to Eternity and multiplicity, and
as his “great task” (5.17): “To open the Eternal Worlds, to open the immortal Eyes / Of
man inwards into the Worlds of Thought: into Eternity / Ever expanding in the Bosom of
God, the Human Imagination” (5.18-20). The ideal incorporative figure, Jesus, contains
both multitudes and subject wholeness: “we live as One Man; for contracting our infinite
sense / We behold multitude; or expanding: we behold as one” (Jerusalem 38.17-18).
Although human multiplicity— such as in the genders—is symptomatic of fallenness for
Blake, it also provides a glimpse of the infinite in the expanse of multiplied finites.
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Blake‟s two versions of “The Entombment,” Numbers 143 and 144 from his
Illustrations to the Bible, vary in revealing ways. In Number 143, painted with tempera
on canvas, darkness shadows most of the characters‟ faces. A male figure—Nicodemus,
according to a note in the text—stands in the center above the coffin, flanked by two
women. The figures around the coffin curl toward the floor, clutching their knees, with
their faces cast downward. In Number 144, drawn with pen and painted with watercolor,
the central male figure is no longer present. Instead, three women stand in this central
location, looking down at the coffin. In this painting, the central female figure has her
face covered mysteriously, with a candle highlighting the shadows on her face. The faces
of the females on either side of her are fully exposed. The characters around the coffin
stand and are well lit. Blake develops a narrative about gender and enlightenment
through the two visual texts, which differ in their portrayal of the mood of the
entombment, the reactions of those present, and the gender of the central figure.
Perhaps we can attribute the difference in color to the fact that the tempera does
not seem to age as well as the watercolor and seems darker in nature. However, the
positions of the characters are so different that it seems that Blake used these versions to
Thus, multiplication represents fallenness, division, and the finite, and provides an
image of incorporation, unity, and infinity. Division through multiplication enables
vision. Similarly, the argument of The Marriage of Heaven and Hell states, “Without
Contraries is no progression” (3.6). Thus, the divisiveness and perhaps destructiveness in
Blake‟s poems provides the glimpse of infinity. The demonic narrator explains that he
prints “in the infernal method … melting apparent surfaces away, and displaying the
infinite which was hid” (14.9-11). The womb provides a female space in Milton, that
simultaneously contains and expands perception: “The nature of a Female Space is this: it
shrinks the Organs / Of Life till they become Finite & Itself seems Infinite” (10.6-7).
Similarly, the story of Milton ends in the search for a space for the incorporation of
Milton and his six-fold emanation, and their incorporation results in Jesus (Johnson and
Grant 235).
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Fig. 4: Blake’s The Entombment, Number 143

Fig. 5: Blake’s The Entombment, Number 144
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create multiple meanings through multiple bodies at Jesus‟s entombment. The addition
of a mysterious female with a candle and the classical body shapes of the figures create a
sense of hope in the second version of the entombment. Blake adds to the Bible‟s
account a triune woman who carries with her the spiritual knowledge the people in
Number 143 weep to have lost. Although the central female‟s face remains hidden
beneath the veil, her light brightens the room, including the face of Jesus. When one
scans the image from left to right, one sees the triune woman first, then Jesus. Jesus‟s
body faces the other direction in Number 143, so one sees Jesus‟s face and then the
patriarchal male‟s. Details in the image, such as the man‟s beard in Number 143 and the
white light‟s reflection on the veiled woman‟s chin in Number 144, create intertextual
coherency linking the two images, doubling them further. Thus, the images multiply the
meanings of the Bible‟s accounts of Jesus‟s entombment, the female characters in
Number 144 seem to form one body, and the triune characters link both pieces visually.
In this way, Blake uses multiple images in his Entombment series to emphasize the
spiritual enlightenment through multiple meanings, rather than only through one metasystem. The womb-like structure of the tomb is the liminal space of Jesus‟s spiritual
transformation and the space for the intermixing of bodies and of meanings.
Women presented for Blake the fundamental bodies by which to express selfannihilation. In Levinasian theory, this act is the shattering of ego that occurs when
considering the Other, or God.33 For Blake, the female symbolized the power to break

33

To escape the earthly body in Levinas‟s theory, one must engage in selfannihilation. Levinas uses the tradition of death as a state of nothingness to underpin his
ideas about fear, especially that the fear of death equates to the fear of the Other
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subject positions through her Otherness and through her embodiment of replication and
difference.34 The three Mary characters—also featuring in The Three Maries at the
Sepulchre—typify this multiplication of beings and the power of the womb to provide
profusion of meaning. Blake revealingly titles this painting The Three Maries, not The
Three Marys. In other words, we might read this title as a plural form of “Mary”
(“Maries”). In this case, he uses this plural form to posit simultaneously the unity of their
names and the plurality of their typological representation. The women are all types of
Mary, joined in an ideological system. His portrayal of multiple Marys was not the first;
Haskins explains that before the Middle Ages, two Marys were the norm, and afterwards,
three Marys became traditional in Christian iconography (61). Two unusual features of
Blake‟s Maries are the inclusion of the more complicated tradition of Mary Magdalen as
an Apostle—the carrier of the light—rather than the representation of her as the repenting

overtaking one‟s life, not the fear of the loss of ego (232-33). As Levinas explains it,
“the negation of the I by the self is precisely one of the modes of identification of the I”
(37). In Milton, Milton calls his Negation an “Incrustation over my Immortal / Spirit”
(40.35-6). Self-annihilation must occur for one to obtain a greater knowledge of the
soul—for Levinas, a greater understanding of obligation. This can also be seen in
Blake‟s use of the idea of circumcision as a “cutting away [of] the surface to reveal what
is hidden” (Johnson and Grant 336). Patricia Beal describes self-annihilation in Blake‟s
poetry as “a process that requires that the subject both approach and resist the erotic
object as it is manifested in the two females” (78). She argues that Blake‟s characters
must endure self-annihilation to gain “the capacity to maintain plasticity in relation to the
empirical world and to experience what [Beal calls] „transcendental eros‟” (78). For
Beal, the womb image represents simultaneous wholeness and emptiness: “The womb
serves as protection from the void. The knowledge that a void lies at the center of one‟s
system of meaning or one‟s identity must be hidden” (87). See Richard Boothby‟s work
for more discussion of the death drive and self-annihilation.
34
See Irene Taylor‟s “The Woman Scaly” for an elegant account of Blake‟s
approach to the female body, the Female Will, and Human Forms.
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Fig. 6: Blake’s The Three Maries at the Sepulchre, Number 149
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sinner, and the manipulation of the characters‟ gender through the visual echoes between
Mary and the bearded man. The three women, identically dressed and positioned, look
fearfully at a male angel who apparently explains the open tomb door. Because Mary
gave birth to a part human, part spiritual being within the Christian story, her womb
intermixes the physical and spiritual. Blake draws the viewer‟s attention to this circular
space of intermixing through the arced doorway of painting Number 144, which takes the
viewer‟s eye down to the three spherical urns at the women‟s feet. Blake heightens the
sense of spiritual procreation in the three characters of Mary, the three versions of
femininity.
This sort of liminality promises symbolic freedom through the dislocation of signs
from signifiers and the self from socially constructed identity. Blake drew the biblical
illustrations between 1799 and 1810 (Keynes ix). He wrote “Mary” around the same
time, at least as early as 1803 (Johnson and Grant 201).35 In “Mary” (see Appendix A),36
the title character faces many different social expectations for her and experiences a crisis
of identity. Even the title of the piece complicates the notion of autonomy. If one by
name becomes a type of Mary and thus becomes located within the myth of Jesus‟s birth
and resulting stereotypes of virginal femininity, every action one takes has already been
evaluated by a cultural norm regulated by the signification of a name.37 Although

According to David V. Erdman, “Mary” was included in “a collection made for
some friend or patron” now known as the Pickering Manuscript because of its owner in
1866, B. M. Pickering (859).
36
I have used Erdman‟s version of the poem.
37
Similarly, Diana Hume George explains, “Blake‟s portrayals of women … are
problems of symbol formation that express themselves in the limitations of language”
(qtd. in Connolly x).
35

82
Blake‟s earlier use of multiplied Marys proves hopeful, the woman facing such
replication must fight to maintain a subject position. As we shall see, Mary cannot
escape the deterministic symbolic spaces in which her society tries to transfix her.38
The poem begins in the ballroom, where she quickly gains everyone‟s attention:
Sweet Mary the first time she ever was there
Came into the Ball room among the Fair
The young Men & Maidens around her throng
And these are the words upon every tongue
An Angel is here from the heavenly Climes
Or again does return the Golden times
Her eyes outshine every brilliant ray
She opens her lips tis the Month of May (1-8)
However, this praise soon and inexplicably turns to jealousy. Mary must struggle to
adapt to a confusing social situation in which the villagers‟ representations of her are
always changing:
Some said she was proud some calld her a whore
And some when she passed by shut to the door
A damp cold came oer her her blushes all fled
Her lilies & roses are blighted & shed (17-20, sic)

38

According to G. E. Bentley, Blake might have written this poem with Mary
Wollstonecraft in mind: “It has been suggested frequently that „Mary‟ is in some sense a
reflection of Mary Wollstonecraft” (349). Bentley links the poem to Wollstonecraft‟s
Maria, or The Wrongs of Woman.
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When she endeavors to “humble [her] Beauty” (29), she receives worse treatment: a child
calls her “Mad” (33), and “she [comes] home in Evening bespatterd with mire” (36).
Through depicting the torment of a beautiful woman scorned by envious people, Blake
explores the destructive power of society‟s representation of the individual. At first, the
villagers‟ descriptions of her inscribe Mary as an Angel, an ideal Greek woman, the sun,
and the spring. This metonymic movement of signifiers entraps Mary in a system of
replicated representation that prevents any true public effusion of her self. “Mary”
describes a Christian womanly ideal and it further reflects a system of representation tied
up in symbols of representation (“weak as a Lamb & smooth as a Dove” [25]). Caught
within this network of signification, Mary spirals into a sort of madness, perhaps
realizing that her self is merely a collection of signifiers with no true center:
She trembled & wept sitting on the Bed side
She forgot it was Night & she trembled & cried
She forgot it was Night she forgot it was Morn
Her soft Memory imprinted with Faces of Scorn
With Faces of Scorn & with Eyes of disdain
Like foul Fiends inhabiting Marys mild Brain
She remembers no Face like the Human Divine
All Faces have Envy sweet Mary but thine
And thine is a Face of sweet Love in Despair
And thine is a Face of mild sorrow & care
And thine is a Face of wild terror & fear
That shall never be quiet till laid on its bier (37-48)
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She cannot find a means by which to understand herself outside of these systems of
signification that move metonymically away from an individual human located in a
particular time. Mary receives her traits from the villagers, from cultural traditions, from
her name, and from the speaker‟s description of her. Her identity multiplies and
dissolves with each of her encounters.
Mary “remembers no Face like the Human Divine” (43), but the trouble with
memory lies in the difficulties of representing ideas. Even this line (43) reflects
language‟s inherent ambiguity.39 It could describe Mary‟s inability to remember any
faces that approach the Human Divine, or her inability to remember any faces but the
Human Divine‟s. The last twelve lines pile onto each other with a series of commas and
semicolons, metonymically linked by this punctuation. The reader must allow the lines
to move laterally into some meaning. For instance, the reader must make sense of
consecutive, but disparate lines: “She remembers no Face like the Human Divine” (43)
and “All Faces have Envy sweet Mary but thine” (44). The reader links the faces in the
two lines, but the lines do not build logically. After all, seeing envious faces does not
necessarily cause lack of memory. The lines shift from third person to second person
39

Blake infuses his texts with liminality in order to create generative spaces that
portray elements of gender embodiment. Using Victor Turner‟s anthropological work,
Bryan C. Nudelman writes about liminality in Blake‟s writing, especially how liminality
functions in ceremonies to create a separation between participants and society (35).
Liminality, according to Turner, creates “a blurring of social distinctions” (qtd. in
Nudelman 35) and it provides a space for “„the doffing of masks, the stripping of
statuses, the renunciation of roles‟ and the „demolishing of structures‟” (qtd. in Nudelman
37). Nudelman argues that Blake uses liminal spaces in order to “put forth an original
image of revolution born out of the freedom the space provides” (35). Part of this
“doffing of masks,” perhaps, is the joining of bodies in Blake‟s work. Vesely contends
that this process occurs in a non-sexist way as both sexes learn how to rid themselves of a
rationality that obscures their vision (33).
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within this long, three-stanza sentence, which further complicates the lines‟ meanings.
The poem moves through ideas metonymically, laterally, from signifier to signifier,
dramatizing Mary‟s impossible search for a central identity.
The poem further emphasizes replication in the repetition built into the lines,
linking it to Blake‟s replicated Marys in The Three Maries. Lines ten and thirteen—
which both contain the phrase “the joys of the night”—depict the moment when Mary
leaves the ballroom and her public judgment shifts from positive to negative and from a
limited audience to the general population. This repetition accents the outward
movement of gossip about Mary and the subsequent creation of Mary‟s socially located
identity. In lines twenty-six and twenty-seven, the phrase “raise Envy” repeats when
Mary defines herself according to Christian doctrine and social norms:
To be weak as a Lamb & smooth as a Dove
And not to raise Envy is calld Christian love
But if you raise Envy your Merits to blame
For planting such spite in the weak & the tame (26-29)
These self-definitions thus seem destined to fail. When they do fail and the village still
ridicules her, Mary loses the possibility of agency through self-definition because all such
avenues have been closed to her. This trauma destroys Mary‟s stable knowledge of the
world. The phrase “She forgot it was Night” repeats in lines thirty-eight and thirty-nine
and “she forgot it was Morn” echoes it in line thirty-nine. In this climactic moment of
realization, Mary loses teleological understanding of all time, including any coherent
narrative of her history. Social norms provide her with means to interact with the Other
in a common language of signification, but when this process fails, she finds herself cut
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off. In every experience with the Other, Mary attempts to fit herself into ideological roles
that will successfully win her a socially recognized selfhood. The failure of her attempts
calls into question the cultural norms of identification and the viability of signifying any
central truths of being. Pluralism, such as the broken self that Levinas describes, seems
inevitable when facing the Other. Although multiplied subject positions disrupt unitary
identity, perhaps this pluralized self represents to Blake an ideal in a fallen world. At
least a multiplied subject position offers broader vision and a multi-faceted identity.40
The speaker‟s description of Mary‟s face spirals from “sweet Love in Despair”
(45) to “wild terror & fear” (47) and continues to define Mary‟s corporeal reality in terms
of social norms and literary tropes. Shifting to second person, the lines attempt to figure
Mary‟s face in terms of emotions. Mary‟s portrait may lack envy, but it contains the
horror of alienation that the speaker claims she can only escape in death. Ideally, the
speaker‟s description would finally figure Mary‟s individuality and give shape to the
Selfhood she seeks. However, the descriptions of her face fit traditional gender
characteristics of the suffering female and, as if to accentuate the literary precedents for
Mary‟s figuring, the speaker‟s vision of her freedom from despair and terror only
includes her silenced, dead body. The poem‟s language itself traps Mary‟s identity
within a linguistic order of signification, forming and replicating her identity through
40

Although Levinas‟s philosophies differ from Blake‟s in many ways, they both
share a similar notion of envisioning infinity. Levinas explains that “multiplicity is a fall
of the One or the Infinite, a diminution in being which each of the multiple beings would
have to surmount so as to return from the multiple to the One, from the finite to the
Infinite” (Totality 292). This movement from the multiple to One, embodied in many of
Blake‟s works in Jesus, comprises Blake‟s artistic project. If “Without Contraries is no
progression” (Marriage of Heaven and Hell 3.6), without multiplication there is no
incorporation; without finitude, there is no infinity.
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symbols, metonymic descriptions, and literary tropes. Mary‟s name perhaps symbolizes
this inscriptive power. However, through her multiplied identity, Mary recedes to the
edges of the poem and disappears from the traps of its signification.41 She cannot
overcome these traps; she can only escape them.
Writing as “Michael Field,” Bradley and Cooper draw the reader‟s attention to
artistic depictions of the Magdalen figure in “The Magdalen” and “A Pen-Drawing of
Leda,” both published in 1892.42 Like Blake‟s work, their poetry reveals the long history
of this sort of female figure who, while human, physically embodies the divine. Their
pairing of the two ekphrastic poems reveals by contrast that Leda, not the converted
Magdalen, maintains her spiritual power. “The Magdalen: Timoteo Viti” (1892)
describes the Viti painting which, like Blake‟s The Three Maries at the Sepulchre, frames
the Magdalen figure in a stone tomb. She awaits God‟s visit in quiet solitude, “remote”:
“She knows that when God needs / From the sinning world relief, / He will find her thus
with the wild bees” (53-55). Although she is “infinitely clean” (35), she is also infinitely
separated from the world she knew before her cleansing, a world that made her feel
needed and whole:
41

Dee Drake similarly argues that Thel‟s “litany of multiple likenesses” creates in
her character a “multiplicity [of] voice and body” (220).
42
Kenneth Ireland describes the scope of the book and discusses the genre of
ekphrastic poetry in “Sight and Song: A Study of the Interrelations between Painting and
Poetry.” He argues, “Sight and Song emerges . . . as a set of thirty-one variations upon
the theme of tension between life and death. On the one side are the forces of love,
beauty, and art; on the other, the forces of cruelty, sorrow, and pride” (15). For more
recent discussions of Field‟s poetry, see Holly Laird‟s “Contradictory Legacies: Michael
Field and Feminist Restoration” (1995), Yopie Prins‟s “A Metaphorical Field: Katherine
Bradley and Edith Cooper” (1995), Ana I. Parejo Vadillo‟s “Sight and Song: Transparent
Translations and a Manifesto for the Observer” (2000), and Marion Thain‟s ―Michael
Field‖: Poetry, Aestheticism, and the Fin de Siècle (2007).
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Fig. 7: Viti’s St. Mary Magdalene
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She is shut from fellowship;
How she loved to mingle with her friends!
To give them eyes and lip;
She lived for their sake alone;
Not a braid of her hair, not a rose
Of her cheek was her own:
And she loved to minister
To any in want of her,
All service was so sweet:
Now she must stand all day on lithe, unsummoned feet. (41-50)
Her “ministry” dissolved, Magdalen waits on “unsummoned feet” for a chance to live in
the fullness of her vast love, her greatest gift while “God is a great way off” (62).
Magdalen counts away the hours while the cave surrounding her bears witness
that God is distant and she is alone. In Bradley and Cooper‟s poem, Jesus is dead.
Although these seem like the moments before—in the biblical text—she finds him raised
in the empty tomb, this discovery has passed. She has traveled to find this “destined
grot” (97), stricken dumb by the Jesus‟s rejection, “Musing on those great days before
she at first grew sad” (100). Keats‟s earlier version of “La Belle Dame sans Mercy”
resonates in these lines:
She took me to her elfin grot,
And there she gaz‟d and sighed deep,
And there I shut her wild sad eyes—
So kiss‟d to sleep. (29-32)
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Like the Belle Dame, Magdalen rests on moss, and the speaker describes her body as if
flowers drape it. If Bradley and Cooper are rewriting Keats‟s poem in the Magdalen
tradition, they link Keats‟s speaker with Jesus. In this case, Jesus is like the lover scared
away by dreams of “pale kings, and princes too” (“La Belle” 37), a legion of patriarchal
figures warning him of the possible dangers of this woman. The poems, then, speak to
each other, with Keats‟s speaker presenting one perspective and the Magdalen, alone in
her grot, the other perspective.43 Keats‟s poem ends with the speaker waiting in the
silence:
And this is why I sojourn here
Alone and palely loitering,
Though the sedge is wither‟d from the lake,
And no birds sing. (45-48)
“The Magdalen” ends similarly:
In her heart there is a song
And yet no song she sings.
Since the word Rabboni came
Straightway at the call of her name
And the Master reproved,

43

As Ireland notes, Bradley and Cooper developed the title of the book (Sight and
Song) from a line in Keats‟s “Ode to Psyche” (14): “I see, and sing, by my own eyes
inspired” (43). In fact, they placed this quotation at the beginning of the book. The
thematic connection between their work and Keats‟s seems to have been immediately
apparent to their contemporary readers. According to Ireland, a reviewer from The
Academy described the book in June of 1892 as “„one of the most Keats-like things that
has been produced since Keats himself‟” (19).
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It seems she has no choice—her lips have never moved. (85-90)
Magdalen has not failed; God has failed. We will see a very similar dynamic in Levy‟s
Magdalen. God is distant, cold, reproving; she is warm and loving, but now clothed in
“new-born loveliness” that marks the loss of her place in her world: “no place for her
pure arts is longer found” (70). It is for this reason that she has wandered to this
“destined spot” (97), the place allotted her by the weight of God‟s will.
Bringing “La Belle Dame” into the poem allows Bradley and Cooper to build
upon the earlier Magdalen poems, leaving the same gap that Keats allows that suggests
that maybe the kings and princes are wrong and the romantic moments he had at the elfin
grot were better than what he could ever have had either being welcomed into the
presence of the distant royal fraternal order or “palely loitering / Though the sedge is
wither‟d from the lake” (46-47). Correspondingly, Jesus, the knight, has “reproved” (89)
her in the name of patriarchal religion, leaving for a pure white and distant heaven.
Additionally, by building the poem on the painting, Cooper and Bradley accentuate her
isolation. An inviting home beckons in the distance, but Magdalen turns her back to it,
preferring her rocky tomb. The fur trim of her undergarment aligns her images with
those of John the Baptist, but she is not carving out a life in the wilderness; she waits
piously next to a book and an urn, perhaps filled with her tears. Because this is not a
dramatic monologue, we never hear Magdalen‟s voice. Even her most intimate desires
are revealed as her story has always been told, in the third person and from a distance.
Bradley and Cooper published “A Pen-Drawing of Leda,” another ekphrastic
poem, the same year. In direct contrast to their depiction of Magdalen, they portray Leda
as luxuriating in the warm feathers of the swan, her lover. She is “lovely, wild and free”
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(1) and able to “[draw] the fondled creature to her will” (7). While Magdalen attempts to
remain “infinitely clean” (35), Leda “joys to bend in the live light / Her glistening body
toward her love, how much more bright!” (8-9). Like Swinburne, Bradley and Cooper
looked to past religions to create an alternative to the purity and impotence of
Christianity. While Magdalen languishes in the cold, dark cave, Leda feels the force of
“Heaven‟s concentrated rays” (14) as she “the sunshine lies / And spreads its affluence on
the wide curves of her waist and thighs” (10-11). This drawing, Leda kneeling towards
the swan, was originally thought by Giovanni Morelli to be the work of Antonio Bazzi—
who also went under the name “Il Sodoma”—but it has since been attributed to Leonardo
(Cust 366), who depicted the mythological story in a series of drawings and in Leda and
the Swan. The drawing at the palace at Weimar, to which Bradley and Cooper refer, is
Leonardo‟s drawing that prefigured the painting. Contessa Lilian Priuli-Bon‟s
description of the drawing replicates the painting‟s main features: “It is a kneeling figure
of Leda bending to the left towards the crouching swan, while the twins, Castor and
Pollux, lie beneath some rushes to her right” (37).
In the painting, the swan looks hungrily up at Leda, while she gazes adoringly at
her sons, whom Bradley and Cooper describe as “[c]ertain round eggs without a speck”
(3). Their union has resulted in the two sons; an image in sharp contrast to Magdalen‟s
empty womb encircled by her living tomb. In both poems, the readers are distanced from
the female characters by the use of the third person. Readers are positioned to gaze at the
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Fig. 8: Leonardo Da Vinci’s Leda and the Swan
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female characters, without inhabiting their minds.44 Bradley and Cooper seem purposely
to avoid the dramatic monologue for this reason. Perhaps responding to Levy‟s
“Magdalen” (1884), they build upon Blake‟s work with the Mary characters by creating a
space for Mary‟s subjectivity to fill. They seem to be working in concert with other
writers to build up the mythical structures that have filled in the character‟s delineations
in the past in order to draw the reader‟s attention to the human lack in the center.
Because of projects like these, Levy‟s and Mew‟s use of the monologue to express
Magdalen‟s thoughts radically departs from the literary tradition.

From the Ball to the “Hideous Masquerade”
And there is neither false nor true;
But in a hideous masquerade
All things dance on, the ages through.
And good is evil, evil good . . . .
–―Magdalen,‖ Amy Levy, 70-73
In 1893, in a letter to Lucy Violet Hodgkin, Mary Elizabeth Coleridge wrote
about visiting Margaret Duckworth just after the birth of her son:

44

See Hilary Fraser‟s “A Visual Field: Michael Field and the Gaze” for more
discussion of the function of the gaze in the poetry of “Michael Field.”
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Her cheeks had a pink flush afterwards, & she looked lovely. She says she
can hardly bear to leave her sweet bedroom & the Madonna di San Sisto
over the fireplace. (87, f. 2b)45
Although Margaret was married to Henry Duckworth, she shared an intimate bond with
her cousin Ella Coltman. Because Margaret had already given birth to a daughter, this
child was to be Coltman‟s, according to Susan Chitty‟s biography of Henry Duckworth
(96). In the Madonna di San Sisto, or the Sistine Madonna, the Madonna figure holds the
Christ child. Beside her are two kneeling figures, a man and a woman. They are
identified by the full title of the painting as Pope Sixtus II and Saint Barbara. Knowing
that she was about to give her son to be raised by Ella, she might have been inspired by
the image of the martyred Saint Barbara, looking away bravely but humbly. However,
the two kneeling figures also recall two important people in Mary‟s life, Joseph and
Elizabeth, Mary‟s cousin. In this way, Margaret could be identifying with the Virgin
Mary. At the foreground of the painting are two cherubs and in the background, a sea of
faces looking toward Mary and the child. The painting that transfixes Margaret, then,
mirrors her own domestic life, Margaret corresponding to Mary, and Joseph and
Elizabeth representing her own husband and cousin, Henry and Ella. Adding another
layer to this multiplication of relationships, Mary Coleridge has just described holding
Margaret‟s baby, perhaps herself doubling the image of Mary and the infant in the
painting. She comments that while holding the baby, she wondered “what it was that I
held, —a conqueror or a shepherd,” mirroring Mary‟s imagined sentiments about the

45

Quoted by permission of the Provost and Fellows, Eton College.
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Fig. 9: Raphael’s Sistine Madonna
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baby Jesus.
Margaret was no virgin mother and her tripartite marriage was certainly not a
socially—or religiously—approved arrangement. By identifying with Mary—desiring
not to leave the painting and gazing at it while holding her infant—Margaret identifies
her relationships with Ella and Henry with those of Mary, Joseph, and Elizabeth.
Through her radical reinterpretation, she sees Mary as her double, gaining for herself the
roles of both virgin mother and sexual agent. Edith and Katharine once visited a gallery
to view the same painting, resulting in a similar moment. As Hilary Fraser describes,
Edith gazed at Katharine, blending Katharine—in her eyesight—with Mary: “I lie back
in the cushions, feel in invalid for the time being + love her” (qtd. in Fraser 566). Levy
and Mew similarly endeavored to overlap the possible modes of identity for the
Magdalen character. They interpreted the Magdalen figure as a type of Mary, both
figures types of women that the modern woman, the antitype, encompasses—forms in
which she can transmogrify.46
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Aubrey Beardsley‟s famous drawing, A Christmas Card (1896), prefigures
“Madeleine in Church” with a similarly dark interpretation of the Madonna, a woman
who has become complicit in a system that uses her body in order to create a baby she
might think “strangely made.” In the drawing, she seems at once glorified and
condemned. She wears a spiky aureole that pushes outward into the wilderness just at her
back. The flowers surrounding her spill into the fabric of her dress, further signaling an
affinity between her body and nature. The trim of her dress curls like a snake, as
Casteras points out (170). Furthermore, it gapes just at her pelvis like an exaggerated
vagina surrounding the child. It is as if the child has been born to a woman still
connected to untamed and spiritually dangerous wilderness. The pain of childbirth and
pleasures of sexual intercourse doubly represent her natural depravity, which made her a
follower of Satan‟s temptations and a temptress, by turn. Beardsley visually depicts the
discourses that Coleridge, Levy, and Mew portray through literary texts.
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In Amy Levy‟s “Magdalen” (1884), the speaker, dying in a Magdalen hospital,
addresses her absent lover. Cynthia Scheinberg reads the poem as a rewriting of religious
discourses, Mary Magdalen addressing Jesus: “One of Levy‟s major poetic projects is to
deconstruct a central metaphor that governs both Jewish and Christian traditions of
religious poetry: the symbol of the divine/human relationship as heterosexual romance”
(Women‘s Poetry 217). As Scheinberg points out, Levy‟s dual identities as lesbian and
Jewish gave her important reasons to desire this sort of rewriting. I would like to build
upon this reading by considering how multiple elements of the Mary/Magdalen character
inhabit the poem‟s speaker, a woman who navigates all of these discourses in a

Beardsley’s A Christmas Card
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multiplied subjectivity. Ultimately, this performance—this “hideous masquerade” (71)—
reveals the inconsistencies and paradoxes in life, the great grey that governs all. One
might hear in the background Fra Lippo Lippi, a similar portrayer of religious discourses,
“There‟s the grey beginning. Zooks!” (392). For the Magdalen, the grey is all that is left.
She has lost even her name beneath the “masquerade” that has become her life, in which
“there is neither false nor true” (70). This ambiguous state disrupts even the ethical
frameworks that form the categories of falsity or truth: “good is evil, evil good” (73). As
in Blake‟s A Marriage of Heaven and Hell, we might read this disruption as positive.
After all, it leads to her freedom, which she wishes she could claim to him in person:
I fain would see your face once more,
.................................
Look in your eyes and tell you this:
[A]ll is done, that I am free;
That you, through all eternity,
Have neither part nor lot in me. (79, 82-85)
As we shall see, Magdalen‟s escape into pain, the only thing “known or understood” (74),
frees her to see into eternity.
The pain she experiences is the pain of being violated emotionally and physically.
Levy uses a Wordsworthian allusion to describe the impact of this pain. Ode: Intimations
of Immortality ends with the claim that there is hope that despite disconnectedness with
full spiritual energy, humans can still experience the infinite in the subtle movements of
the heart:
Thanks to the human heart by which we live,
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Thanks to its tenderness, its joys, and fears,
To me the meanest flower that blows can give
Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears. (205-08)
For Magdalen and for Wordsworth, experiencing the infinite means moving past
structures of spiritual power, like good and evil, into the realm of pure experience and
pure pain:
At night, or when the daylight nears,
I hear the other women weep;
My own heart‟s anguish lies too deep
For the soft rain and pain of tears. (48-51)
This pain serves two functions in the poem. First, it directs the reader‟s attention to the
cause of the pain, the absent lover who “knew what thing would be” and yet “wrought
this evil” (11-12). The speaker, then, is innocent of any real moral violation, desiring
only for oneness with her lover. In contrast to his betrayal, she claims her steadfastness:
I wonder do you know
How gladly, gladly I had died
(And life was very sweet that tide)
To save you from the least, light ill?
How gladly I had borne your pain. (35-39).
Her willingness to have “borne [his] pain” responds to a popular Victorian attitude about
women‟s natural sympathy that, according to some, could lead to sexual vulnerability, if
not prostitution. William Rathbone Greg argued in 1850 that prostitutes had given in to
women‟s natural “sympathetic selflessness,” as Anderson terms it (The Powers 62).
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However, sexuality for Levy‟s Magdalen is the physical expression of a love that rivals
heavenly goodness, her only opportunity for an earthly glimpse of heavenly unity. In this
way, she is perhaps overly compassionate, but she is not entirely selfless. She gains
agency and power through her claim to martyrdom. For the Victorians, her pain could
have represented God‟s retribution, the just suffering of the sinful. However, Levy fights
this interpretation of Magdalen‟s situation by revealing the woman‟s noble self-sacrifice
and innocent realization of her lover‟s betrayal: “It is so strange to think upon” (20).
Like the Virgin Mary and Jesus, willing to make bodily sacrifices for divine love, the
Magdalen reveals herself as a martyr for love. Ironically, the very trait that differentiates
her from the Virgin Mary is her lack of virginity. In this way, the speaker embodies the
roles of Madonna and Magdalen, navigating roles in this “hideous masquerade”—like
Mary‟s ball in Blake‟s “Mary”—that leaves her lonely and dying.
As a dramatic monologue, the speaker addresses the lover as “you.” The lack of
his presence in the poem as a hearer within the poem‟s frame draws the reader‟s attention
to his absence from the poem and from the woman‟s life. However, other Magdalen
women surround her: “At night, or when the daylight nears, / I hear the other women
weep” (48-49). The reader‟s knowledge of the women‟s presence draws them nearer,
revealing the speaker as one woman in a room with other women just as desperate, just as
betrayed, on the other side of the walls. This poetic method effectively multiplies the
impact of the story because every woman in the building could be recounting a story very
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similar. In effect, the building fairly shakes with the resounding voices of women‟s
sorrow that pour forth in weeping late at night.47

47

An oil painting by Ford Madox Brown, Take Your Son, Sir!, prefigures
Magdalen monologues such as Levy‟s. In the unfinished painting, one can see similar a
dynamic occurring. The woman stares directly at the painter. The mirror above her
reveals that the she is also looking at a man before her, to whom she offers the son. The
positioning of the figures resembles that of Rossetti‟s “In an Artist‟s Studio,” written in
the same year (1856), revealing complicity between the male lover and painter. In the

Brown’s Take Your Son, Sir!

same way, the “selfsame” face looks from the canvas, the Madonna and Magdalen in one.
The mirror behind her forms an aureole, as does the garment that surrounds the child. As
the faces look toward the title figure in Madonna di San Sisti, the stars surround this
woman, her head tilted back in anguish, her arms lowered as if at any moment she will
drop the child who stares blankly, his head also tilted back, his neck unprotected. The
man in the mirror raises his hands as if to deny that the child is his. As if from stigmata,
the fabric around her neck and around the garment surrounding the child bleeds onto her
dress, as does the wallpaper in the background, as the Madonna, Magdalen, and Christ
child stand in the nexus point of the ethereal and the everyday, heaven descending into
the bourgeois bedroom.
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Charlotte Mew similarly blends of the roles of Madonna, Magdalen, and Savior in
“Ne Me Tangito.” In the title, she re-conjugates the traditional Latin phrase from Mary
Magdalen‟s visit to the tomb, “Noli me tangere,” “Touch me not.” Mew‟s version,
“Never touch me,” implies a greater distance between Jesus and Mary Magdalen, or
closeness so intense that they must enforce physical distance. To heighten the allusion to
Mary Magdalen, Mew adds the passage from Luke, “This man . . . would have known
who and what manner of woman this is: for she is, a sinner (vii: 39)”. However, the
poem is a love song between parent and child. It is a song between both Jesus and his
sinful daughter, Magdalen, and Madonna and her small but “most divine” son (22).
The two stanzas reveal the perspectives of two different speakers. The first
stanza, from the perspective of Mary Magdalen, describes the striking power of the title
phrase:
Odd, You should fear the touch,
The first that I was ever ready to let go,
I, that have not cared much
For any toy I could not break and throw
To the four winds when I had done with it. You need not fear the touch,
Blindest of all the things that I have cared for very much
In the whole gay, unbearable, amazing show. (1-7)
On one hand, this seems clearly from Mary Magdalen‟s perspective, a woman who,
according to religious tradition, was a sinner who lived a dangerous and haphazard life,
“not car[ing] much / For any toy [she] could not break and throw” (4-5). The word
“blind” carries spiritual force here, describing the touch of a prostitute reaching for any
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flesh to help her survive and Jesus, who will not be tempted by her touch. In the next
line, she depicts her life as one “gay, unbearable, amazing show” (7). “Gay” at this time
referred to a lifestyle of prostitution (Casteras 139). In this way, the stanza seems like a
response to Jesus‟s final words to Mary Magdalen, which according to Mew‟s changes,
separate Magdalen from Jesus forever. The threat of eternal separation leads the reader
to expect one of two outcomes from the second stanza. Jesus will either condemn her or
save her. What happens is therefore quite shocking.
Jesus explains that Mary Magdalen tried “to hide the ugly doubt behind that
hurried puzzled little smile” that yet contained the “shade of something vile” (9-10).
Then, he relates a dream in which he walks through a field and hears “the far-off bleat of
sheep,” an image of the lost Magdalen crying for help. At this point, the dream mirrors
images of both the Madonna and the Magdalen, naked and holding a child:
Someone stood by and it was you:
About us both a great wind blew.
My breast was bared
But sheltered by my hair
I found you, suddenly, lying there,
Tugging with tiny fingers at my heart, no more afraid:
The weakest thing, the most divine
That ever yet was mine . . . . (16-23)
The Magdalen/sheep/lost soul becomes a child in his arms, a child “strangely made” (24)
and forgotten, “The child for which [he] had not looked or ever cared, / Of whom, before,
[he] never dreamed” (26-27). At the same time, he takes the form of the naked
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Magdalen—protected only by flowing locks—and the nude Madonna, covered in the
glory of God, both women marveling at the unexpected child. Magdalen receives neither
condemnation nor forgiveness, but instead, the story of a dream that reveals no emotion
at all. Although he claims her for his own, he has not cared for her and does not seem to
do so now. A child can be “strangely made” by a woman‟s body, but yet remain
something she has not ever desired or imagined. The relationship between mother and
child that makes the Madonna images emotionally powerful is unhinged, then, at this
moment. After all, how does the Virgin Mary have agency in the annunciation or control
over the child that she has “strangely made”? Jesus‟s unitary identity and role as antitype
are threatened by the gender-bending description that makes him a type of Madonna, who
is also a type of Magdalen.
In Mew‟s “Madeleine in Church” (1916), Magdalen is not in church to pray for
forgiveness for her sins and rejoin traditional religious structures. Instead, she dreams
about a saint more human than the “plaster saint” before her, one who “[b]efore he got
his niche and crown, / [h]ad one short stroll about the town” (10-11). In this way, she
dreams of the saint she will someday be, one to whom people can look to find a model
from someone who has lived, who has a “taint”: “And anyone can wash the paint / Off
our poor faces, his and mine!” (13-14). At the same time, her use of language is clearly
modern, so Mew seems to be drawing our attention as readers to the fact that this is a
timeless story, sadly replicated by many Magdalens.48

48

See Linda Mizejewski‟s “Charlotte Mew and the Unrepentant Magdalene: A
Myth in Transition” for a description of Mew‟s many poems about this figure.
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The speaker describes herself as a “rip,” a form of reap and of reprobate. A “rip”
is “unthreshed grain or hay,” “a disturbed state of the sea,” and a “person or thing of little
or no value” (“Rip,” 2.1, 5.1.a, 6.3). In religious terms, she is a mixture of the good and
bad, the wheat and the chaff. She is both the current that drags others down and the ship
sinking in it:
It seems too funny all we other rips
Should have immortal souls; Monty and Redge quite damnably
Keeps theirs afloat while we go down like scuttled ships.—
It‟s funny too, how easily we sink,
One might put up a monument, I think
To half the world and cut across it, “Lost at Sea!”
I should drown Jim, poor little sparrow, if I netted him to-night— (24-30)
Like “scuttled ships,” their drowning is self-imposed. In this way, she admits to a sort of
failure, the loss of her value through her damaging tendencies. However, she also
describes herself as a powerful force. She is Mary of Magdala—of Tower—standing
outside of the fortress of religion, observing it from an outside perspective and
threatening it with contrary force.
What others see as her sin is a result of her intense feeling, one that sets her apart
from the coldness of the saints and the disconnected piety of Christian religion. To the
speaker, Jesus is “quiet,” and “never knew / [t]he poisonous fangs that bit us through /
[a]nd make us do the things we do” (39-41). He is distant, hanging “high” (44) on the
cross. However, she felt such focused emotion in response to everything around her, “joy
and pain, like any mother and her / unborn child were almost one” (53). Because of her

107
deep connection to the world around her, she could not separate her physical acts from an
outside idea of righteousness: “I think my body was my soul” (63). She does not have
Jesus‟s emotional distance, so she cannot have his piety. To be found as a lost sheep is to
be “stripped and done” (125), taken back into the fold by agonizing force:
So we are won:
Then safe, safe are we? in the shelter of His everlasting wings—
I do not envy Him his victories. His arms are full of broken things. (12628)
Consequently, she stands separated, unwilling to be broken, desiring for Jesus to come to
her on her terms as he did for Mary Magdalen, to share a kiss that was “in her own way”
(177): “You can change the things for which we care / But even You, unless You kill us,
not the way” (185-86). She wants her openness to be returned by his affection, or at least
his acknowledgment, “if, for once, He would only speak” (223).49 If he will not, she is
unwilling to give up even her lonely life for the wish of brokenness.
As a monologue, the poem draws attention to Madeleine‟s situation in the silent
room, sometimes talking about God, sometimes talking to him. She does not doubt
God‟s existence, but she does not have faith in their relationship or even in a belief that
he is always listening. The church—the place of her weddings and confessed failures—
figures in the title, but she is in a “doll‟s house looking on the Park” (150-51). Her “blue
49

Jane Dowson and Alice Entwistle explain that
the treatment of emotions is the core and the subject is tormented by what
she cannot have . . . . The elusive identities of lover and loved one codify
the same-sex passion. . . . Mew‟s biographers agree that her secret love
for women remained unresolved and is projected on to her representations
of mental conflict. (74)
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and gold box of a room,” then, doubles as a church in her mind, her “plaster saint” her
only ecumenical detail. She would rather pray “here, in the darkness” (1) than “over
there, in open day” (5), under Christ, hanging overhead, looking down from a distance
and refusing to speak.
According to Madeleine‟s conception of life, no forgiveness is available, only
brokenness. Those willing to be forced into the fold must give up the ability to feel.
They must numb themselves to the intensity of life for the dubious blessing of a large,
wounded, and crushing hand attached to a body infinitely higher containing a mouth that
will never speak. The Magdalen figure in the Bible, according to her namesake in the
poem, survives the religious acceptance of Jesus only because she communicates in the
way she knows and he allows it. These poets build upon their literary history to direct the
coming cultural changes that will free women to imagine new social, religious, and
personal roles. Linda Mizejewski similarly argues that this development of the Magdalen
figure had important social and political implications: “If the Victorian imagination
delighted in the surrender of the Magdalene, the conversion from sensuality to spirituality
upon which was modeled dozens of fictional magdalene-conversions, then Mew is
striking at the heart of the myth” (294). These poems reveal anxieties caused by
structures of social discipline like the Contagious Diseases Acts, systems that when put
into practice, made any woman vulnerable to the appellation of “whore.” Through the
monologue, they dramatize how a woman must navigate such discourses in order to
figure herself as a social agent, and their poetic experimentation leads to a new form of
poetic subjectivity.
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Chapter Three:
Contrasubjectivity and the Crisis of the 1870s
The Magdalen character, as “fallen woman,” featured in the poetry of the 1870s,
when Rossetti‟s Jenny was followed by responses like Webster‟s A Castaway,
Buchanan‟s “The Fleshly School of Poetry,” and Browning‟s Fifine at the Fair. The later
Magdalen poems by Bradley, Cooper, Levy, and Meynell reveal the influence of these
conversations. As we have seen, Victorian writers dramatized a shift in models of
subjectivity from a type of objectivity that relied upon concurrence within a community
to a type of subjectivity defined against the views of others. We could call the initial
objectivity “intersubjective,” because the relationship with others determines the process
of judging the world. However, we could also call late-Victorian subjectivity
“intersubjective,” because its literary representations portray the process of
intersubjective thought through the intermixing of subjectivities.50 The shift from one
kind of intersubjectivity to another—which occurs through the internalization of the
process of intersubjectivity and the self-conscious representation of this process—results
from a crisis in the 1870s. The representations of the Magdalen character in poetry
mirror the evolution of intersubjective poetry from Blake to “Field” to Levy and Mew.
50

My approach to intersubjectivity builds upon the theoretical work of writers
like Irigaray, Husserl, Habermas, Lacan, and Kristeva. As Sara Heinämaa explains,
Irigaray‟s theory of intersubjectivity responds to Husserl‟s work with objectivity, in
which “[t]he sense of objectivity proves to depend on our experiences of other
experiencing subjects” (246). According to Heinämaa, Irigaray criticizes Husserl‟s and
Merleau-Ponty‟s theories by “argu[ing] that phenomenological and
postphenomenological thinkers neglect the fundamental difference between two sexual
types, and that their descriptions, explications, and analyses of otherness and
intersubjectivity suffer from the identification of human with male” (248).
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The poets who engaged in this literary discussion attempted to determine the possibility
of a type of contrasubjective judgment, in which the individual‟s subjectivity functions
against—not through—another person‟s subjectivity. As a type of Magdalen character
stripped of her biblical significations, the prostitute in her self-objectified position
provided the perfect subject for such contrasubjective experiments.
I am using the term contrasubjective to describe subjectivity formed through
denying the interrelationship of the self and the other. As we have seen, for Habermas,
the relationship of self, Other, and third party create the intersubjective awareness
necessary for communicative action.51 Habermas describes intersubjectivity as the
experience of a “shared world in which I live, speak, and act together with other subjects”
(24): “Intersubjectively communalized experience is expressed in symbolic systems,
especially natural language, in which accumulated knowledge is pregiven to the
individual subject as cultural tradition” (24). As Habermas explains Edmund Husserl‟s
position, intersubjectivity depends upon the “appresentation” of the other that allows for
identification:
The living body of the other “appresents” a life of conscious acts that is at
first inaccessible and foreign to me. This life of the conscious acts of the
other, mediated by his living body, is the absolutely first foreign object
that comes into being in my primordial world. This constitutes the
meaning of another subject whose body is associated with her as a living
body just as my own living body is associated with me. In the second step
51

Steven Hendley develops this thesis in From Communicative Action to the Face
of the Other: Levinas and Habermas on Language, Obligation, and Community.
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of his argument, Husserl tries to make the case that the meaning of the
appresentation of the other‟s inner life unproblematically gives rise to the
community [Vergemeinschaftung] of monads. (38-39)
This chapter focuses on the breakdown of such identification and its consequences for
intersubjectivity. As Vincenzo R. Sanguineti explains, intersubjectivity represents “a
field of intersection of two subjectivities” (128):
Benjamin expands on Stolorow‟s definition and points to the difference
between perceiving the other as objectified—an object separate from us,
that has actually been expelled from our intrapsychic world—and the other
perceived as a subject, a center of our being equivalent to us and
interconnected to us in complex ways. (128)
Non-intersubjective behavior works in contrast with biologically-originating
intersubjective mechanisms. As he explains,
I am of the opinion that the original imprinting of the first “other” in the
self is a normal, necessary, inevitable evolutionary process, essential to
survival. Its roots are very ancient, running through the programs of
parental bonding as it appeared at a certain point in evolution. … We
carry this “other-within-us” as an imprinted image of the primary source
of life and safety and order: not purely necessity: a true archetypal
construct in a Jungian sense. The template imposes that its dictates … are
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to be followed; they are life-saving; if we get disconnected we get lost and
will not survive. (131)52
His blend of neuroscientific and psychological methods reveals the need for
intersubjectivity and the dangers of contrasubjectivity. The person who does not identify
intersubjectively, who does not “carry this „other-within-us,‟” will not, by implication,
find safety in the group. If the non-identification leads to violent exclusion of the other;
the victim marked Other and denied intersubjective identification will be excised from
the group.
During the 1870s, immense social changes were occurring. As we have seen,
Eliza Lynn Linton published “Girl of the Period,” then John Stuart Mill published
Subjection of Women, and Cobbe, “Criminals, Idiots, Women, and Minors.” Women‟s
civil rights were indeed greatly expanded during this time, because of the efforts of
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Lacan might describe this “other-within-us” as desire:
Demand constitutes the Other as already possessing the “privilege” of
satisfying needs, that is to say, the power of depriving them of that alone
by which they are satisfied. This privilege of the Other thus outlines the
radical form of the gift of that which the Other does not have, namely, its
love. . . . Thus desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the
demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the
first from the second, the phenomenon of their splitting (Spaltung). . . .
The gap in this enigma betrays what determines it, namely, to put it in the
simplest possible way, that for both partners in the relation, but the subject
and the Other, it is not enough to be subjects of need, or objects of love,
but that they must stand for the cause of desire. . . . The fact that the
phallus is a signifier means that it is in the place of the Other that the
subject has access to it. But since this signifier is only veiled, as ratio of
the Other‟s desire, it is this desire of the Other as such that the subject
must recognize, that is to say, the other in so far as he is himself a subject
divided by the signifying Spaltung. (1306-09)
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writers like Mill and Cobbe. Even in the midst of legal changes for women‟s rights,53 the
debates about the Contagious Diseases Act of 1864 raged through this period, until the
act was finally repealed in 1886.54 According to Patricia Rigg, “[t]he issues of
prostitution and the Contagious Diseases Acts, with economic rather than moral
implications, fuelled the woman‟s movement in the seventies and eighties as much as did
the question of suffrage” (“Augusta Webster: The Social” 96). Consequently, when
Rossetti published Jenny, in newspapers and journals, in churches, and in parlors, people
debated women‟s physical and mental equality to men and they discussed the degree of
physical danger women like Jenny might pose to the population. Of course, there was no
real consensus about the nature of humanity, the shape of ethical relationships, or
women‟s capabilities. However, the frequency of public responses to these issues reveals
their importance in this time of social change.
Jenny presented just the sort of subjective struggle Sanguineti describes. Rossetti
vacillates between representing intersubjective identification and contrasubjective
rejection. I do not mean to appropriate Rossetti‟s project, which is epistemological and
aesthetic, and force it solely into an ethical discourse. Instead, I wish to pull these
disparate threads—epistemological, formal, and ethical—together in order to describe
how this particular conversation through which Rossetti, Webster, and Browning
experiment with the monologue to portray subjectivity in terms of gender relationships.
53

In 1870, the Married Women‟s Property Act was passed, building upon the
Matrimonial Causes Act and Divorce Act of 1857. Women were admitted unofficially to
Cambridge in 1872.
54
For more discussion of the Acts and of Victorian sexuality, see Sutphin‟s
“Human Tigresses, Fractious Angels, and Nursery Saints: Augusta Webster‟s „A
Castaway‟ and Victorian Discourses on Prostitution and Women‟s Sexuality.”
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Although he had been writing it for decades, the publication of Jenny was timely and the
response was explosive. It elicited passionate and immediate reactions from critics and
poets. Browning, for one, poured out two thousand lines of poetry in response. By
terming this a “crisis,” I am building upon Julia Kristeva‟s use of the term: “I wish to
point out that, far from being a minor, marginal activity in our culture, as a general
consensus seems to have it, this kind of literature, or even literature as such, represents
the ultimate coding of our crises, of our utmost intimate and most serious apocalypses”
(Powers of Horror 208). This moment of crisis in the 1870s is between old and new
paradigms, between the traditional gender politics and radical legal changes. As such, the
crisis reveals both individual, “intimate” conflicts and patterns of social discourses that
contributed to changing the cultural paradigm. Blake‟s representations of the problems
of gendered identity begin the paradigm shift early in the century. The poetry of Bradley,
Cooper, Levy, and Mew represents a conclusion to the crisis and the beginning of the
new gender paradigm. Rossetti, Webster, and Browning participated in the cultural
paradigm shift by offering different perspectives on, respectively, the process of
contrasubjectivity, the damage of contrasubjectivity on the person marked as Other, and
the inherent violence of contrasubjectivity.
Contrasubjectivity represented for these poets a theory of the mind at once ethical,
because it preserved the uniqueness and otherness of fellow human beings, and unethical,
because it relied on a natural disconnection that separates people subjectively from each
other. In a moment in which the political and social structure of the country was
changing, this theory of the mind suggested that the very social changes that permitted
people to fight for equal rights also separated units of the society. After all, if—as the
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Victorian feminists argued—women and men were alike in their capacities, but women
were separate from men in their gender, the common ground for humanity found in the
one-sex model, albeit a complicated common ground, was rejected. In other words, the
crisis of the 1870s corresponded to the ongoing tensions between the paradigms of the
one-sex model and the two-sex model that Thomas Laqueur describes as persisting
throughout the nineteenth century (193). As a result, it was important to develop
contrasubjective modes of thinking in order to maintain the respect for difference that led
to civil rights legislation, such as the Reform Acts, compulsory education, and women‟s
suffrage. If women were different from men, their lack of legal representation apart from
men through the practice of coverture led to legal movements for women‟s civil rights
such as the Married Women‟s Property Act. However, these same modes of thinking
depended upon the process of recognizing difference, a process that could lead to the
violence of objectification.

“It makes a goblin of the sun”:
Jenny and the Construction of Contrasubjectivity
In three hundred and ninety lines, much longer than the majority of his poems,
Rossetti‟s monologue traces the thoughts of a young man visiting a prostitute, Jenny, who
sleeps on his lap for most of the poem. Rossetti wrote the poem over the course of
twenty-three years, buried it with his wife, disinterred it seven years later, and, finally,
published it in 1870 (De Vane, “The Harlot” 468, 472). I argue that this poem was so
important to Rossetti because of his intricate balancing of aesthetic, epistemological, and
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ethical positions. He wishes to portray a speaker who can separate himself from his
surroundings in order to drink in its beauty because, epistemologically, this is the only
access we have to meaning. He designs a poem, building upon the tradition of Browning,
in particular, in which the speaker does not merely gaze at the body of a woman, but also
actively seeks to know her thoughts. The impossibility of this sort of mind-reading does
not necessarily doom it to be meaningless; the search for human interconnection is itself
meaning, perhaps the most profound meaning we can attain and certainly the shared
pursuit that bonds us all. 55 However, for Rossetti, this sort of connection is precluded by
our limited abilities to know our world and by the frames we use to give us some access
to cognitive response, mental paradigms that always distance us from pure knowledge
and certainly from pure intercourse with others.56 Furthermore, he highlights the process
of contrasubjective response, defining the self against the other, through this poem.
Thus, even as the speaker strives to empathize with her, he describes Jenny in the famous
opening lines in deprecating words that emphasize her failures:
Lazy laughing languid Jenny,
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Anderson similarly contends that the poem “disrupts the monologic vision of
the speaker” through moments that “thwart the speaker‟s attempt to objectify and
stabilize his apperception of her, and indirectly suggest a more open-ended dialogical
ideal” (Tainted 144).
56
Anderson explains,
In general terms, then, “Jenny” is a poem about uncertain agency,
thwarted recognition, and the profound unreadability of otherness. To
center such concerns on the figure of the prostitute at once heightens and
deflects the anxieties that attend these epistemological and intersubjective
predicaments. For in the case of the Victorian prostitute, the problems in
readability that attend the intersubjective moment are part of a complex
configuration; . . . these problems are inextricably linked to economic and
sexual anxieties about agency. (Tainted 165)
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Fond of a kiss and fond of a guinea … . (1-2)
According to the speaker‟s wording, we can surmise that Jenny lacks energy (“lazy”),
serious consideration of her situation (“laughing”), and the energy to act on her own
behalf (“languid”). Furthermore, she first desires physical affection (“a kiss”), and next,
she desires money (“a guinea”). In other words, Jenny is a prostitute because she will not
act to change her situation and because she enjoys it. She enjoys sexual encounters with
strangers and she appreciates the money that results from them. As we have seen, many
Victorians thought that prostitutes were women weak from a frailty deemed naturally
feminine. They were women who could not avoid giving in to their desires to please
men. However, according to the speaker‟s description, Jenny does not fit this model.
She is not weak because of a greater impulse toward self-sacrifice; instead, she merely
gives into her inclinations toward slothfulness and sexual depravity.57
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I this reading, I am building upon Anderson‟s work with the poem. She reads
this poem as
not so much as an interior monologue as the negation of dramatic
monologue. The “speaker” repeatedly decides not to talk to the prostitute;
and I argue that his failure to speak to her emerges precisely out of the
extreme intersubjective distortions that characterize encounters with the
fallen. While actual speech is no guarantee of mutual recognition, and
while ordinary dramatic monologue itself explores imbalances of power,
this poem heightens the failure of mutuality and reveals the anxiety over
the prostitute‟s uncertain status by repeatedly negating the possibility of
speech. . . . Rossetti‟s poem . . . displays how the mutually imbricated
forces of sexual desire and commodification also unsettle deliberative
action, private identity, and sympathetic communication. (Tainted 143)
I am most interested in the poem‟s depiction of “private identity,” rather than
“sympathetic communication.” In fact, I would argue that the two are mutually exclusive
in the model of subjectivity Rossetti depicts in the poem. Sympathy itself disrupts the
development of subjectivity that must be fostered in contrast with the other.
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The speaker feels confident in his ability to “read” the prostrate woman. He
transfers his scholarship from books to Jenny, whose thoughts he imagines:
You know not what a book you seem,
Half-read by lightning in a dream! (52-53)
Conveniently, perhaps, he imagines that she would not comprehend his words. Her brain
has even decayed with misuse:
Suppose I were to think aloud,—
What if to her all this were said?
Why, as a volume seldom read
Being opened halfway shuts again,
So might the pages of her brain
Be parted at such words, and thence
Close back upon the dusty sense. (157-62)
Jenny, then, becomes to the speaker an object of study. Even her mind is an object filled
with penetrable openings, enclosed by the dying flesh of a woman who objectifies
herself. At this moment, he realizes that she has fallen asleep, and her sleeping form
emphasizes her inert fleshliness, the object status of the wilting “lily” (97).
Throughout the poem, he has been comparing their lives: “This room of yours,
my Jenny, looks / [a] change from mine so full of books” (22-23). At this point in the
poem, the comparisons take on a new urgency. Not only are their lives very different, but
Jenny seems a separate being altogether, something nearly inhuman, sleeping—as he is
surprised to report—“[j]ust as another woman sleeps!” (177). Although Rossetti might
have considered the speaker sensitive and humane to consider her well-being, I would
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like to argue that the speaker is never able to be truly sympathetic because he cannot
imagine himself in her position. As we have seen through the work of Habermas and
Sanguineti, intersubjectivity depends upon identification, in this case, empathy.
Rossetti‟s design allows the poem to foreground the speaker‟s struggle to empathize,
perhaps more so than any previous monologue speaker, and his ultimate failure.
However, we could argue that empathy is merely the projection of the self onto the
other‟s form, thus complicating any discussion of the ethics of subjectivity.58
Fundamentally, Rossetti‟s speaker must consider her Other. After all, her close
resemblance to “another woman” is “[e]nough to throw one‟s thoughts in heaps / [o]f
doubt and horror” (178-79).
Her mimicry of womanhood reveals that the “potter” has “[o]f the same lump (it
has been said) / [f]or honour and dishonour made, / [t]wo sister vessels” (182-84). The
speaker‟s hedging—“(it has been said)”—uncovers his secret hypothesis that perhaps
Jenny and his cousin Nell are two different beings altogether, not framed from the “same
lump” at all. Otherwise, “[i]t makes a goblin of the sun” (206). Yet, the speaker and
Jenny are connected in their common need for money, and their realization that life is but
a spending of the bounty of our time on earth:
Yet as to me, even so to her
Are golden sun and silver moon,
In daily largesse of earth‟s boon,
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As we shall see, psychoanalytic theories of non-violence such as Jessica
Benjamin‟s describe the necessity of both intersubjective identification and the
recognition of difference.
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Counted for life-coins to one tune.
And if, as blindfold fates are toss‟d,
Through some one man this life be lost,
Shall soul not somehow pay for soul? (223-29)
As we shall see in the course of the poem, this does not mean that there is an even
exchange rate. Any connection between the speaker and Jenny results from his largesse:
his willingness to “read” her, his approximation of these “two sister vessels,” and, finally,
his coins dropping into Jenny‟s hair, his soul paying for hers. None will see “[w]hat man
has done here” (242) to such a beautiful person; women even will forever shun her,
refusing to notice her presence: “Like a rose shut in a book / In which pure women may
not look” (253-55). 59 However, there is almost nothing left of Jenny to see, only the
shell of her body that can betray but traces of the soul that once inhabited it:
Yet, Jenny, looking long at you,
The woman almost fades from view.
A cipher of man‟s changeless sum
Of lust, past, present, and to come,
Is left. A riddle that one shrinks
To challenge from the scornful sphinx. (276-81)
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Robin Sheets argues that
the narrator occasionally senses that he himself has made Jenny into what
she is: in social terms, a prostitute; in verbal terms, the subject of his
monologue. But the general inability to name himself as agent reflects
profound guilt and confusion, not only about his participation in
prostitution but also about his objectification of women in art (332).
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Thus, in his own estimation, the speaker is not guilty of objectifying Jenny because there
is no subject left or because that subject is unknowable.
Lawrence J. Starzyk explains this process differently:
Like the veiling of a dead duchess‟s portrait, the silence of a sleeping
Jenny similarly minimizes the disconcerting messages likely to be
delivered by objects suddenly given voice. But attenuation never fully
relieves pain, nor does it prevent these protagonists [the narrator of Jenny
and Browning‟s Pictor Ignotus, Child Roland, and the speaker of
“Pauline”] from taking three important steps in aestheticizing their
respective idols. Silencing a potentially threatening voice is the first step.
The second is a consequence of the first: the idol must be rendered
inanimate and thus an object. The third step discloses the ultimate reason
for silencing and thus rendering inanimate the idol: to appropriate the
object to self and in the process resuscitate the object by solipsistically
assuming the “idol‟s empery” (“Sordello” 1.515). What is broken by the
self is reconstituted as objective correlative self. (232)
I agree that the narrator of Jenny configures an identity for Jenny from his own thoughts,
thus projecting a version of himself into his representation of her. However, he
constantly distinguishes between the self he recognizes in his thoughts and the version of
himself he projects onto Jenny‟s sleeping form and “reads” as her identity. Jules Paul
Seigel understands this process as “a dialogue of the mind with itself, a dialogue of heart
and head” (685). By contrast, I think that Rossetti is dramatizing a kind of subjectivity in
the poem that requires this other self, the “objective correlative self,” to provide contrast
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with the familiar self and to contradict the self‟s desires and motivations. In other words,
I disagree with the order that Starzyk suggests. In Starzyk‟s scheme, there is a central
subject implied who acts to silence and objectify the other. In the model detailed in this
chapter, the central subject cannot attain a fully developed subjectivity—cannot exist
fully in terms of a self he recognizes—without the synchronous process of building
subjectivity in the self and objectifying the Other.
Immediately after his philosophical meanderings, the dawn breaks, Jenny stirs,
and he sings to her, “Poor little Jenny, good to kiss” (299). He sees their reflection,
Jenny‟s face layered by the etchings of her lovers‟ names on the mirror. The speaker‟s
gaze moves to the visual layers in the mirror of the names, the diamonds that etched
them, and Jenny‟s face, which all equate to her body‟s economic value. Accordingly, he
fulfills what he imagines are her dreams, inserting in the mirrored image the shine of
golden coins:
I lay among your golden hair
Perhaps the subject of your dreams,
These golden coins.
……………………………………
Ah Jenny, yes, we know your dreams.
……………………………………….
Jenny, my love rang true! for still
Love at first sight is vague, until
That tinkling makes him audible. (340-42, 364, 380-83)
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Finally, he admits that he “mock[s]” her because he is “[a]shamed of [his] own shame”
(383, 384). However, he is not truly connected to her; his soul is not irrevocable lost.
She reminds him of their differences60:
Well, of such thoughts so much I know:
In my life, as in hers, they show,
By a far gleam which I may near,
A dark path I can strive to clear. (387-90).
The “far gleam” of her soul contrasts the darkness that envelopes her body. Jenny‟s body
symbolizes her “dark path” because, to the speaker, she has allowed its value to be
economic. The interweaving of commercial and spiritual allusions in the poem makes it
apparent that the speaker‟s payment of golden coins represents his soul paying for hers:
“Shall soul not somehow pay for soul?” (229). At the same time, perhaps these models
of exchange represent our limited avenues to intimacy; if soul cannot know soul, it can
only “pay” for it. Although through Buchanan‟s criticism, Rossetti would be associated
60

My reading of the narrator‟s enlightenment—his walk home in the sunshine and
his supposed moral reformation—goes against a line of criticism that interprets this
ending as ultimately morally uplifting or as ambivalent. According to Sheets,
[T]his young man experiences moments of insight, guilt, and even despair.
… D. M. R. Bentley and others argue that the narrator develops moral
insight as the night proceeds, attaining “a measure of spiritual
regeneration” at the end (“RFW,” p. 192). However, it seems to me that
the narrator‟s commentary, like his conduct, is fraught with contradiction.
The young man cannot explain how his past is related to his present….
(320-21)
I would like to argue that this ending is the only natural conclusion to the narrator‟s
construction of contrasubjectivity. He must end in light and Jenny in darkness; he must
be on one path and she another; he must be in nature and she in a small apartment.
Otherwise, he cannot have a fully developed subject position built upon the differences
between them. This walk into the light is the dramatization of the philosophical
distancing he has worked to cultivate throughout the monologue.
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with the speaker and pay dearly for it, as we shall see, Rossetti rejects this association.
After all, he stayed beside Jenny despite the horrific circumstances (i.e. burial and
resurrection) for twenty-three years. By contrast, the speaker can leave; he can “strive to
clear” the “dark path.” In this way, even the exchange happens at a distance
psychologically. He does not engage with the system of exchange; presumably, he has
not even slept with her. Throughout the poem, he continues to form his subjectivity
against hers, his easy walk home in the light against her paralytic sleep in persistent
darkness.
As a dramatic monologue, the poem leads the reader to view the whole situation
outside of and within the speaker‟s subjective gaze. Although the speaker cannot always
discern Jenny‟s humanity, the reader presumably can. In this way, Rossetti cannot be
said merely to reveal his objectification of women. Instead, he positions the reader to
identify the consecutive mechanisms of the speaker‟s judgment of Jenny. For Rossetti,
this poetic method allowed the reader access into the speaker‟s mind, the “inner standingpoint,” as he explains in “The Stealthy School of Criticism” (1343), an essay he wrote in
response to Buchanan‟s public criticism. Buchanan, a poet and critic, published a
scathing review of the recent poetry by William Morris, Algernon Charles Swinburne,
and Dante Gabriel Rossetti the next year in his essay on “The Fleshly School of Poetry.”
He describes the speaker of the poem as “never a true lover merging his identity into that
of the beloved one; never spiritual, never tender; always self-conscious and aesthetic”
(1336). While Buchanan takes an ethical stance against Rossetti here, I am more
interested in analyzing Jenny to find Rossetti‟s contribution to a larger poetic
conversation about ethics, genre, and gender. Rossetti‟s poetic self-consciousness
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seemed sexually self-gratifying for Rossetti to Buchanan, who, just before this section,
describes reading Swinburne‟s poetry with disgust:
Here is a full-grown man, presumably intelligent and cultivated, putting on
record for other full-grown men to read, the most secret mysteries of
sexual connection, and that with so sickening a desire to reproduce the
sensual mood, so careful a choice of epithet to convey mere animal
sensations, that we merely shudder at the shameless nakedness. (1332)
Buchanan does not object to “sexual connection,” but he fears the perhaps contagious
power of “fleshliness,” a drive he also locates in Rossetti‟s Jenny: “We detect its
fleshliness at a glance; we perceive that the scene was fascinating less through its human
tenderness than because it, like all the others [the poetry of Swinburne and Morris],
possessed an inherent quality of animalism” (1336). “Fleshliness” threatens to corrupt
private acts, to flood with light the “secret mysteries.” For Buchanan, the implications
are revolutionary and dangerous:
Fully conscious of this themselves, the fleshly gentlemen have bound
themselves by solemn league and covenant to extol fleshliness as the
distinct and supreme end of poetic and pictorial art; to aver that poetic
expression is greater than poetic thought, and by inference that the body is
greater than the soul, and sound superior to sense; and that the poet,
properly to develop his poetic faculty, must be an intellectual
hermaphrodite, to whom the very facts of day and night are lost in a whirl
of aesthetic terminology. (1330)
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Such an act separates expression from thought, sound from sense, and body from soul.
For Buchanan, Rossetti‟s “self-conscious and aesthetic” (1336) poetry commits several
distinct errors. First, it embarrassingly reveals Rossetti‟s relationships with prostitutes
and attempts to pass juvenile lust for profound human meaning. Next, it bares the
author‟s presumption to focus only on the object of his musings, the body of the sleeping
woman, while pretending to understand her spirit. Finally, it consists of half-formed
thoughts better imagined in visual form (1334) and so separates crafted language from
depth of meaning.61
Dante Gabriel Rossetti quickly shot back in “The Stealthy School of Criticism,”
also in 1871, that Buchanan missed the point of the dramatic monologue altogether. The
genre allows the poet to stand back, not self-consciously in the reality of an
autobiographically scripted event, but within a fictional mind:
But the motive powers of art reverse the requirement of science, and
demand first of all an inner standing-point. The heart of such a mystery as
this must be plucked from the very world in which it beats or bleeds; and
the beauty and pity, the self-questioning and all-questionings which it
brings with it, can come with full force only from the mouth of one alive
to its whole appeal, such as the speaker put forward in the poem, —that is,
of a young and thoughtful man of the world. To such a speaker, many
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For a brilliant and thorough description of the impact of Buchanan‟s attack on
Rossetti‟s psychological stability and his health, see William Clyde De Vane‟s “The
Harlot and the Thoughtful Young Man.” He writes, “Buchanan‟s pamphlet changed the
course of Rossetti‟s life. The crisis was immediate. To cure his insomnia and anguish
Rossetti took enormous doses of chloral and whisky” (466).
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half-cynical revulsions of feeling and reverie, and a recurrent presence of
the impression of beauty (however artificial) which first brought him
within such a circle of influence, would be inevitable features of the
dramatic relations portrayed. (1343)
Rossetti‟s ability to enter the speaker‟s psyche so persuasively in his execution of finding
the poetic “inner standing-point” unfortunately provided the grounds for Buchanan‟s
attack. The great irony for Rossetti is that Buchanan wrote his essay under a pseudonym
(Thomas Maitland) and then attacked his poetry as dishonest.62 For Rossetti, the
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Reeling from Buchanan‟s essay, Rossetti and Swinburne quickly attempted to
ascertain the name of the author, who used the pseudonym “Maitland.” D. G. Rossetti
wrote to William Michael Rossetti on October 17, 1871,
Dear WWhat do you think? Ellis writes to me that Maitland is-----------------------Buchanan! [Rossetti‟s writing takes up the whole line here.]
Do you know B‟s prose, & can you judge if it be so? If it be, I‟ll not deny
myself the fun of a printed Letter to the Skunk. E. says he has it “on very
good authority.”
Yours, Gabriel. (Ashley A294, ff. 183)
D. G. Rossetti apparently also informed his brother of his intention to write a letter in
response to Buchanan‟s essay. As W. M. Rossetti explains in a letter to Swinburne,
Gabriel naturally takes such “criticism” in a reasonable Spirit of disdain:
but he is somewhat displeased with it too, & had thoughts of printing a
letter (he has written a little of it) to Mr. Buchanan, not ill adapted to
produce a tingling sensation on that individual‟s hide. However my
advice to G is not to print anything; & to make very sure that is Buchanan
(tho really I suppose it is) before he definitely fixes any responsibility on
him. G has persuaded me on two very good rhymes also—one about
“Buchanan
Who the pseudo prefers to the anon”:
I am sorry I can‟t quote it fully—…. (Ashley A294, ff. 89)
W. M. Rossetti would later write in his Memoir, “From his wild ways of talking—about
conspiracies and what not—I was astounded to perceive that he was, past question, not
entirely sane” (qtd. in De Vane, “The Harlot” 467). The “good rhymes” to which W. M.
Rossetti refers are as follows:
As a critic, the poet Buchanan
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Things the Pseudo worth two of the Anon.
Into Maitland he‟s slunk;
But what gift in the skunk
Guides the shuttering nose to Buchanan!
And the Lord stuck His Thumb into His Nose
And spread His everlasting Fingers out.
A fivefold Shadow blacken‟d Heaven. The depths
Yelped. One small Scotchman with a mangy Muse
Twang‟d his Jew‟s harp on Earth, till Silence cried,
“By God, O god, this is unbearable!” (Ashley A1880, ff. 52-53)
Swinburne‟s response was even more virulent. He was fielding complaints from clergy
at this time, and he presents himself as being both energized and angered by the constant
criticism:
The little reptile‟s hide demands the lash—his head the application of a
man‟s heel, his breech, of a man‟s toe . . . . . . . I believe it is a habit with
the verminous little cur to sneak into some other hide as mangy as his own
and pretend to tell on himself as well as his betters to keep up the
disguise. (Ashley A294, ff. 71)
As if to ensure that Browning would not take Rossetti‟s side against him,
Buchanan wrote him in March of 1872, just after the publication of Fifine at the Fair:
I am delighted to hear you say what you do say, I have to ask to be
forgiven for troubling you with a matter so contemptible. On one thing I
was certain: that these men would poison even your mind if they could.
My pamphlet is just ready, & be its literary merit what it may, I am
convinced that it will do good . . . perhaps even saving them from going
headlong to Hell. You will see the whole matter there put in its perfect
form of simple & artless truths, & you will moreover see their allusions to
yourself. In this matter of the Fleshly School, I know every great-minded
& honest man will stand on my side; and, come what may, a Snake is
scotched effectually & his entire scheme ruined.
In the whole finale of the affair, I will only plead guilty to one
instance of recrimination. When these men, not content with outrageous
literature, violated the memory of the poor boy who went home from me
twelve years ago to die, I made a religious vow to have no mercy; & I
have had none. Thus far I have been revengeful. The main cause is
nevertheless righteous & good. (Ashley A4374 ff. 91-92)
Buchanan later wrote of the incident,
I published many years ago an article called the “Fleshly School of
Poetry.” It created a tremendous stir and provoked endless recriminations,
and the questions which I am about to answer not is, Was it an honest
article, i.e., did it actually represent my honest belief? To answer that
question I must refer to the fons et origo of the whole affair. Not long
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dramatic monologue allows the poet to trace a speaker‟s mental movements and
motivations, and this makes the poem beneficial socially—although that was not his only
interest—whether the speaker acts humanely or not. However, the aesthetic issue at this
point had become political and the genre itself seemed like a form of violence. If the poet
silences the female figure, such as in Jenny, in order to adumbrate human mental
processes through a speaker, how could poetry engage ethically with society?

before its publication Mr. Swinburne the poet had gone out of his way to
print, in a note to one of his prose essays, an insulting allusion to the
friend of my boyhood, David Gray, whose premature death I still mourned
deeply. He spoke contemptuously and cruelly of Gray‟s “poor little
book,” an allusion emphasised, I was assured, by other spiteful comments
of the Coterie to which Mr. Swinburne belonged. … Whatever motive
inspired the allusion, it seemed to me the most ill-timed, offensive, and
cruel; and I vowed then and there to avenge it if ever I had the
opportunity. I am not justifying my conduct; I am simply describing it. I
am not naturally revengeful, but remember I was very young and my dead
friend was very dear to me. Well, I bided my time. I forgot the
provocation I myself had given by my review of Mr. Swinburne‟s “Poems
and Ballads” in the Athenaeum…. The retort came, not merely in Mr.
Swinburne‟s fierce exculpatory brochure, but in Mr. Rossetti‟s pamphlet
defending his friend, in the opening passage of which I was called “a poor
and pretentious poetaster who was causing storms in teacups,” the allusion
being to the success of my “London Poems.” From that instant I
considered my self free to strike at the whole Coterie, which I finally did,
at the moment when all the journals were sounding extravagant paeans
over the poems of Dante Gabriel Rossetti. (qtd. in Jay 159-61)
Buchanan professes that other writers agreed with his estimation of Rossetti‟s work. He
claims, “Tennyson avowed me vivâ voce that he considered Rossetti‟s sonnet on „Nuptial
Sleep‟ the „filthiest thing he had ever read‟ [and] Browning in private talks had been
equally emphatic” (qtd. in Jay 161).
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“[T]he woman‟s superfluity”:
Contrasubjective Response in A Castaway
As if directly responding to the differences between Nell and Jenny that the
speaker of Jenny identifies, A Castaway begins with a comparison between Eulalie‟s life
now and that of her childhood, which had been recorded in a diary she reads sadly:
Poor little diary, with its simple thoughts,
Its good resolves, its “Studied French an hour,” ….
……………………………………………………
And did I write it? Was I this good girl,
This budding colourless young rose of home? (1-2, 7-8)
In this immediate response to Jenny, Webster sets up a dialogue through the monologue
through her rereading of Jenny‟s character in Eulalie‟s. Although Jenny and A Castaway
were published in the same year, with four editions of Rossetti‟s Poems published in
1870, Webster would have had time to read Jenny and respond to it in her poem. While
Jenny wears “Yesterday‟s rose,” which “now droops forlorn,” (324) and is the “rose shut
in a book” (253) with “crushed petals” (269), Eulalie has now developed into the full rose
from the “budding colourless young rose” (8). Jenny is crushed by her circumstances and
trapped in a narrative—a book—“[i]n which pure women may not look” (254).
Furthermore, she is trapped by the speaker‟s narrative of her and crushed by his
suffocating “reading.” Eulalie, on the other hand, looks back on her sheltered life with
disdain, her Nell-like existence:
Did I so live content in such a life,
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Seeing no larger scope, nor asking it…? (9-10)
The speaker believes that he knows Jenny‟s dreams of golden coins: “Ah Jenny, yes, we
know your dreams” (364). However, it is only as an adult who has escaped her mundane
and trifling domestic existence that Eulalie knows the fallacy of her early dreams:
For gaiety, to go, in my best white
Well washed and starched and freshened with new bows,
No wishes and no cares, almost no hopes,
Only the young girl‟s haze and golden dreams
That veil the Future from her. (18-23)
Of course, just as the speaker in Jenny rationalizes his relationship with her to condone it
implicitly, Eulalie strives to create a narrative for her life that gives her agency and
justification. At times, the mask slips for both speakers and they reveal the shame they
feel in participating in prostitution. For example, the speaker of Jenny is moved to claim
any kinship between Nell and Jenny “makes a goblin of the sun” (206) and Eulalie
admits,
So long since:
And now it seems a jest to talk of me
As if I could be one with her, of me
Who am … me. (22-25)
These echoes of Jenny in A Castaway serve to put the monologues in dialogue. In many
ways, Eulalie speaks with a voice we might expect from Jenny. Strikingly, Webster has
brought the objectified woman to subjective life.
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By using genre to analyze Webster‟s involvement in a conversation about
subjectivity, I am building upon the arguments Cynthia Scheinberg makes about Levy‟s
monologues:
I want to suggest that Levy‟s dramatic monologues incorporate into their
generic structure an awareness of the problem I posed above, namely that
readers, auditors, and critics have deep moral and personal commitments
which necessarily affect their capacities for identification or sympathy
with poetic speakers. (“Recasting „Sympathy and Judgment‟” 179)
Furthermore, I am disagreeing with Rigg, who argues that this poem represents Webster‟s
work with monodrama, not the dramatic monologue. For Rigg, “the female speakers are
delineated not through re-presentation or reconstruction, but through representation or
image” (“Augusta Webster: The Social” 82). She explains that A Castaway and “The
Happiest Girl,”
with their focus on social context instead of on a specific historical figure,
are monodrama. The common ancestry makes the distinction subtle, but
the speaker in a monodrama adopts a series of poses that reflect the inner
life of the speaker at the same time that they indicate the social, political,
and philosophical climate in which the speaker exists. In other words, the
integration of speaker and situation presents a complete “portrait” and is
the point of Webster‟s monodrama. (83)
Although I too see the generic relationship between Webster‟s poem and monodrama, I
believe that rather than writing in another genre, Webster takes part in the conversation
with Rossetti through the dramatic monologue. After all, the interlocutor in Jenny is
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sleeping, and Elvire‟s position as interlocutor is debatable. For example, Clyde De L.
Ryals suggests, “It may be that Elvire [and Fifine are] not even present” (212). As we
have seen, these generic categories can be flexible. By tracing these poetic echoes, we
can identify how Webster sought to shape the poetic conversation about
contrasubjectivity.
Webster‟s writing reflects her social interests; in her literary work, she questions
her culture‟s gender narratives. According to Angela Leighton, “Webster‟s journalism,
like her poetry, is ultimately concerned with the political truths behind life‟s pleasing
myths, with the real, listless, ill-educated girls behind the spell-bound beauties of fairytale” (Victorian Women Poets: Writing 172). Her experience traveling on her father‟s
boat and moving with his career (Sutphin, Introduction 10) probably helped her to gain a
more panoramic view of British culture. She seems to have reacted to her distance from
English society by challenging gender stereotypes; she was expelled from the South
Kensington Art School for whistling, and she taught herself Greek and began translating
(Sutphin, Introduction 10). Later, Webster worked to produce social and political change
through her writing and political involvements (Sutphin, Introduction 12).
In tacit agreement with the traditional misogynistic thought that equates women‟s
worth with their beauty, the speaker of Jenny—as Rossetti, of course, has situated him—
notes that her beauty is worthy of artistic re-creation. More specifically, such rendering
is necessary for people to see her beautiful spirit, the results of “what God can do”:
And the stilled features thus descried
As Jenny‟s long throat droops aside,—
The shadows where the cheeks are thin,
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And pure wide curve from ear to chin,—
With Raffael‟s, Leonardo‟s hand
To show them to men‟s souls, might stand
Whole ages long, the whole world through,
For preachings of what God can do. (233-40)
Eulalie similarly recognizes her own beauty. However, she is under no illusions that her
outer beauty just needs to be appreciated as linked to some capacity for inner beauty. All
beauty is performance for Eulalie, and it has a price:
Aye, let me feed upon my beauty thus,
Be glad in it like painters when they see
At last the face they dreamed but could not find
Look from their canvas on them, triumph in it,
The dearest thing I have. Why, ‟tis my all,
Let me make much of it: is it not this,
This beauty, my own curse at once and tool
To snare men‟s souls, (I know what the good say
Of beauty in such creatures) is it not this
That makes me feel myself a woman still [?] (34-44)
For “the good,” the prostitute‟s beauty is an aberration because it used as a “tool,” rather
than remaining a symbol of God‟s goodness unencumbered by social utility. However,
as Eulalie will point out, women who are not prostitutes use their beauty in just the same
way—to attain economic stability. After all, “who wants his wife to know weeds‟ Latin
names? / who ever chose a girl for saying dates? / or asked if she had learned to trace a
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map?” (373-75). In fact, she darkly suggests that “to kill off female infants, ‟twould
make room” for more women to find jobs (302). Outer beauty protects all women in
such a world, in which “the woman‟s superfluity” (298).
According to Slinn, the poem reveals that “[t]he difference between wife and
mistress is a difference of economic function rather than inherent (or internal) moral
condition” (172).63 By continuing to interweave Jenny into her poem, Webster suggests
that men actively contribute to women‟s struggles by valuing outward displays of beauty
and the women who embrace such a system of value:
Yes, a new rich dress,
with lace like this too, that‟s a soothing balm
for any fretting woman, cannot fail,
I‟ve heard men say it … and they know so well
what‟s in all women‟s hearts, especially women like me. (A Castaway,
456-61)
Of course, Eulalie cannot deny the appeal, one made even more attractive by her
Victorian socialization as a girl and her pragmatic realization of the possible profits “a
new rich dress” could yield in her profession. Reverberating in these lines is the
speaker‟s confident claim in Jenny, “Ah Jenny, yes, we know your dreams” (364).
Eulalie‟s sarcasm betrays her belief that men often know nothing of women, or they
would realize that they are “poor fools” (99) whose wives “could keep their husbands if
they cared, / but ‟tis an easier life to let them go, / and whimper at it for morality” (10963

See Rigg and Brown for additional discussion on Webster and the relationship
between prostitution and marriage in Victorian England.
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11). Because she recognizes the socio-economic forces that put her in the position of the
“fallen woman,” she can declare, “I have looked coolly on my what and why, / and I
accept myself” (135-36). E. Warwick Slinn argues,
Eulalie, like Rossetti‟s speaker, is written by these discourses—not being
able to elude them—but she is more aware of their function and of her
difference (which is also produced by them). This interplay between
identification and difference constitutes the dynamic process of the poem
and the nature of Eulalie as female subject and courtesan. “A Castaway”
thus offers one of the clearest examples in Victorian poetry of an interplay
of reciprocation and alienation between speaker and society and hence
between poem and culture—one of the conditions for poetry as cultural
criticism …. (163-64)
I would like to add that Webster was engaging Rossetti in a conversation about
“identification and difference” through A Castaway. As a result, the poems meet at
several important points through direct allusion and through similar constructions of
subjectivity.
Drawing on Jenny, Webster further develops the metaphor of the path that proved
so important for religious rhetoric.64 In Jenny, the speaker endeavors to use the figure of
the woman to remind him to stay on the right path, in contrast to her “dark path [he] can
strive to clear” (390). In A Castaway, that path is not chosen by the willfully sinful. It is
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See, for example, Christina Rossetti‟s “Uphill.”
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the horrific fate of those without other choices, who must “hurl [themselves] into a
quicksand” (466) beyond the help of “some kindly people in the world” (464):
And how, so firmly clutching the stretched hand,
as death‟s pursuing terror bids, even so,
how can one reach firm land, having to foot
the treacherous crumbling soil that slides and gives
and sucks one in again? Impossible path!
No, why waste struggles, I or any one?
what is must be. What then? I, where I am,
sinking and sinking; let the wise pass by
and keep their wisdom for an apter use,
let me sink merrily as I best may. (470-79)
Reading Jenny from Eulalie‟s perspective means recognizing that whether or not she
wants it, the speaker in Rossetti‟s poem does not even reach out to help. He is not one of
the “kindly people.” In Webster‟s rereading of Rossetti, the speaker of Jenny participates
in the woman‟s objectification and leaves her alone to “let [her] sink merrily.” Of course,
their projects seem fundamentally different in this way; as we have seen, Rossetti‟s poem
addresses complicated epistemological, formal, and ethical issues while Webster‟s poem
focuses on the social implications. She seems to suggest that there are “kindly people”
who can empathize; thus, empathy without mere projection is possible. While Eulalie
often speaks from hopelessness and despair, Webster‟s poem suggests that the speaker of
Jenny acts from a position of privilege and chooses to avoid her in the future not because
she is beyond his help, but because he wants merely to preserve his own morality. The
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irony, of course, is that his willingness to enter her “dark path” for his own pleasure and
then to eschew it for his moral improvement undermines any ethical standing he might
choose to take.
Coins feature in A Castaway, as they also do in Jenny and Fifine. The speaker of
Jenny asks, “Shall soul not somehow pay for soul?” (229), paying a piece of his soul to
her in the form of his coins bouncing in her “golden hair” (340) and his soul‟s deviation
onto her “dark path,” if only for a night. Eulalie believes in an economic system in which
soul cannot “somehow pay for soul”; instead, the cold and “indifferent world” (562) runs
on a system of exchange65 in which each body pays for its own poor investments:
I see clear now and know one has one‟s life
in hand at first to spend or spare or give
like any other coin; spend it or give
or drop it in the mire, ….
………………………………………………
And if you spend or give that is your choice;
and if you let it slip that‟s your choice too,
you should have held it firmer. (552-61)
Some women, “useless else” (566), from whom the world “buys [them] of [them]selves”
(567), have a choice to make. They “could hold back, / free all of [them] to starve” (56768), choosing not to sell their body to the world. However, others, although they “have
done no ill and are in luck” (569), “slave their lives out and have food and clothes / until
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For more discussion on this system, see Slinn, Brown, and Nead.

139
they grow unserviceably old” (570-71). In this way, Webster reveals that the speaker of
Jenny betrays two fallacies in his payment of coins. First, he believes that he knows her
desires, i.e. new dresses, and the coins can buy them. Second, he believes that he has
participated in a heavenly exchange, soul for soul, by participating in her trade. He does
not realize that any woman who desires the accoutrement of the system of her
objectification cannot form desires outside of this system. Furthermore, buying more
dresses just provides her with more tools for her industry, rather than helping her
individually. He also believes that paying for her time, rather than her body, makes the
money less a token formed by and used within the economic system that values life as a
good “to spend or spare or give / like any other coin” (A Castaway 553-54).
Eulalie‟s subjectivity is that of a woman who realizes that the world has defined
itself against her, and in doing so, has drained any non-economic value from her body.
She has lost the luxury of fully expressing her feelings, so they surface in mingling
emotions, a blend of laughter and tears:
I could laugh outright. . . . . . or else,
for I feel near it, roll on the ground and sob.
Well, after all, there‟s not much difference
between the two sometimes. (619-22)
At the end of the poem, she desires some human contact, even with “the cackling goose”
(625), rather than sitting alone; “half a loaf / is better than no bread” (627-28). Slinn
argues,
Thus [Eulalie‟s] beauty becomes a focus for her interdependence with
established signs. And thus Webster dramatizes the dilemma of female
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identity (or any gendered identity for that matter), where a woman asserts
her separate definition and yet remains inseparable from her social
environs. (165)
Indeed, Webster was interested in redefining women‟s social value through poetry that
reveals women‟s—and Eulalie‟s—negotiation of these social codes. However, it is her
literary conversation with Rossetti that most clearly elucidates her project. In order to
explain the need for large-scale social change for gender equality, she needed to
dramatize the subjective effects of the current system. Eulalie‟s miserable circumstances
pathetically represent these effects, but speaking from the “margin” (184)—as Slinn
argues—most clearly exhibits the subjectivity of the “other,” against whom other
characters like the speaker of Jenny, and, later, Fifine, define themselves.

“[W]e put forth hand and pluck
At what seems somehow like reality—a soul”:
Metonymy, Contrasubjectivity, and Fifine at the Fair
Written a year later in response to Jenny and, I would argue, A Castaway, Fifine
reveals Browning‟s perspective on the matter. De Vane explains, “Browning wrote
Fifine, according to a manuscript in the library of Balliol College, between December
1871 and April 1872, the very time when the clamor aroused by the Buchanan-Rossetti
controversy was at its height in London” (“The Harlot” 479). He suggests that Browning
“meant no attack upon Rossetti‟s moral character” (“The Harlot” 481). Instead, “it was a
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mere literary disagreement concerning a point of human nature, and he as master in those
regions . . . was recording his own opinion” (481).66 I concur with this assessment of the
situation, and I would like to add that Browning‟s text exhibits even more selfconsciousness about the process of contrasubjectivity Rossetti explores in Jenny. Their
view of “human nature,” then, was quite similar. They differed in their conclusions.
Rossetti seems to have believed that art itself links people through the capacity to
construct an “inner standing-point,” whereas, for Browning, this capacity corresponds to
a truth of human nature that art reveals, rather than heals. In other words, Rossetti was
more optimistic than was Browning about the possibilities for human connectedness
despite—or through—their mutual epistemological limitations. To create a coherent
conception of their identities, people must create “inner standing-points” for other
people, constructing others in contrast to their construction of themselves. What serves
as a creative capacity for Rossetti reveals a truth about human cognition—and human
disconnectedness—for Browning. Browning thus depicts the violence of
contrasubjectivity through Fifine.
De Vane reads this differently. He argues that there is an inherent connection
between the two poems, but their connection is primarily in their subject matter and the
possible biographical revelations of the poets:
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Charlotte C. Watkins argues,
At a time when Buchanan‟s epithet “the Fleshly School” had currency,
Browning appears to have dramatized his judgment of the “new” poetry of
the 1870‟s by placing an argument analogous to the criticism which
defended it in the mouth of a speaker for whose character he chose as an
image the very prototype of the fleshly, Don Juan himself. (431)
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Indeed, Browning seems to have been almost as apprehensive about Fifine
as Rossetti had been about Jenny, and for somewhat the same reasons.
The woman who gives title to Browning‟s poem is of the same ancient
profession as Jenny, and the hero or speaker is, as in Jenny, a rather too
thoughtful young man of the world who ponders upon the situation of the
gypsy girl, Fifine, and upon his own emotions concerning her. (“The
Harlot” 479)
For DeVane, the poem itself serves as “the speaker‟s justification, through some of
Browning‟s most cherished principles, of his sensual yearnings for the handsome gypsy
girl” (“The Harlot and the Thoughtful Young Man” 480). As he notes, “The casuist
justifying sensuality by quoting Browning was Satan quoting scripture” (480).
Comparing the two speakers, he concludes that
Rossetti‟s young man leaves Jenny‟s lodgings at daybreak, innocent in act,
compassionate in heart, after flinging gold into Jenny‟s hair; Browning‟s
young man, in the midst of his musings, slips gold into Fifine‟s
tambourine, and presently, in a most adulterous mood, goes off to
encounter her. The moral philosophizings of these two thoughtful young
men lead to totally dissimilar actions. (480-81)
I agree that Browning is building upon Rossetti‟s poem through speakers that respond
differently. I would argue that in Fifine, Browning builds upon the idea of “reading” that
Rossetti establishes in Jenny and Webster disrupts in A Castaway in order to explore how
this “reading” functions from an ethical vantage point. The difference in Browning‟s
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ending, I suggest, results from his desire to portray objectification taken to a physical
conclusion.
My use of metaphor and metonymy here builds upon the work of Earl G.
Ingersoll and Jane Gallop. Gallop explains the sexual connotations of metaphor and
metonym:
Metaphor is patent; metonymy is latent. The latency, the hiddenness of
metonymy, like that of female genitalia, lends it an appearance of
naturalness or passivity, so that the realism […] appears either as the lack
of tropes, or as somehow mysterious, the “dark continent” (Freud‟s term
for female sexuality) of rhetoric. (qtd. in Ingersoll 547)
Ingersoll describes the differences thus: “Metaphor finds a signifier to represent the
signified which has been repressed in the unconscious; metonymy finds a contiguous
signifier to escape the significant signifier” (547). He explains that Lacan, building upon
Roman Jakobson, “reads metaphor as an expression of Freud‟s „identification and
symbolism‟ . . . [and] metonymy as an expression of Freud‟s „condensation‟ and
„displacement‟” (546). While Fifine is obviously not a realist text, we can use these
descriptions to build a model of poetic metonymy in the poem.
The speaker develops an elaborate scheme of representation to depict his
“reading” of Fifine, Elvire, and all women. Through the course of this long description,
the speaker moves from metaphorically representing the women, finding a creative
signifier for the signified of their existence, to metonymically representing the women,
escaping from their signified identities through multiplying signifiers. While it may be
impossible to represent someone else accurately, with any attempt resulting in a
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collection of signifiers, the speaker in Fifine claims to see to the truth of women‟s
existence. In this way, the poem reveals the problems with a philosophy in which one
can purely represent the other‟s identity. The Platonic and aesthetic search for the true
form beneath the representation certainly exists in Fifine through the speaker‟s
philosophy:
I have not vexed in vain
Elvire: because she knows, now she has stood the test
How, this and this being good, herself may still be best
O‟ the beauty in review; because the flesh that claimed
Unduly my regard, she thought, the taste, she blamed
In me, for things extern, was all mistake, she finds,—
Or will find, when I prove that bodies show me minds,
That, through the outward sign, the inward grace allures,
And sparks from heaven transpierce earth‟s coarsest covertures, —
All by demonstrating the value of Fifine! (329-38)
This philosophy loses its cogency because its mouthpiece, the sensual speaker,
presumably Don Juan, maintains his “conquests of the soul” (840) which leads, of course,
to the conquest of bodies. He ultimately compares women to inanimate objects in his art
collection, altering their means of signification in his scheme from beautiful spirits, to
beautiful bodies, to things that are his.67
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Robyn Warhol defines metonymy in a very broad, and very helpful way:
Unlike most scholars who have been trying assiduously to narrow down
the precise meaning of “metonymy”—or, indeed, to discredit it as a
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He “demonstrat[es] the value of Fifine” (338) by placing her in the role of many
female characters. He uses the excuse of trying to see the “true” Fifine, to see the
signifier beneath her sign, while trying to control her:
[W]e put forth hand and pluck
At what seems somehow like reality—a soul.
I catch at this and that, to capture and control. (1093-95)
The “pageant” (580) dramatizes the process of Fifine‟s representation that moves from
metaphor to metonym in the speaker‟s mind. He first places Fifine‟s “phantom” (298) in
his pageant, but soon all of these women prove phantom figures under his control, all
types of Woman. In this way, the speaker uses the women to prove to Elvire that his
interest in Fifine is purely academic; the women (Helen, Lady Venus, Cleopatra, a Saint)
serve as versions of Fifine that reveal something about her character that he is able to
rhetorical category altogether—I will use the term as broadly as possible.
“Metonymy,” for our purposes, will include the substitution and
association in discourse of terms related to each other by numerous kinds
of contiguity: by (1) cause and effect (e.g., “that movie was a good cry”);
(2) inventor and invented or maker and thing produced (e.g. calling a
painting “a Rembrandt”); (3) user and instrument (e.g., “he‟s the base
guitar, she‟s the drums”); (4) doer and thing done (e.g., “she‟s
management” or “he‟s administration”); (5) passion and object of passion
(consider the referent of “Lolita” in Vladimir Nabokov‟s novel: not the
littler girl Dolores Haze, but the passion Humbert Humbert has associated
with her; or, consider Hugh Bredin‟s helpful example: “she is my true
love”); (6) container and contained (e.g., “that pot is boiling over”); (7)
place and object, event, or place (e.g., “Woodstock,” “Pearl Harbor,”
“Watergate”); (8) time and object, event, or institution in time (e.g., “68”
for the latest “revolution” in Paris); (9) possessor and possessed (e.g., “ask
the fur coat over there what she wants”); and (10) part for whole
(otherwise known as synecdoche). A broader example of metonymy is the
relation between (11) concrete object and abstraction, a strictly discursive
relation that characterizes those situations where metonymy “blossoms
into metaphor.” (76)
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discern. This double objectification pushes the real Fifine even further in the background
of the monologue as the speaker interprets her according to past interpretations of women
in history.
He even begins to interpret his wife (Elvire) as she pulls away: “(Your husband
holds you fast / Will have you listen, learn your character at last!)” (462-63).68 As if she
has to “learn [her] character” from her husband, Elvire is also denied an identity of her
own. Her only power is through trying to evade the speaker‟s controlling text—as she
seems to do, despite her husband who “holds [her] fast.” He tells her to “play out [her]
rôle / I‟ the pageant” (579-80), that her “phantom” (580) cannot yet leave the stage, in an
attempt to control even her soul. Elvire is a silent entity whose husband speaks for her.
After he feels he has adequately explained the inner significance of Fifine‟s soul, he
places Elvire within the pageant as Fifine‟s opposite.
For the speaker, art has the capacity to reveal a sort of truth otherwise
impenetrable: “Art is my evidence / That something was, is, might be; but no more thing
itself, / Than flame is fuel” (628-30). Of course, in these lines the “truth” he is trying to
convince Elvire that “Art” reveals to him is that she is still beautiful, although he admits
that she would argue,
My mirror would reflect a tall, thin, pale, deep-eyed
Personage, pretty once, it may be, doubtless still
Loving, —a certain grace yet lingers, if you will. (624-26)
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Donald Hair explains, “He cannot read „the slow shake of head, the
melancholy smile‟ (144) of Elvire, and so he turns to Fifine: „Here‟s she, shall make by
thoughts be surer what they mean! / First let me read the signs‟ (149-50)” (284-85).
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In other words, he tells her that she is not still beautiful at all, but the same “Art” that
gives him a special vision into Fifine‟s true nature allows him to see Elvire‟s beauty. If
Elvire denies the first, she denies the second, too. He goes on to explain, “I seem to
understand the way heart chooses heart” (646). According to his theory, “instinctive Art”
(688), “working with a will,” (692), unites the souls that “[go] on striving to combine /
With what shall right the wrong, the under or above / The standard: supplement
unloveliness by love” (681-83). In the end, the pairing successfully attains Plato‟s ideal:
“There‟s the restored, the prime, the individual type!” (694). When he again imagines
Elvire‟s inevitable protests against his descriptions of her beauty—protests that he is
putting in her mouth—he exclaims, “See yourself in my soul!” (808). At the same time,
he desires the freedom to swim in the ocean of the real, according to his metaphor,
attempting to “endure the false” (1059): “up we mount with a pitch / Above it, find our
head reach truth, while hands explore / The false below” (1060-62). He can “swim” in
both worlds, his head filled with the true beauty of Elvire while his “hands explore / The
false below.”69 His philosophy, then, serves to justify the way he uses women for his
own “Platonic completion,” spiritually and physically. At the same time, his soul has
become the receptacle of the phantoms‟ representations, and very quickly, the women—
as subjects—have disappeared. Browning draws the readers‟ attention to the
consequences of viewing women as missing parts to complete a man by echoing A
Castaway:
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For a thorough description of the system of symbolism Juan develops for Fifine
and Elvire, see Charlotte C. Watkins‟s “The „Abstruser Themes‟ of Browning‟s Fifine at
the Fair.”
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No—‟tis ungainly work, the ruling men, at best!
The graceful instinct‟s right: ‘tis women stand confessed
Auxiliary, the gain that never goes away,
Takes nothing and gives all: Elvire, Fifine, ‟tis they
Convince,—if little, much, no matter! —one degree
The more, at least, convince unreasonable me
That I am, anyhow, a truth, though all else seem
And be not; if I dream, at least I know I dream. (1352-59, emphasis mine)
For Eulalie, men remain oblivious or apathetic to women‟s suffering—due to their
“auxiliary” status, as Don Juan terms it—because men can only gain from the
arrangement of having both wife and mistress, “the gain that never goes away, / [t]akes
nothing and gives all.” By changing “superfluity” to “auxiliary,” Browning further
reveals the sociological and economical underpinnings of women‟s value, systems
supported by philosophies like the speaker‟s.70
The more he objectifies women, the more he touts his re-creative power. Through
this interpretation of Elvire (and women in general), he gains creative dominance over
her, calling her his “new-created shape” (587) and her face his “pearl” (613), which “fits
into just the cleft” of his heart (609). Thus, from the mere sand of her individual
existence, he has fashioned a pearl. Once he becomes “Art‟s judge” (628), he owns the
artifact: “Each beauty, born of each, grows clearer and more clear, / Mine henceforth,
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Ten years later, Browning received an autographed copy of Webster‟s A Book
of Rhyme, signed “To Robert Browning from the Author A. W.” (Kelley and Coley 205).
According to Kathleen Jones, he was known to admire Webster‟s work (Jones 192).
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ever mine!” (632-33). Of course, the speaker functions this way as an exaggeration of
the Duke or Porphyria‟s Lover. He does not admit to acknowledging that any individual
women have beauty; instead, they only display an inner “type”:
Which, if in any case they found expression, whole
I‟ the traits, would give a type, undoubtedly display
A novel, true, distinct perfection in its way. (652-54)
Their beauty, then, is in his “reading.” Through the speaker‟s “reading,” Browning
positions the poem to respond to Webster‟s and Rossetti‟s poems. Browning‟s speaker
forces his interpretation on the women around him—attaining creative and (he hopes)
sexual dominance. Flesh is “meant to yield” (650) to the soul, the true “individual type”
(694). Flesh is also, presumably, meant to yield to him as a sexually powerful man, and
to his interpretation as an artist who restores the beauty of type to women.
Responding to Jenny and A Castaway, Browning complicates access to authentic
representations of human life through Don Juan‟s optimistic exuberance, which masks
obvious ulterior motives. Furthermore, he explores the ethics of “reading” another
human being. The speaker‟s metaphoric interpretations of Fifine allow him to see “the
absolute truth of things” (686) as those interpretations become metonyms for all women,
with Fifine/Elvire as the all-encompassing dichotomous metonym. Furthermore, he
discovers the inadequacies of speech, and he refers to words as “simulacra” (1736), a
word that carries with it the understanding that such representations are faulty and lose
original meaning. The sign cannot fully represent the signified. Baudrillard will later use
the same word to denote the empty shell of a signifier that remains, the sign having
vanished beneath it: “Thus perhaps at stake has always been the murderous capacity of
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images, murderers of the real” (1735). For the speaker, Fifine is a signifying vessel
waiting to be filled by his sign, as the words he puts in her mouth express: “I‟m just my
instrument, —sound hollow: mere smooth skin / Stretched o‟er gilt framework” (40405).71 However, he realizes the inadequacy of language: “Words struggle with the weight
/ So feebly of the false, thick element between / Our soul, the True, and Truth!” (943-45).
He proposes to interpret Fifine in order to get to the truth of her being; however, through
his interpretation, his funneling of thought into words, she is lost.72 Fifine and Elvire
vanish beneath the monologue.73 However, the speaker maintains the belief that truth can
emerge from representation:
That‟s the first o‟ the truths found: all things, slow
Or quick i‟ the passage, come at last to that, you know!
Each has a false outside, whereby a truth is forced
To issue from within: truth, falsehood, are divorced
By the excepted eye, at the rare season, for
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U. C. Knoepflmacher has described a similar dynamic in his important article,
“Projection and the Female Other: Romanticism, Browning, and the Victorian Dramatic
Monologue.”
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Thirteen years later, in the middle of the heated debate about painting nudes,
Pen painted a nude of Joan of Arc that was rejected from Royal Academy (O‟Neill 542).
Browning responded through Parleyings “With Francis Furini,” according to Patricia
O‟Neill. She explains, “Browning‟s defense of nude studies makes art the soul of
experience. […] The imaginative power of art becomes important in Browning‟s poem
not only to defend even a minor artist like Furini but to see through art the something
different in humanity from an apelike body or activity” (551). Browning clearly
understood the complicated nature of artistic creation and the thin line between creation
and appropriation. These issues surfaced and resurfaced for him throughout the rest of
his life.
73
As Donald Hair explains the “blurring of speakers is partly a result of verbal
echoes,” with the speaker attributing words to Elvire “that he also uses himself” (285).
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The happy moment. Life means—learning to abhor
The false, and love the true, truth treasured snatch by snatch,
Waifs counted at their worth. (1504-10)
As he searches for their “truth” (1505) which is “forced to issue from within” (1506)
despite their “false outside” (1505), his words become theirs, his identity superimposed
upon them.74
What I am terming the “crisis” of the 1870s occurs primarily in this dialogue
through the monologues of Jenny, A Castaway, and Fifine at the Fair. Thomas Kuhn
describes crises as “a necessary precondition for the emergence of novel theories” (77).
However, a crisis does not always lead to paradigm shift; rather, “[t]he decision to reject
one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to accept another, and the judgment
leading to that decision involves the comparison of both paradigms with nature and with
each other” (77). The new paradigm is not magically invented; the old is “declared
invalid only if an alternate candidate is available to take its place” (77). Thus, the new
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Jennifer A. Wagner-Lawlor has also suggested that Browning positions the
reader to notice how these systems of power work:
My argument is that dramatic monologue thus constructs the image of the
audience through the very silence it enforces upon the textual auditor. The
genre self-reflexively figures its own problems of interpretation, and of the
freedom of the reader in the effaced, voiceless shadow of the implied
listener, who emerges from obscurity as the figure of the reader. . . .
Through the performance of interpretation, the reader distinguishes
her/himself from both the speaker and the auditor; in doing so, the reader
both fulfills, but also ironically undermines, the speaker‟s apparent
tyranny over the communicate situation that makes up the discourse of the
poem. (288)
I would like to argue that through metonymy, Browning draws the readers‟ attention to
the dangers of representation both for the speaker and for the poet, the possibility that
poetic observation itself can be fallible, tenuous, and unethical by nature.
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paradigm is already present. I would like to argue that the crisis of the 1870s
encompasses the competing discourses of both the old and new paradigms. More
specifically, it is “the comparison of both paradigms with nature and with each other.”
As we have seen, Rossetti, Webster, and Browning each respond differently to these
issues, positing through poetry, respectively, the process of contrasubjectivity, a
contrasubjective response, and the dangers of violent contrasubjectivity. As we will see
in the next chapter, another response to these concerns was the development of abject
subjectivity. Poets like Christina Rossetti, Swinburne, Hopkins, and Coleridge
experimented with abjected speakers, modifying the monologue to portray these
moments of contact between the self and Other, in order to portray the power in
decentralized subjectivity.
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Chapter Four:
Abject Subjectivity and Generic Experimentation

There looms, within abjection, one of those violent, dark revolts of
being, directed against a threat that seems to emanate from an
exorbitant outside or inside, ejected beyond the scope of the
possible, the tolerable, the thinkable. . . . Unflaggingly, like an
inescapable boomerang, a vortex of summons and repulsions
places the one haunted by it literally beside himself. (Kristeva,
Powers of Horror 1)

The previous chapter outlined the growing literary interest in contrasubjectivity as
a response to the social changes that separated men and women into sexes, changes that
ultimately afforded women equal rights. In the midst of these important changes, abject
subjectivity provided a different philosophical response from contrasubjectivity, a
response that dramatized the self made object to itself. As Julia Kristeva describes the
process in the quotation above, the abject draws the individual through a “vortex of
summons and repulsions” into “the place where meaning collapses” (2). Through this
process, a version of the self is born:
During that course in which “I” become, I give birth to myself amid the
violence of sobs, of vomit. Mute protest of the symptom, shattering
violence of a convulsion that, to be sure, is inscribed in a symbolic system,

154
but which, without either wanting or being able to become integrating in
order to answer to it, it reacts, it abreacts. It abjects. (Powers of Horror
3).
The self that Kristeva describes here is broken into vomit, spit, and feces; it is a
disordered and disorderly self that reveals the process of ingesting and expelling that is
existence, the “vortex of summons and repulsions”:
The abject shatters the wall of repression and its judgments. It takes the
ego back to its source on the abominable limits from which, in order to be,
the ego has broken away—it assigns a source in the non-ego, drive, and
death. Abjection is a resurrection that has gone through death (of the ego).
It is an alchemy that transforms death drive into a start of life, of new
significance. (15)
My description of abject subjectivity in this chapter grows from Kristeva‟s work. I am
most interested in the abject as the “alchemy that transforms death drive into a start of
life” through the paradox of life in death and death in life. Victorian writers increasingly
take up a position of abjection in order to find “new significance,” a self with extended
powers and expansive presence in the world. Abject subjectivity results from the self
released from a primary subject position and moved toward an intersubjective position.
In the next chapter, we will explore this intersubjective position that fascinates poets at
the end of the Victorian period, resulting in intertextual practices and polyphonic
speakers. This chapter will trace the Victorian poetic conversation about abjection in two
forms of generic innovation, Christina Rossetti‟s modified monologue and Mary
Elizabeth Coleridge‟s duologue.
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In the 1850s, Rossetti wrote a series of lyrics that in content explore the
relationships between the lyrical “I” and the other and in form modify the monologue by
complicating the relationships between the speaker and the interlocutor. Her
experimentation resembles early monologues like “Porphyria‟s Lover,” which lack any
interlocutor but God, who “has not said not a word” (60). Building upon a long history
of theories of abject sublimity, Rossetti‟s modifications allow her to question the
authenticity of the lyric voice and to pose alternative versions of subjectivity. Robert
Langbaum has argued,
It is when we look inside the dramatic monologue, when we consider its
effect, its way of meaning, that we see its connection with the poetry that
precedes and follows Browning. . . . [W]e welcome as particularly
illuminating just those “approximations” that distress the classifiers. We
welcome them because, having without the mechanical resemblance the
same effect as the so-called “typical” dramatic monologues, they show us
what the form is essentially doing. (77-78)
I would like to extend Langbaum‟s approach to include Rossetti in order to study “what
the form is essentially doing.” As we saw in the previous chapter, Dante Gabriel used the
monologue to reveal the process of contrasubjectivity. While he was revising and
rewriting Jenny, Christina was writing and revising the lyrics that I will soon discuss. I
would argue that rather than writing in a different genre altogether, Rossetti and
Coleridge modify the monologue form to accentuate its features, particularly by positing
alternative subject positions by dramatizing alternative relationships of the self and other,
and speaker and interlocutor.
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Many Victorian poets, like Hopkins, Swinburne, Bradley, and Cooper, also
experimented with abjecting the speaker. Hopkins‟s subjectivity, for example, requires
the individual to connect to God by focusing on the spirit, not the body, which is
inherently depraved in its physicality. Some of Hopkins‟s “terrible sonnets” reveal his
growing concern that God—as interlocutor—has disappeared, or, more specifically, that
the speaker cannot reach God. In “The shepherd‟s brow,” humans are a “scaffold of
score brittle bones” (5), fragile and pitifully unable to reach to God, as our representative,
Jack, demonstrates:
He! Hand to mouth he lives, and voids with shame;
And, blazoned in however bold the name,
Man Jack the man is . . . . (9-11)75
In poems like “Hymn to Prosperine” and “Garden of Prosperine,” Swinburne builds upon
the religious tradition of spiritual purity through abjection. “Michael Field” creates an
aesthetic abject—rather than a religious abject—through poems like “Embalmment” and
“A Portrait: Bartolommeo Veneto.” For Swinburne, Bradley, and Cooper, focusing on
the body‟s pain creates a new form of relationship. Like Hopkins, Swinburne desires this
pain to make accessible a new religious order, for example in “Dolores.” For Bradley
and Cooper, the body‟s decomposition provides an erotic possibility for physical
75

Kristeva similarly uses defecation to demonstrate the abject qualities of
humanity:
These body fluids, this defilement, this shit are what life withstands,
hardly and with difficulty, on the part of death. There I am at the border
of my condition as a living being. My body extricates itself, as being
alive, from that border. Such wastes drop so that I might live, until, from
loss to loss, northing remains in me and my entire body falls beyond the
limit—cadere, cadaver. (3)
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intermixing. Mary Coleridge inherits this poetic tradition, which she reinterprets by
experimenting with a duologue form in order to dramatize the moment of contact with the
other and the multiplicity of subject positions opened by abjection.
Christina Rossetti, like Hopkins, focuses on how one must go through the body—
through our only means of experiencing the world—to escape it. The presence of death
in her poetry is the memento mori, the knowledge of the body‟s constant decomposition
that leads to the soul‟s increasing power. Bodies do not often touch in her poetry, and
when they do, it is the slurping of Laura, the disgusting slap of flesh that typifies mortal
desire. By contrast, sublimity is found in the distances between people, the echo, the
wish for maternal communication. This for Rossetti is the realm of the soul, the body
held in abeyance by the strength of another desire, the desire for spiritual wholeness.76
Mary Coleridge‟s approach is very different. Laura‟s feasting upon the syrupy face
typifies for her a mysterious moment of interconnection that fascinates her. She desires
to dwell in these moments in her poetry, creating them repeatedly in poems like “Master
and Guest” and “The Witch.” Abjection for Coleridge is not an escape from the body,
but an escape from an identity that holds others at a distance, that prevents
interconnection. In this way, their projects are very different, but both use a modified
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Harrington explains that Rossetti‟s religious beliefs regarding a soul/body split
changed over the course of her life:
[H]er vision of the afterlife becomes more earthly towards the end of her
career. . . . Earlier work presented self-loss as holy; this late devotional
prose revises that view. In earlier poems she implies that there is a
difference between the unnecessary part of the self and the essential self.
In these devotional works, she no longer wants to dissolve the self, but
rather wants to define its essence. (59, 61)
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version of the monologue to create related forms of abject sublimity. Even in their
dissonance, they are in conversation.

“Pulse for pulse, breath for breath”:
Christina Rossetti and the Abject Sublime
In 1918, Virginia Woolf wrote, “If I were bringing a case against God, Christina
Rossetti is one of the first witnesses I should call” (qtd. in Marsh, Introduction xxix).
Such a charge implies that Rossetti weighed down her own literary genius with the
burden of a religious, patriarchal narrative of proper religious behavior. In Christina
Rossetti: A Literary Biography, Jan Marsh responds: “For the defence, we might ask
what impelled Christina to choose such a fearful religion—and why, in her last years, she
found in it so little consolation. Hers was assuredly a careful and very troubled heart”
(556).77 Kristeva might defend her as she defends other authors of the abject:
Does one write under any other condition than being possessed by
abjection, in an indefinite catharsis? Leaving aside adherents of a
77

Recent critics have begun to explore how Rossetti‟s religious beliefs helped
shape her aesthetic projects. For instance, in Recovering Christina Rossetti: Female
Community and Incarnational Poetics, Mary Arseneau uses Isobel Armstrong‟s notion of
the “double poem,” from Victorian Poetry: Poetry, Poetics, and Politics, to explore “how
women poets express unconventional, subversive, and feminist elements while at the
same time retaining conventional and pious themes” (2). Appending and expanding
Armstrong‟s methodology for reading Rossetti‟s work, Arseneau describes the
“mechanisms and motivations underlying Rossetti‟s characteristically reserved poetic
expression” (2). For Arseneau, Rossetti‟s poetics and theology work together. My
project adds to this growing body of scholarship by focusing on the issue of selfabnegation, or abjection, especially how this religious act takes on extra-religious
valences in Rossetti‟s shorter poetry.
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feminism that is jealous of conserving its power—the last of the powerseeking ideologies—none will accuse of being a usurper the artist who,
even if he does not know it, is an undoer of narcissism and of all
imaginary identity as well, sexual included. (Powers of Horror 208)
At issue for current critics is how to frame Rossetti‟s aesthetics, which seem, throughout
her career, a confusing mixture of self-abnegation and staunch individuality. I would like
to suggest that in her lyric poems, Rossetti experiments with a form of the dramatic
monologue structure by removing the interlocutor or making him or her unreachable and
by creating in her speakers a form of abject subjectivity. She builds upon types of
abjection in “Sappho”78 (composed in 1846), “Song” (1848), “After Death” (1849),
“Cobwebs” (1855), “From the Antique” (1854), “Echo” (1854), and “A Chilly Night”
(1856). For the purposes of this chapter, I will focus on the poems in which she positions
abjection not only as the loss of self, but also as the experience of alterity.79
Critics have responded to liminality in Rossetti‟s work by characterizing it as
evasive, erotic, religious, and liberating. In “The Secret of Christina Rossetti,” Angela
Leighton describes Rossetti‟s “in-between-time of twilight” as “a time […] liberated
from both life and afterlife, from both regret and expectation” (“„When I am dead, my
78

Tales of Sappho‟s lament underpin the poem, buttressing the literary history of
expressive poetry, the realm of the female poet in Victorian culture, as Anne Jamison
notes—building on Isobel Armstrong‟s work (259)—and a role with which Rossetti
repeatedly plays. Jamison argues that Rossetti frequently uses her speakers ironically,
letting the dead female that inhabits so many poems by male writers gain subjectivity
while maintaining the role of gazed-upon object. For Jamison, this act constitutes an
empowering transgression for Rossetti (260), “an alternative [sic] materiality, an
alternative subjectivity, an alternative way of being in the world” (275).
79
I have used Jan Marsh‟s dates from her edition of Rossetti‟s poetry and R.W.
Crump‟s text from the 2001 edition.
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dearest‟” 380). She contends that Rossetti creates these spaces in her work because,
building upon “the Romantic tradition, the experience missed is the poem gained” (387);
evasion creates philosophical action, and de-animation animates. Leighton responds in
this way to Jerome McGann‟s work with Rossetti‟s religious belief in “soul sleep,” a
limbo state of death that precedes entrance into Heaven or Hell (375).80 However,
Leighton does not consider these moments in Rossetti‟s work as static:
The attitude of death, which is so dear to this poet, is not the attitude of
being an object, but, rather, of becoming an autonomous subject, who
dreams in a place between past and future, memory and goal, eroticism
and grace, and makes it the place—Barthes‟s slow, delighting, “dilatory
space”—of poems. (388)
Suzy Waldman similarly envisions Rossetti‟s use of the death drive as a freeing means by
which to reach the symbolic (535). Brad Sullivan explains that critics have not explored
Rossetti‟s aesthetic complexities of alienation (227) and he contends that Rossetti‟s
poetry contains “a powerful tension between control and chaos [and] self-assertion and
self-destruction” (227). He questions whether any hope exists in Rossetti‟s death-driven
poems, whether there one can find any opportunity of escape (240). I agree that her
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Leighton is also responding to Gilbert and Gubar‟s description of Rossetti‟s
“Aesthetics of Renunciation.” She counters,
Behind Rossetti‟s „Aesthetics of Renunciation,‟ it is possible to discern
an alternative aesthetics of secrecy, self-containment, and caprice. There
opens up, at the very heart of this poet‟s emotional and religious
consolations, a vague, obsessional dreamland of uncertainty and delay.
Poem after poem bears witness to the emotional and religious
disorientation of that place—a threshold giving onto nowhere, spreading
indefinitely. (376)
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speakers hover between “self-assertion and self-destruction,” but, like Leighton, I
contend that these processes happen together in a sublime moment in which abjection
empowers. I would like to build upon this earlier critical work to argue that it is her
experimentation with the dramatic monologue that allows for her innovative “selfassertion.”
To describe her “self-assertion,” I first need to explain the process of her “selfdestruction.” She accepts the imitatio Christi inherent in the emptying act of kenosis, but
she does not seek any redemptive pleroma, or the refilling of the soul through spiritual
excess.81 Instead, her speakers desire the freedom of abjection, the abasement of
selfhood and loss of identity. Absent from this form of sublimity is the linear narrative of
the self‟s journey to inspired self-realization that usually grounds sublimity discourses.82
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Emily Marie Harrington argues that Rossetti does seek the salvation possible
through self-abnegation:
The chiasmus, save-lose-lose-save encloses self-loss within redemption,
so that each of these seemingly mutually exclusive situations is not
complete without the other. The purpose, then of self-sacrifice is to
preserve the self. By calling that sacrificial self “oblation,” an offering to
a deity and a more specific reference to the Eucharist, Rossetti understands
the process to be an exchange between the self and Christ; He offered His
body for her and so she offers her own in return. (32)
82
In 1674, Boileau translated Longinus‟s On the Sublime, and opened a discourse
on the nature and uses of the sublime that proved resonant to eighteenth century writers.
John Dennis continues the discussion on Longinus, by analyzing the “great” in poetry,
using Milton as a touchstone, in Advancement and Reformation of Poetry, published in
1701. Perhaps responding to Dennis, Joseph Addison, in numbers 267, 273, 279, 285 of The Spectator, published over the course of 20 days in 1712, considers a version of
sublimity in Milton. Edmund Burke published A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin
of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful in 1757, the longest study of the sublime of
the period. Sublimity provides a means to discuss greater socio-political concerns, such
as the nature of the relationship between an individual and power, the origins and uses of
that power, and the value and function of individual experience.
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Longinus‟s sublime, the starting point for most major philosophical epistemologies of
sublimity, involves three stages: 1) stasis, 2) ekstasis and disequilibrium, and 3) recovery.
John Dennis and Joseph Addison both wrote about Milton in terms of the sublime,
but they identified vastly different types of sublimity in Paradise Lost. Like Bunyan,
Dennis focused on how to bridge the gap between Post-Lapsarian humanity and God and
for Dennis, sublimity provided a way. In The Advancement and Reformation of Modern
Poetry, published in 1701, Dennis joins the critical discussion begun by William Wotton
in 1694 with Reflections upon Ancient and Modern Learning. In the spirit of proving that
“we have the advantage of the Ancients” (8), Dennis claims that the primary advantage
they had was true inspiration (8). In The Grounds of Criticism in Poetry, published in
1704, Dennis applies this claim to Milton. To Dennis, Milton fulfills the religious spirit
of the Longinian sublime and because he uses Christianity, he surpasses the ancients.
Addison, on the other hand, writing eight years later, focuses on the physical experience
of the sublime, instead of its external situation in God.
For Addison, writing in 1712, the strength of Paradise Lost is Milton‟s use of “the
natural and the sublime” (No. 279), allowing the reader to identify with the characters
(No. 273), and feel awe from the scope of the “greatness” of the epic (No. 267). Addison
mentions the pleasures of Milton‟s use of “what is delivered in Holy Writ” (No. 267), but
his comments focus on the craft of Paradise Lost and its impact on the mind of the
reader. This sublimity does not primarily transport the reader to the edge of spiritual
power; it thrills the mind by helping the reader to identify and feel the effects of the
action of the piece. John Locke‟s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, published in
1690, increased interest in the nature of understanding and moral behavior. Addison‟s
secular focus on “greatness” as natural to an imagination that “loves to be filled with an
Object, or to grasp at any thing that is too big for its Capacity” (No. 412) has Lockean
overtones of the “empty cabinet” of the mind filled with sense data (14). Dennis, by
contrast, yearns for guided transport to lost spiritual foundations through learned
discourse.
Edmund Burke, who read Addison‟s essays on the sublime in Paradise Lost while
at Trinity College (Phillips x), uses in A Philosophical Enquiry Addison‟s secularized
focus on the physical experience of sublimity, rather than the reaching of a God figure.
For Burke, writing in 1757, the sublime is that which reveals our limits as human beings,
which “is productive of the strongest emotion which the mind is capable of feeling” (36).
Beauty provides continuity of the species and the social norms that connect it. Sublimity
disrupts this continuity by allowing one to imagine the end of desire and sensation, and in
the experience, feel the body brought to its highest pitch. Rather than considering
sublimity as reaching up to the seat of power known a priori, as Longinus and Dennis
conceive of it, Addison and Burke shift the focus to human physicality that provides
sublime experience. Similarly, Adam Smith‟s Theory of Moral Sentiments, published in
1759, suggests that we identify with our fellow human beings because through our
original sense data that formed our ideas, we feel what others feel: “[W]e enter as it were
into his body” (2).
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The individual begins in stasis, has a sublime experience that creates disequilibrium and
the sensation of standing outside of the Self, and then the individual recovers, in a
different place psychologically.83 In Edmund Burke‟s sublime, ekstasis results from the
experience of terror, the impulse that inspires awe and self-preservation. Immanuel
Kant‟s sublime works through imagination‟s failure.84 In each of these influential
theories of sublimity, an individual has an experience that empowers and transforms the
psyche. This experience involves reaching toward a higher figure (Longinus), grappling
with the mind‟s abilities and limitations (Kant),85 or feeling the prick of mortality
(Burke).86

83

Longinus‟s treatise on the sublime explains how to craft an oration in order to
cause the listeners to feel hypsous, or transport to a high place of grandeur. However,
although the orator in a way has “mastery” over the listener (114), the primary function
of the sublime is to transfer power from the subject of the speech to the orator to the
listener: “we are filled with a proud exaltation and a sense of vaunting joy, just as thought
we had ourselves produced what we had heard” (120). In this way, the listener can join
in the speaker‟s power and gain a sort of agency through it.
84
Kant explains,
[What happens is that] our imagination strives to progress toward infinity,
while our reason demands absolute totality as a real idea, and so [the
imagination,] our power of estimating the magnitude of things in the world
of sense, is inadequate to that idea. Yet this inadequacy itself is the
arousal in us of the feeling that we have within us a supersensible power;
and what is absolutely large is not an object of sense, but is the use that
judgment makes naturally of certain objects so as to [arouse] this (feeling),
and in contrast with that use any other use is small. Hence what is to be
called sublime is not the object, but the attunement that the intellect [gets]
through a certain presentation that occupies reflective judgment. . . .
Sublime is what even to be able to think proves that the mind has a power
surpassing any standard of sense. (106)
85
Jean-François Lyotard provides a detailed description Kant‟s sublime:
In the event of an absolutely large object—the desert, a mountain, a
pyramid—or one that is absolutely powerful—a storm at sea, an erupting
volcano—which like all absolutes can only be thought, without any
sensible/sensory intuition, as an Idea of reason, the faculty of presentation,
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In Rossetti‟s poetry, the sublime works through the speaker‟s abjection and
encounter with the other. Rossetti‟s sublime blends what Barbara Claire Freeman and
Patricia Yaeger call a female or feminine sublime, which differs from a Longinian,
Burkean, or Kantian sublime. In contrast to these previous models of sublimity, the
encounter with other does not lead to integration, but to the continued recognition of
alterity. Through her theory of the feminine sublime, Freeman explains how “women
exert agency, even as they confront its limits” (6). Freeman uses the ideas of Lyotard,
Žižek, and Levinas to describe the sublime as “the presentation of the fact that the
the imagination, fails to provide a representation corresponding to this
Idea. This failure of expression gives rise to a pain, a kind of cleavage
within the subject between what can be conceived and what can be
imagined or presented. But this pain in turn engenders a pleasure, in fact a
double pleasure: the impotence of the imagination attests a contrario to an
imagination striving to figure even that which cannot be figured, and that
imagination thus aims to harmonize its object with that of reason—and
that furthermore the inadequacy of the images is a negative sign of the
immense power of ideas. This dislocation of the faculties among
themselves gives rise to the extreme tension (Kant calls it agitation) that
characterizes the pathos of the sublime, as opposed to the calm feeling of
beauty. (98)
86
For instance, in “After Death,” the speaker confronts her own dead body
without emotion and in “A Chilly Night,” the speaker looks into the face of her mother‟s
ghost and meets the incommensurability of the self and the Other and the irretrievability
of the past. Recent theorists, building upon Longinus, Kant, and Burke, have best
described the sort of abjection that I argue Rossetti employs. For Lyotard, recognition of
the failure of representation constitutes the sublime moment, and for Slavoj Žižek, it is in
the gaps of the incommensurable. Rossetti‟s speakers‟ self-negation moves toward a
Lyotardian sublime, which—building upon Burke—Lyotard explains as “kindled by the
threat of nothing further happening” (99). In other words, representation‟s failure causes
the reader to fear the disappearance of meaning. Although Rossetti‟s abject sublimity
resembles a post-modern sublime, such as the sublime Fredric Jameson details, repetition
and outward movement do not presuppose simulacra for Rossetti. Instead, they lead to
clearer vision of human meaning. Altering the traditional notion of ekstasis, in which the
disembodied experience strengthens subjective identity, Rossetti‟s ekstasis involves a self
that remains disembodied and loses subjectivity. With the loss of self, meaning coalesces
for Rossetti.
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unpresentable exists” and as “an encounter with a radical alterity” (11). In the feminine
sublime, the body multiplies when facing the other. For Freeman, the sublime is “the
place where boundaries come apart and boundarylessness is at issue” (116). Even the
boundaries that hem in the self are broken. Yaeger similarly explains that the female
sublime works not as a vertical transference of power but as a horizontal unfolding of the
self; the individual “refuses an oedipal, phallic fight to the death with the father, but
expands toward others, spreads itself out into multiplicity” (191). For Kristeva, “the
sublime is a something added that expands us, overstrains us, and causes us to be both
here, as dejects, and there, as others and sparkling. A divergence, an impossible
bounding. Everything missed, joy—fascination” (Powers of Horror 12). Michael
Lackey argues that sublimity differs in Romantic and Victorian poetry primarily because
Romantic sublimity entails a Self that grows to cover everything around it—even the
other (80)—while Victorian sublimity includes a true merging with the other, and the
“sublime union reveals the infinite as it inheres within human flesh” (82). Rossetti‟s
short poetry seems to strain these categories by epitomizing both the Romantic lyric,
depicting the expansive mind, and the Victorian monologue, depicting selves in contact.
I would like to argue that Rossetti starts with the lyric to rewrite the monologue because
it affords her more opportunities for manipulating the relationship of speaker/interlocutor
in order to express the experience Kristeva describes above as “impossible bounding.”
Abjection allows Rossetti to reach a new space of negation; in “After Death,” for
instance, through focusing on the dead female body, Rossetti‟s speaker can escape the
world and gain a panoramic consciousness—a form of subjectivity, but a fragmented,
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non-Cartesian form.87 As Leighton notes, Rossetti‟s “dead woman really harbors some
ultimate knowledge which, arbitrary and noncommittal, is almost no knowledge at all,
but a form of consciousness released from knowledge” (376). We might build upon this
critical approach to describe Rossetti‟s sublime as allowing for the ekstasis to occur
through the self‟s dispersion. Furthermore, the speakers recognize that the desire to fuse
with the other requires refusing the other‟s alterity. Death in Rossetti‟s early poetry
exists not merely as unavoidable, but ultimately preferable, in order to escape a constant
pull toward an ordered identity.88 She seeks the explosion of identity into a sense realm
she codes as divine, collapsing a spiritual and sensual reality beyond physicality.
Rossetti‟s biographical critics have also noted her trajectory toward the abject.
For example, Virginia Blain explains that Rossetti tried to “repress all signs of egotism”
(111) from the beginning of her career. She notes the line “learning „not to be first‟” in
Rossetti‟s poem “The Lowest Room” (111) as an example of Rossetti‟s interest in
abjecting the ego. Other critics like Kathleen Jones—in her book Learning Not to be
First: The Life of Christina Rossetti—and Alexis Easley—in “Gender and the Politics of
Literary Fame”—also focus on the Rossetti‟s life within her family and its literary
ramifications. Marsh suggests that Rossetti‟s fascination with writing poetry about death
87

Kristeva argues, “The corpse, seen without God and outside of science, is the
utmost of abjection. It is death infecting life. Abject. It is something rejected from
which one does not part, from which one does not protect oneself as from an object.
Imaginary uncanniness and real threat, it beckons to us and ends up engulfing us” (4).
88
As we have seen, Levinas uses the tradition of death as a state of nothingness to
underpin his ideas about fear, especially that the fear of death equates to the fear of the
Other overtaking one‟s life, not the fear of the loss of ego (232-33). Thus, a subject can
desire a freeing loss of ego, such as in the death drive, without desiring the violence of
self-murder. The power of Rossetti‟s use of abjection is in this sort of death drive, the
impulse to kill the ego.
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and destruction began in the period after her family‟s financial difficulties in 1842 and
before what Marsh sees as a new period of healing in 1860 (Christina, 258-64). Perhaps
Rossetti‟s interest in the abject did begin in her violent reactions to strong feelings of
guilt, emphasized by her self-mutilation at fifteen (50) and encouraged by the ascetic
religious teachings of Edward Bouverie Pusey, a prominent figure at Rossetti‟s church
and a man who advocated the use of hair shirts and five-tailed whips (63). Marsh
suggests that Rossetti‟s death-focused poetry reverberated in terrifying dreams for years,
perhaps resulting from incestuous experiences with her father (260-64). As Marsh
suggests, the family‟s financial problems, the pain of puberty, and the frustrating and
repressive experience of becoming a female adult in Victorian society were difficulties
exacerbated by religious rhetoric, changing Rossetti‟s psychology fundamentally (55-64).
Additionally, James Collinson‟s conversion to Catholicism, which effectively
ended their engagement (115), and her father‟s withdrawn behavior might have led to
Rossetti‟s attraction to death and self-negation in her poetry of this period. Marsh refers
to 1860-61 as “a watershed in her writing” when “she used her creative gifts to come to
terms with childhood fears” (264). I suggest that Rossetti‟s healing began through the
way she uses death in these early poems to imagine alternatives to her painful life and to
envision a soul and Self within, unlimited by her gender or by any traditional notions of
sin. Rossetti‟s approach feels more like Robert Browning‟s here, testing the boundaries
of self and other, speaker and interlocutor, and pushing at the limits of traditional notions
of identity.
In “From the Antique,” the speaker receives an education from a female figure
about the benefits of negation, benefits contrasted with her painful life:
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It‟s a weary life, it is; she said:—
Doubly blank is a woman‟s lot. . . . (1-2)
As a solution for this “doubly blank” state, she proposes further negation. The woman
gets to this negation by a double wish for a transgendered existence (“I wish and I wish I
were a man” [3]), and this wish seems to counter her “doubly blank” existence in order to
lead her to her true ideal: “Or, better than any being, were not” (4). The woman seeks
absolute negation, not only from a body, but from nature as well:
I wish and I wish I were a man;
Or, better than any being, were not:
Were nothing at all in all the world,
Not a body and not a soul;
Not so much as a grain of dust
Or drop of water from pole to pole. (3-8)
She imagines that her negation would not change anything; all “would wag on the same”
(9) and “none would miss [her] in all the world” (13). However, through her negation,
she would find peace by escaping from cyclical existence: “I should be nothing; while all
the rest / Would wake and weary and fall asleep” (14-15). The title—which suggests a
statement from someone ageless and culturally important (that is, “antique”)—changes
the valence of the statements from an effusion of self-pity to the concrete wish for escape
from powerlessness. She does not merely desire death; she desires to escape a system
that has already taken away her being, forced her to be “doubly blank” (2). No Godfigure exists whom she wishes to subsume her. Instead, she wants negation from all
systems and, through this negation, to see all and remain other from all. She momentarily
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desires to intermix with this other, but then she recognizes that she craves ego negation:
“I wish and I wish I were a man; / Or, better than any being, were not” (3-4). Further
blending and erasing identities, the speaker quotes the “Antique,” but she disappears
behind the other woman‟s words, serving as her mouthpiece.89 In the very first line we
see a glimpse of this speaker: “It‟s a weary life, it is; she said” (1, emphasis mine). The
“Antique” has also disappeared, remaining only in her disembodied words. As an
“antique,” her context has been reconstituted; she lives on in a form that haunts the
present from the past. In the immediate moment of the poem, the only event that occurs
is the memory of the brief instant of contact between the two figures who both act as
speakers and interlocutors and who coalesce into a multi-generational female identity.
In contrast to “From the Antique,” in “A Chilly Night,” the speaker/interlocutor,
mother/daughter meet in the poem, but because the mother is dead, they can have no real
contact. She cannot hear the words of wisdom from an “antique.” The poem hinges on
this moment in which the daughter strains to hear the voice of the mother only to realize
that she is “indeed alone”: “Living had failed and dead had failed / And I was indeed
alone” (49-50). This recognition of solitude, so welcome in “Cobwebs,” “Song,” and
“From the Antique,” also here presents itself as a loss of contact, producing nostalgic
desire for renewed communication.90 Even the poem itself is in the past tense, existing as
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Leighton might describe the “Antique” as one of the “sister women” Rossetti
used “as projections of the self” (374).
90
Levinas contends that “[d]esire is desire for the absolute other” and it “is a
desire that cannot be satisfied” (34). One cannot represent the Other, because, according
to Levinas, “the Other would dissolve into the same” (38). The Other exists as a figure
under a veil in “After Death,” patriarchy in general in “From the Antique,” and a ghostly
Mother in “A Chilly Night.” This recognition of the alterity of the Other leads to the
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a memory of a wish for contact. Gazing out of a window “at the dead of night” (1), she
looks “for [her] Mother‟s ghost” (3). As it does in “After Death,” the lattice represents
the interpenetration of space and the intermixing of dead and living, the frame for the
points of contact.91 The uppercase m in the word Mother in line three emphasizes that the
speaker is looking for a female predecessor, not merely a relative. The speaker longs to
gaze on the ghosts, claiming their kinship: “the ghosts were warmer to me / Than my
friends that had grown cold” (7-8). “A Chilly Night” builds on “From the Antique.” In
both poems, the speaker longs for a community with the dead. In “A Chilly Night,” this
longing leads to a new stage of being. In “From the Antique,” the first narrator quotes
the “antique,” imbedding the woman‟s language in her own, speaking for the older
female figure: “It‟s a weary life, it is; she said:—” (1). However, in “A Chilly Night,”
the older female figure cannot speak and so the two remain fundamentally separated:
I strained to catch her words
And she strained to make me hear,
But never a sound of words
Fell on my straining ear. (37-40)

speakers‟ sense of alienation and, more importantly, an expansive, alternative existence,
one Levinas would call “the idea of infinity” (52). In the end, the loss of nostalgia and
the recognition of alienation and disconnection redefines subjectivity in the poem.
91
Leighton similarly describes the importance of twilight for Rossetti: “The time
of being dead, for Rossetti, is very often the in-between-time of twilight—a time of
ambiguity, dream, delay. Such a time is liberated from both life and afterlife, from both
regret and expectation” (380).
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In this moment, the living narrator and ghostly mother figure lock in failed
communication, the mother‟s unseeing eyes holding the narrator transfixed, her silent
words disappearing into the night.
When we look this moment more closely, we realize that it is not just this
communication that is failed; language is always already fallen. It is the speaker‟s
experience with the ghost that creates meaning.92 The ghosts‟ actions have no reactions
(“They spoke without a voice / And they leapt without a sound” [13-14]), but the speaker,
remaining in the physical world, responds to the ghosts‟ actions. The Mother‟s “blank”
eyes trap the speaker physically (24) and although the speaker cannot hear her voice, her
body reacts: “my flesh crept on my bones / And every hair was stirred” (29-30). The
ghosts disappear, leaving the speaker unable to understand them and completely
alienated: “Living had failed and dead had failed / And I was indeed alone” (49-50). The
night ends with her realization of the absolute alterity of the Mother/Other and her own
isolation. After this moment when time stopped, it resumes its chronology, moving
slowly “From midnight to the cockcrow” (41). At this point, the speaker tries to reclaim
an ordered understanding of her life by ending the poem in a narrative summary (“Living
had failed and dead had failed / And I was indeed alone” [49-50]).
In “A Chilly Night,” the sublime experience overwhelms, but does not restore the
self. The speaker gains a changed subject position of sorts by recognizing the other‟s
92

Suzanne Guerlac similarly describes the Longinian sublime by noting that the
enunciation transfers the meaning (279). Guerlac differentiates between the énoncé, the
factual meaning of a term, and the enunciation, the actions that accompany a word‟s
deployment. Just as the ghosts represent disembodied selves, dislocated signs, the verbal
interaction intensifies the disconnection in the breakdown of the énoncé and enunciation
and creates a sublime moment of linguistic schism.

172
alterity and her own alienation. The kenotic emptying of the self renews a primal desire
for synthesis with the other. The failures of the moment of communication, in which
both women “strain” (“I strained to catch her words / And she strained to make me
hear”), locks them in a communion of silence, a combination of mind and body, self and
other that connects them while keeping them fundamentally separated. This Levinasian
infinity of incommensurability creates a new plain of existence in which “alone” does not
connote loss, but reconstitution. For Kristeva, abjection occurs in the pre-symbolic stage,
“a violent, clumsy breaking away, with the constant risk of falling back under the sway of
a power as securing as it is stifling” (Powers of Horror 13). As Kelly Oliver explains,
Kristeva‟s theory entails that
the child must break out of this identification with the breast by abjecting
its mother. It must move from an identification with the mother‟s
nourishing breast to an identification with its own birth and the horrifying
maternal sex, to an identification with an abjected and threatening mother.
. . . The maternal body is what is off limits. For Kristeva, primary drive
pleasure, which is associated with the mother‟s body, threatens the
symbolic, which is why it is repressed. (59)
Oliver points out that Kristeva‟s focus on the male child makes this theory problematic
for girls: “But what about the daughter? Whereas the son splits the mother in order to
unify himself, if the daughter splits the mother, she splits herself” (63). For Rossetti, the
mother participates with the daughter in modeling an empowering abjection. In “A
Chilly Night,” the mother‟s dead body—perhaps the most abject image for Kristeva—
allows the daughter to create a sort of coherent subject position, the narrator of her story,
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the “I” who was alone.93 Thus, in these two lyric poems, Rossetti modifies the dramatic
monologue by leaving a shadow of a speaker or an interlocutor to dramatize the moments
of abjection fundamental to both poems.
“Echo,” a polyrhythmic poem like “A Chilly Night” and “From the Antique,”
most strongly expresses the desire for and unreachable other. The speaker, “tho‟ cold in
death” (15), longs for an intimate encounter with her lover, the unhearing interlocutor
that remains locked in the mind of the speaker. As in “After Death,” the female body
becomes a locus of intermixing. In “Echo,” the speaker does not visit the lover as a
ghost, but longs for the lover to visit her, to come in “the silence of the night” (1), “in the
speaking silence of a dream” (2), and “in tears” (5). The speaker has discovered that
Paradise contains, even imprisons, “thirsting longing eyes” (10) that await a glimpse of a
lover.94 The speaker wants, instead, to meet her lover outside of the structure of Heaven,
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Although my description of the abject sublime builds upon both Levinasian and
humanistic ethics, it is important for me to note that these positions are intrinsically
opposed. In the first, the self must remain broken in the face of the other; in the second,
the self can maintain a unitary subject position. Rossetti‟s poetry lends itself to both
readings simultaneously, even though these readings are not complementary. For
example, we might align the self‟s dispersal in her poetry with Levinasian theory, but any
resulting subject position moves her poetry away from a Levinasian reading.
94
We might read “Echo” as being in conversation with Dante Gabriel Rossetti‟s
“The Blessed Damozel,” a poem written from the point of view of the earth-bound lover:
“(I saw her smile.) . . . (I heard her tears)” (139, 144). Leighton, discussing “DayDreams,” notes,
It is as if Christina has taken that quintessentially pre-Raphaelite poem of
Dante Gabriel‟s, „The Blessed Damozel,‟ and secularized it. Unlike the
Damozel, who looks down from heaven and makes the “bar” she leans on
“warm” with her flesh, Christina‟s women are dead but unrisen, buried but
unhopeful. They are not heavenly Beatrices, whose role is to lead the
quester to salvation, but heartless, fixated dreamers, whose attention is
directed elsewhere. (379)
“Echo” similarly contains a strange mixture of longing and apathy.
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in dreams.95 She desires not just an experience of love, but a regaining of her life. The
last lines emphasize this inherent need for mixing with the other and its impossibility:
Yet come to me in dreams, that I may live
My very life again tho‟ cold in death:
Come back to me in dreams, that I may give
Pulse for pulse, breath for breath:
Speak low, lean low,
As long ago, my love, how long ago. (15-18)
Trapped between a physical and spiritual state, the speaker remains unfulfilled by
Paradise; she still dreams. She seeks a hypsous that will vivify her and yet this
necessitates a union with her lover that no longer seems possible. In this abject
sublimity, the speaker fixes on her physical body, her pulse, her breath, in order to
discover an existence beyond any structures in a state of ekstasis.
While the speaker never attains physical intimacy with the other, the enunciation
implies a sort of intimacy as the speaker imagines their bodies intermixed, exchanging
“pulse for pulse, breath for breath” (16). In these last few lines, the anaphora builds and
the speaker seems literally lost in the moment, as she begs the Other/Lover to “lean low”
(17), violating a spatial understanding of Heaven as high and earth as low. Time
intermixes, past with present, the “long ago” (18) with the immediate moment. Although
their union might not prove possible, the poem constitutes a sort of joining that takes the
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Writing about Maude, Leighton similarly argues, “Rossetti‟s famous „mortuary
imagery‟[Lona Mosk Packer] would seem to betray a profound reluctance on her part to
imagine the afterlife she so rigorously preaches” (375).
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reader up to the point of interpenetration. The speaker‟s desire for the other and the
spreading of the ego within negation are clarified by Levinas‟s theory of “pluralism”:
Contemplation is to be defined, perhaps, as a process by which being is
revealed without ceasing to be one. The philosophy it commands is a
suppression of pluralism. Multiplicity therefore implies an objectivity
posited in the impossibility of total reflection, in the impossibility of
conjoining the I and non-I in a whole. This impossibility is not negative—
which would be to still posit it by reference to the idea of truth
contemplated. It results from the surplus of the epiphany of the other, who
dominates me from his height. (221)
The recognition of the other‟s alterity blocks full objective knowledge while it creates a
subject position, or rather, a multiplicity of subject positions. “Echo,” in its inherent
repetition further embodies replication in its title, as echo can refer to a sound of
unknown origin, of unknown subject location, pluralizing its being in the void. The voice
of the speaker is this echo, cut off from any interlocutor, its message unreceived.
“From the Antique,” “A Chilly Night,” and “Echo,” poems written within a few
years of each other, deviate from the carefully organized rhythms of earlier poems like
“Cobwebs,” “Song,” and “After Death,” building through polyrhythmic verse prosodic
unpredictability. This unpredictability is heightened by the continual border crossings
that occur in the poems. Likewise, the escape envisioned in the earlier poems leads to an
experience with the other in the later poems. The moment of abject sublimity the
speakers experience in self-negation heightens with the experience of Otherness, one that
reinforces a subject position built on the recognition of alterity. Such alterity is
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maintained through the form of the poems through the disconnected speakers and
interlocutors. Rossetti works from a Christian, kenotic discourse to create a new
religious ekstasis. She envisions the ideal state of abjection as the dissolution of being
and the incommensurability of self and other.

“Oh, lift me over the threshold, and let me in at the door!”:
Boundaries and Thresholds in Mary Coleridge‟s Poetry
Mary Elizabeth Coleridge tucked her manuscript of “The Witch” into a letter to
Lucy Violet Hodgkin on March 21, 189396: “[H]ome again in the company of this Witch.
What do you think of her? Is she very bad? or not so very bad? The metre‟s all wrong
any way” (87, f. 2b).97 The letter is filled with episodes that exemplify the sort of
boundaries Coleridge manipulates even in her questions about the poem—whether the
witch is morally reprehensible or dangerous in a deliciously alluring way that makes her
badness palatable, or even desirable. For Coleridge, the witch‟s badness originates in her
transgressive plea: “Oh, lift me over the threshold, and let me in at the door!” The
poem‟s duologue form accentuates the central moment when the boundary transforms
into a threshold—when the two speakers inhabit the house together. Coleridge revisits
these transgressive moments repeatedly in her poetry: in “The Other Side of a Mirror,”
the moment occurs when the speaker whispers, “„I am she!‟” (30); in “Master and
96

I would like to thank the librarians and library administrators of Eton College
Library, including Mr. Michael Meredith, Ms. Rachel Bond, and Ms. Danielle Maisey,
for assisting me in my research.
97
Quoted by permission of the Provost and Fellows, Eton College.
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Guest,” it is when the speaker invites inside the man who “stood in the shadow of the
door” (4), a man who later tells her, “You have kissed a citizen of Hell, / And a soul was
doomed when you were born” (19-20). In “On a Bas-relief of Pelops and Hippodameia,”
the moment occurs when the waves “cut [the stone] more smoothly than the knife” (6): in
“Wilderspin,” it occurs when the speaker cries, “I broke the web for ever, / I broke my
heart as well. / Michael and the Saints deliver / My soul from the nethermost Hell!” (3336). In each case, what seemed a barrier—between individuals and between objects—
melts into a threshold for interpenetration. Building upon previously unexamined
archival material, in particular the letter that envelopes “The Witch” in one of its earliest
forms,98 I would like to offer a new reading of the poem that re-envisions Coleridge‟s
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Although in her edition of Coleridge‟s poetry, Theresa Whistler gives the
poem‟s composition date as 1892, the manuscript in the letter in 1893 is the first version
in existence, as far as I am aware. Only two other versions of the poem are extant; one,
in a black notebook titled “Fancy‟s Followings by Verspertilio” and the other in a red
bound notebook titled “Verses by Vespertilio.” Neither notebook is dated, but both
contain Robert Bridges‟s editorial comments. Because it was not until 1894 that Hodgkin
left out for Bridges to find the white notebook of poetry that Coleridge gave her, the copy
of the poem in the letter probably predates any other drafts in later notebooks with
Bridges‟s comments. The draft of the poem in the letter contains phrases about which
she and Bridges debated—“when they plead” (line 9), “so in she came” (line 10), “sank
down and died” (line 10), and “since” (line 11). Although it did not make it through to
the final draft, “down” (line 10) is present in all three drafts. I am using line numbers
from the manuscript of the poem in the letter, in which she collapses together every two
lines, except the refrain. The line breaks differ in each of the three earlier versions. The
draft in the letter contains “since,” giving causality to the fire‟s extinguishing. The fire
dies because and after she carried the witch over the threshold.
As Virginia Blain notes, Verses by Vespertilio was the original title of Fancy‘s
Following (284). Consequently, the red notebook probably came before the black. In the
red notebook, Bridges and Coleridge seem to have quarreled over the poem. On the back
of the previous page, Bridges has made notes in pencil about the poem. Although she
accepts many of the suggested changes, such as inserting “who” for “when they” at the
beginning of line 9, she seems to have disagreed strongly with his later suggestions.
They have been marked through with a long, scribbled line and the top of the right side of
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poetic project through the lens of her personal experiences. Furthermore, I would like to
suggest that this poem demonstrates Coleridge‟s experimentation with the dramatic
monologue, though which she builds upon the traditions of poetic abjection.
In “The Witch,” a woman knocks at the door and demands entrance and transport
over the threshold (see Appendix B). The female traveler‟s body seems to have
withstood painful tests and even at the moment of the poem‟s opening, she stands
barefoot in the snow, teeth clenched, body recoiling from her icy clothing. She seems at
once Geraldine and Jane Eyre, a woman alone fleeing from an unknown past and begging
for entrance into a warm home with a crackling fire—the domestic ideal from which she
has become somehow barred. As such, her weakened physical state and stalwart will to
survive constitute her first claim to assistance.
Coleridge alludes to Christabel, dramatizing the mixture of voices she experiences
in the process of writing. Christabel, of course, portrays the threat of the other bearing
upon oneself, altering one‟s sense of identity and reshaping one‟s subjectivity. Through
her refrain in “The Witch,” she positions the poem of her great-great-uncle, Samuel

his comments has been erased—presumably by Coleridge. He wrote more comments in
this place, writing from the right side of the page, but these were erased with such force
that a digital scanner reflects the harsh lines of paper damage inflicted by the eraser. It is
impossible to read the majority of these comments, although, given their swift
disappearance, the thought of translating the remaining marks is very attractive indeed.
In this draft, she includes “since” in line 11, but she has changed “She came—she came”
in line 10 to “So in she came,” prompting Bridges to reply: “In she came is slovenly, let
the necessity not be that of commonplace.” In the black notebook Bridges suggests that
she add “since” to line 11, where Coleridge‟s version read, “I hurried across the floor.”
His suggestion implies that Coleridge often reconsidered whether to include the word,
which means that she spent time working through the causal chain of events, ultimately
deciding that she should clarify through “since” that the woman‟s entrance extinguished
the fire.
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Taylor Coleridge, to haunt her own. Henry Newbolt, the editor of the first widely
accessible edition of her collected poetry, explains that she would not publish poetry
under her own name because of “the fear of tarnishing the name which an ancestor had
made illustrious in English poetry”:
She would close the discussion with a gay and characteristic
inconsistency—“Never, as long as I live! When I am dead, you may do as
you like.” Now that death has so soon taken her at her word, I cannot help
thinking myself justified in acting on that permission, however lightly
given; and I believe that no poems are less likely that these to jar upon
lovers of “Christabel” and “The Ancient Mariner.” (v-vi)
However, within her poetry and her letters, Coleridge consistently alludes to her literary
precursors, perhaps anticipating her post-mortem journey from her pseudonym, Anodos,
the “Wanderer,” to the female namesake.
More recently, Angela Leighton, Katharine McGowran, and Alison Chapman
have also explored Coleridge‟s use of her family‟s literary history. Leighton argues that
Coleridge has re-written Christabel “in another voice („the voice that women have‟)”
(612). McGowran posits that Coleridge “is haunted by the witches and demons of
Samuel Taylor‟s texts” (186):
Coleridge seems trapped herself within this network of poetry and
influence. She is caught somewhere between destruction and desire, like a
female version of the Bloomian poet “condemned to learn his profoundest
yearnings through an awareness of other selves.” (196)
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Chapman contends, “Mary Coleridge‟s adoption of a wayward pseudonym allows her to
traverse literary history and inhabit Samuel Taylor Coleridge‟s poems, so that she
reverses the norms of influence and haunts her precursor” (“Flight” 151).99 Chapman
reads the poem as exemplifying the witch as “a quintessential wanderer, a figure for
Anodos and therefore the signature of the poet herself.” For Chapman, “[c]rossing the
threshold means entering into the precursor‟s poem” (“Literary Influence”125). I would
like to reverse the symbolism here to argue that the witch represents the precursor‟s poem
entering Coleridge‟s, a haunting Coleridge desires and directs.
Building upon these arguments, particularly Chapman‟s work with Coleridge‟s
boundary crossings and McGowran‟s work with her thresholds, 100 I want to suggest that
evidence in the letter that presents “The Witch” reveals how her incorporation of
Christabel typifies her poetic project. A woman who never married, she, by all accounts,
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See also her article in Victorian Gothic.
Chapman and McGowran have analyzed Coleridge‟s use of boundaries and
thresholds in several different ways. In “Mary Elizabeth Coleridge, Literary Influence
and Technologies of the Uncanny,” Chapman suggests, “If this poem is indeed a love
poem, as Leighton argues, in the crossing is another kind of deviation: the secret script of
incestuous female desire. It is also a passing of the precursor‟s block to poetic authority
that traverses history as well as space” (Chapman, “Literary Influence” 125). In the more
recent article, “Mary Elizabeth Coleridge and the Flight to the Lyric,” Chapman identifies
Coleridge‟s “willed possession, together with the traversing of boundaries and an
uncanny contextlessness” as “perhaps the condition of Victorian women‟s lyricism taken
to an extreme, the „responsive strings‟ open entirely to the influence of an other,” but also
“the ghosting of an illicit desire and a tentative space for female aestheticism” (158).
For McGowran, “Coleridge somehow always remains outside, or under the rule of
someone else. […] He is the host and she is the guest, her identity is confused by the
sense of being a visitor in someone else‟s poem” (190). Consequently, McGowran
argues, “The threshold is the place where guest meets host in Mary Coleridge‟s
imagination, a place of reciprocal desire, yet also of loss” (196). I would like to focus on
how Coleridge maintains agency by interweaving the voices without blending them,
opening the threshold while maintaining the boundary.
100
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threw herself constantly into a wide variety of literary worlds, writing on scraps of paper
that find themselves in various family archives, leaving a trail of poems scrawled on the
back of other people‟s stationery.101 Although her life featured a series of social events,
with figures such as Tennyson, Morris, and Browning coming to visit and a dedicated
coterie constantly engaging in reading groups and social visits, her greatest fear seems to
be the loss of her independence, personal and poetic. However, rather than experiencing
this fear as an “anxiety of influence”102 or an “anxiety of authorship,”103 instead, she
dissects it, palpating for its causes and reconstructing it in an aesthetic of interpenetration.
Coleridge experiments with poetry in order to portray these precarious moments when
two subjectivities converge in mutual self-consciousness, an aesthetic and personal act
she initiates and desires.104

“I worship you, & I want to nurse you.”:
Boundaries, Thresholds, and Bodily Exchange
In her letter to Hodgin, marked “very private indeed,” Coleridge describes two
encounters with Helen, Margaret Duckworth‟s younger sister, that might have inspired
the poem. Coleridge first met the Duckworth sisters in 1886 through Ella Coltman, their
cousin. Whistler describes Helen as “the beauty, about whom everyone felt protective”
101

See, for example, the letters of Samuel Courtauld to Christabel Mary Melville,
52434, f. 179, British Library.
102
See Harold Bloom‟s The Anxiety of Influence.
103
See Gilbert and Gubar‟s The Madwoman in the Attic.
104
Because she maintains a desiring subject position, her approach to abjection
differs significantly from Levinas‟s.
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(45). All of Coleridge‟s letters and the relationships they describe deserve much more
detailed study, but for the purposes of this paper, I would like to focus only on this letter
to suggest that Coleridge describes these encounters with Duckworth in so much detail
because they resonated with her poetic project. As we shall see, every episode in this
letter seems to move centripetally to “The Witch,” tucked gently in the very middle. By
claiming, “the story begins with Helen,” Coleridge leads Hodgkin to read each event as
advancing a larger narrative. She immediately reveals a pattern to the letter‟s seemingly
haphazard construction through the promise of an internal logic that she reveals, finally,
at the end. In the first encounter, Duckworth, visiting the Coleridge home, shares an
intriguing moment of intimacy with Coleridge:
Darling,
There is so much to tell, that I don‟t know where to begin. However, now
that I come to think of it the story begins with Helen. She came on
Saturday night and I was feeling so tired that I said that we wouldn‟t brush
our hair together that evening. “Couldn‟t you come down for 5 minutes &
not stay?” she asked, with that irresistibly eager, hungry look in her dear
eyes that would bring one back out of one‟s grave. So of course I said
Yes, & went upstairs to collect my brush. As I was coming down again, I
was surprised to see a light in the schoolroom. There stood H. in her blue
dressing gown. “You mustn‟t come down. I‟d forgotten how far down it
is. I only wanted this” & she kissed & kissed & kissed. So sweet of her it
was! & of course, she had arrived without any nightgown. H. asked the
question ironically—I said “How can you be so suspicious?”—H suddenly
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hid her face in her hands— & we found the shaft of a venture had gone
home. Next morning we went to the Abbey. Alas, I found out afterward,
that she had been too tired to enjoy it quite as much as I did!”
(87, f. 1a-c).105
Duckworth‟s childlike fascination for Coleridge persuades Coleridge to
acquiesce—to run up the stairs to find her brush in order to engage in a traditional female
bonding ritual. Evidently, she is surprised to find Duckworth in the schoolroom, a
significant place for the kissing to occur. Duckworth could have chosen the room out of
admiration for Coleridge‟s literary abilities. The room also represents the social world
the women inhabited, with their reading group and their literary-oriented conversations.
For Coleridge, it was an intimate setting, one Whistler describes as “the scene of her most
real adventures all her life” (23). Coleridge and her sister, Florence, “shared a little attic
bedroom under the eaves above the schoolroom, for the roomy house was usually full of
guests” (30). Now standing “in her blue dressing gown,” Duckworth admits that the
request for mutual hair brushing was a ruse; she really “only wanted this.” If her kisses
are out of the ordinary, Coleridge‟s reaction violates one‟s expectations: “So sweet of her
it was! & of course, she had arrived without any nightgown.” Rather, Duckworth‟s
advances and her penchant for running around another woman‟s home without a
nightgown—presumably in a thin dressing gown—seem almost expected to Coleridge.
105

Eton College Library has marked the letter as number 87. There are three parts
to the letter. Each part is a piece of paper folded in half lengthwise. Coleridge wrote on
both sides of each page and inserted the manuscript of “The Witch” in the second part.
For the purposes of this paper, I have labeled the parts f1, f2, and f3 and denoted the
pages through letters. “A” corresponds to the front of the part, “B” to the back of that
page, “C” to the front of the second page, and “D” to the back of the second page.
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At this point in the quotation, the relationship between events grows more tenuous. It is
unclear what question Duckworth asks “ironically” or why it seemed suspicious to
Coleridge. Apparently, Coleridge‟s accusation upsets Duckworth, causing her to
“suddenly [hide] her face in her hands.” Finally, Coleridge describes the dissolution of
the moment between the two in the schoolroom in extremely ambiguous language: “& we
found the shaft of a venture had gone home.”
In “The Witch,” the woman outside claims that she “has wandered over the
fruitful earth” (5)—her travels have been only within areas of plentitude and health—
without having “[come] here before” (6). She flatters the interlocutor, who stands in the
warm room just on the other side of the door and contemplates the request, that she
considers this place “fruitful.” The ambiguity begins here106: how is the home “fruitful”?
To whom is the home “fruitful”? At this moment, the speaker marks herself as a sort of
consumer, come to devour the “fruits” of the home. We might hear in the background
“Goblin Market”:
Did you miss me?
Come and kiss me.
Never mind my bruises,
Hug me, kiss me, suck my juices
Squeezed from goblin fruits for you,
Goblin pulp and goblin dew.
Eat me, drink me, love me;
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For Kristeva, the abject depends upon such open boundaries: “We may call it a
border; abjection is above all ambiguity” (9).
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Laura, make much of me […]. (465-74)
In the case of the “The Witch,” however, the woman inside is asked to give her fruits, to
offer herself up.107 The fruits are not from “goblin pulp and goblin dew”—they originate
in her own life, even her own body. We might read the woman outside, then, as crying:
“I want to eat you, drink you, love you; make much of you.” She is both the
otherworldly goblin and Laura, who needs the juices—the magical essence of another
life—to survive.
As late as 1983, the entry on Coleridge in the Dictionary of Literary Biography
describes her as a shy woman whose “daily life was centered around family and friends.”
In contrast to the existing descriptions of “her merry disposition, her liking for people of
all sorts, her whimsical tastes, [and] her spirituality,” the writer suggests, “her own poems
testify to the mask she wore before even her most intimate friends.” The letter to
Hodgkin—one of many—reveals a very different Coleridge, a woman surrounded by
passionate relationships, whose decision to live at home and dedicate herself to “family
and friends” was by no means the quiet piety of the stereotypical Victorian spinster.
However, it is not entirely clear just what kind of relationships she did have with her
friends. What kind of love did she share with Helen? What sorts of kisses were those in
the schoolroom? By placing the draft of the poem in this letter, Coleridge signals a
relationship between the woman outside begging for entrance and Helen, who pleads for
her own desires. McGowran likewise notes the “eroticism” in “The Witch,” describing
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Katharine McGowran similarly connects the grapes in “Wilderspin” to the
“fairy economy” in Goblin Market (194-96).

186
“the threshold as a threshold of experience, of awakening of sexuality” (188).108 While
the schoolroom kisses might seem overtly erotic, it is difficult to discern how Coleridge
and Duckworth categorized them.
William Cory, who later changed his name to William Johnson, led Coleridge,
Coltman, and Hodgkin in the study of Greek literature (Chitty 80-81). Cory had been
dismissed from Eton after a scandal involving a student:
His regard for his pupils had been emotional, and he did not express
himself discreetly. Like Socrates, he adored the beauty of youth, which
filled him with a protective yearning, at times sentimental. A letter to a
boy is said to have been brought to the attention of the headmaster, who
decided that the safest—or simplest—course was to let Johnson go.
(Whistler 35-36)
The group of Coleridge‟s friends must have discussed Grecian modes of love, which they
may have transferred into their relationships. In this letter, Coleridge will develop more
than the erotic dimension of her relationship with Duckworth. She will weave these
experiences into a more complicated narrative involving mutually elucidating moments.
In the second stanza of “The Witch,” the speaker amplifies her supplication.
First, she cries out against the worsening weather, the “cutting wind” (8) whipping across
her frozen dress. Her body has begun to suffer from exposure, which has turned her
hands to “stone” and her voice to “a groan” (10). However, when she claims that “the
worst of death is past” (11), she makes her physical state increasingly ambiguous. Does
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she imply that death has passed? If so, is she alive or dead? Folded into this line is the
idea that her past is “the worst of death.” As if to assure the interlocutor that she is not a
dangerous woman, she clarifies that despite her independent wandering, she is “a little
maiden still” (12)—one whose “little white feet are sore” (13). Her insistence on making
herself seem innocuous only heightens the intensity of the threat her hidden body holds.
The final stanza, from the perspective of the person listening to the woman‟s plea
from the other side of the door, reveals that the woman inside has indeed acquiesced. In
a quiet explanation, the speaker recounts that the woman‟s voice was persuasively honest
in its insistency—it “was the voice that women have, / Who plead for their heart‟s desire”
(16).109 However, the psychological consequences reveal the multiple valences to the
woman‟s “desire”: “She came—she came—and the quivering flame / Sank and died in
the fire” (17). As with Geraldine, the flame flickers with the mere power of the woman‟s
presence; however in “The Witch,” we glimpse only the consequence of this burst of
energy—the dying flames. Geraldine‟s embrace—“And in her arms the maid she took, /
Ah wel-a-day!” (263-64)—leaves Christabel “resigned to bliss or bale” (288), her beauty
somehow transferred to Geraldine. In “The Witch,” the speaker inside gathers the
woman in her arms, pulling her body to her own and carrying her over the threshold,
blurring the roles of Christabel and Geraldine by both allowing the woman inside and
initiating the physical contact. The consequence of the threshold embrace for the second
speaker in “The Witch” is the loss of the hearth‟s fire, a loss of inspiration or spiritual
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Because of the echoes of Christabel in “The Witch,” I read the second speaker
as female. Katharine McGowran notes that “[i]f this other „I‟ is instead, male, then the
poem takes on a different aspect” (188): “The „voice that women have / Who plead for
their heart‟s desire‟ stresses not commonality but difference” (188).
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life. McGowran reads the poem this way, focusing on the “awareness of limitation, as
though the „heart‟s desire‟ of the woman poet can never be achieved without loss”
(189).110 However, the dying fire could also suggest a radical shift in the idea of home.
The domestic norm has been transformed so that the sort of ideal domestic safety the first
speaker craved has been replaced by something else—a union of bodies and lives that recreates domestic life, even domestic bliss. Unlike Christabel, the second speaker can
reveal the story of their intimacy. Likewise, Coleridge desires to reveal to Hodgkin the
complicated story of her intimacy with Duckworth.
On the second page of her letter to Hodgkin, Coleridge details another encounter
that explains her relationship to Duckworth more clearly:
Also she annoyed me by taking care of me the wrong side up. F.111 who is
much attached to those agonizing graces herself & has a fellow feeling,
says it‟s abominable of me not to like it—& I know it is—& yet O

., I

can‟t help it! The worst of it is, it‟s a new thing; she never took care of me
before, & I do wish she wouldn‟t. And yet it‟s lovely of her. “There‟s
something of the child and something of the mother in my love for you,”
she said afterwards. “I worship you, & I want to nurse you.” Somehow I
couldn‟t tell her what I always feel, that her love for me is the love of the
bird for the bough in “Misconceptions.” (87, f.1.4-2.1)
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“F.” probably stands for Florence, although Coleridge used a system of secret
names for her friends. She often called Coltman “Fidus Achates” (Whistler 49), so,
alternatively, it is possible that “F.” refers to Coltman.
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How does one person care for another “the wrong side up”? Is this a sexual allusion, or
does it describe showing affection in the opposite way it would be best received?
Coleridge does not seem to balk at Duckworth‟s affection, but instead, the ways she
displays it. The heart she doodles in the next sentence proves similarly ambiguous. She
could be apostrophizing her own heart, but given what we know of their friendship, it
could be more likely that she is referring to Hodgkin, the letter‟s recipient, as her heart.
If so, it draws attention to the intricate networks of relationships Coleridge is negotiating
and the balancing of power these relationships involve. In a letter to Hodgkin a few years
later, Coleridge admits, “Egalité is not love‟s motto and never was.”112 Duckworth‟s
behavior is “a new thing,” but her love for Coleridge is not—leading Coleridge to think
about “what [she] always feel[s].” Duckworth expresses her love for Coleridge by
declaring her desire for an intimate exchange with her. Like a child, she wants to
worship Coleridge as an inconceivable, omnipotent figure—filling the corners of her
world with a presence that shapes her understanding of herself. Like a mother, she wants
to experience a physical exchange with Coleridge, their bodies tied together through
childbirth and nursing. Adrienne Rich identifies the mother-child relationship as the first
women share in the lesbian continuum of relationships, “the infant suckling at her
mother‟s breast, to the grown woman experiencing orgasmic sensations while suckling
her own child, perhaps recalling her mother‟s milk smell in her own” (650-51).113
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Whistler, Collected Poems, 48.
Rich defines the “lesbian continuum” as “includ[ing] a range—through each
woman‟s life and throughout history—or woman-identified experience, not simply the
fact that a woman has had or consciously desired genital sexual experience with another
woman” (648).
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Coleridge uses the image—at once non-sexual and highly erotic—to develop a
continuum of intimacy within her relationship with Duckworth, a continuum which she
then presents to Hodgkin.
As we have seen, the image of the nursing mother proves fundamentally
important to Rich and to Kristeva. For Rossetti, it is just this intimate bond that is
missing; her speakers cannot communicate orally with matriarchal figures, much less
bond with them physically. Intimate contact is sacrificed, although highly desired, for
spiritual sublimity. For Coleridge, as we will continue to see, nursing portrays a moment
of interconnection that comes at a price—the sacrifice of one‟s physical wholeness, of
one‟s flesh. As if to further develop her interest in interpenetration, she continues to
weave allusions into her letter.
Browning published “Misconceptions,” alluded to above, in Men and Women.
The poem features a spray that becomes the unlikely place for the bird‟s home:
I.
This is a spray the Bird clung to,
Making it blossom with pleasure,
Ere the high tree-top she sprung to,
Fit for her nest and her treasure.
Oh, what a hope beyond measure
Was the poor spray's, which the flying feet hung to, —
So to be singled out, built in, and sung to!
II.

191
This is a heart the Queen leant on,
Thrilled in a minute erratic,
Ere the true bosom she bent on,
Meet for love's regal dalmatic.
Oh, what a fancy ecstatic
Was the poor heart's, ere the wanderer went on —
Love to be saved for it, proffered to, spent on!
In her letter, Coleridge replaces “spray” or “treetop” with “bough,” adding even more
ambiguity to her relationship with Duckworth, who was soon to be married. If she means
“bough” as substitute for “spray,” she suggests by this allusion that Duckworth lavishes
her attention on Coleridge as a surrogate for her future husband, making Coleridge
“blossom with pleasure” and experience “a fancy ecstatic.” Consequently, Coleridge
places Duckworth in the position of the bird and of the Queen, “the wanderer.” It is
significant that Coleridge signs this letter “Thy Anodos,” or “Thy Wanderer.” She might
be communicating to Hodgkin that she too shares the role of Queen-wanderer, who
“spends” her love in a “minute erratic” (9). Perhaps the letter itself, marked “very secret
indeed,” is just such an act.
On the other hand, if she means “bough” to correspond to the “treetop” in
“Misconceptions,” she communicates a very different message. In this case, Helen hopes
for the most satisfying relationship—with Coleridge—but in the meantime, she gives her
song to the spray, her fiancé. Likewise, in the second stanza, the Queen—Helen—gives
her love to the “poor heart” (13)—her fiancé—until “the true bosom she bent on” is
“Meet for love's regal dalmatic” (10-11). In this reading, Helen holds out hope for a
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future relationship with Coleridge while giving her love temporarily to her fiancé.
Coleridge enhances the ambiguity of her relationship with Helen, returning to these
moments when boundaries become thresholds and when agency and domination blur.
Certainly many Victorian women had relationships that defied strict heterosexual
schemas. Coleridge‟s “Quintette” of female friends, including Helen and Margaret
Duckworth, Ella Coltman, and Lucy Violet Hodgkin,114 seemed to feel strongly that
marriage dangerously threatened their freedom as women. In Coleridge‟s “Marriage,”
for instance, the speaker bemoans impending separation:
No more alone sleeping, no more alone waking,
Thy dreams divided, thy prayers in twain;
Thy merry sisters to-night forsaking,
Never shall we see thee, maiden, again.

Never shall we see thee, thine eyes glancing,
Flashing with laughter and wild in glee,
Under the mistletoe kissing and dancing,
Wantonly free.

There shall come a matron walking sedately,
Low-voiced, gentle, wise in reply.
Tell me, O tell me, can I love her greatly?
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All for her sake must the maiden die!
Duckworth‟s encounter with Coleridge in the schoolroom gives new valences to the
poem. The maiden‟s freedom to kiss and dance under the mistletoe perhaps refers to a
sort of female intimacy that others will consider inappropriate after marriage. Leighton
likewise argues that “[v]ery often in Coleridge the thrill of sexual desire, the „kissing and
dancing,‟ is associated with the company of women rather than of men” (Victorian
Women Poets: An Anthology 611).115 Chapman perspicaciously notes that Coleridge‟s
relationships with other women seem erotic and that they seem to have directed her
aesthetic projects:
While I have found no direct primary evidence, it does seem that
Coleridge‟s close and intense female friendships were erotic attachments.
[…]. I want to draw on the biographical revelations of Newbolt‟s life and
the uneasy insinuations of Whistler‟s account of Coleridge‟s friendships
not to explain away her riddling and allusive poems as lesbian love lyrics,
but rather to suggest that their very uncanniness and dislocation is a
product of her subculture. In other words, illicit sexual desire is not an
interpretative key to unlocking what Whistler terms the “cryptic and
haunting” poetry, but the condition of their production. (154, 155)116
Whether these relationships were seen as illicit or simply overlooked depends upon how
most Victorians understood female sexuality. Sharon Marcus recently argued that “in
Victorian England, female marriage, gender mobility, and women‟s erotic fantasies about
115
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women were at the heart of normative institutions and discourses, even for those who
made a religion of the family, marriage, and sexual difference” (13).117 I have been
hesitant to define my project as “queering” Coleridge because, like Marcus, I see the
evidence suggesting that Victorian lesbian practices (i.e. woman-identified relationships
and romantic bonds) were actually normative. Coleridge created a multi-faceted system
of relationships with her female companions and maneuvered adeptly within a lesbian
continuum. Her lesbian network fit neatly into her otherwise traditional Victorian life
and from it, she shaped her aesthetic project, in which she juxtaposed these relationships
with her relationships with men. Accordingly, in “The Witch,” the figure pleading for
entry initiates a complicated lesbian relationship with the woman inside while also
embodying the character‟s literary ancestor, Geraldine, and the poem‟s allusive visitor,
Christabel.
Although Coleridge wants this letter to remain private, she does not seem
ashamed of the experiences; she seems embarrassed only at the prospect of hurting
Duckworth‟s feelings. Consequently, I am hesitant simply to equate Duckworth to the
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Marcus explains that her book responds to Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick‟s Between
Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire, “which drew on Rich‟s notion of
a lesbian continuum to speculate briefly that women might not have experienced the
panic around boundaries between homo- and heterosexuality that men did (2-3)” (10).
Marcus‟s project “takes to heart Sedgwick‟s powerful precept that to understand any
particular aspect of gender and sexuality we must draw equally on feminist and queer
theories and histories” (11). She goes on to explain the theoretical shift Judith Butler‟s
Gender Trouble initiated: “many [abandoned] the female world of the lesbian continuum
for the project of undoing gender and sexuality categories altogether” (11). Rather than
reading relationships between women in terms of “women‟s resistance to
heterosexuality,” Marcus “ask[s] what social formations swim into focus once we
abandon the preconception of strict divisions between men and women, homosexuality
and heterosexuality, same-sex bonds and those of family and marriage” (12, 13).
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witch, demanding emotional and sexual transport over the threshold. While it intimates
intricate social codes for relationships between Victorian women, the situation is much
more complicated—the letter reveals the inspiration for Coleridge‟s approach to the
poem. A world of complexity exists beneath Whistler‟s comment about the group of
friends: “[T]here was no social oddness or defiance about them. They were not
„emancipated,‟ or even specially „advanced‟” (39).118 Although they might not have been
openly defiant, they certainly surreptitiously redefined their lives according to their own
beliefs and desires. As Whistler describes their relationship, “the romantic intimacy they
enjoyed with each other was the fullest expression of this love” (43).119 According to
Susan Chitty‟s biography of Newbolt, Margaret Duckworth and Ella Coltman cultivated a
long-time romantic relationship:
When Margaret was informed of her parents‟ plans for her future, she
politely but firmly declined them. She had a reason for this. She was in
love with someone else, her cousin Ella Coltman. […] [Newbolt] was
aware that his future depended on her. Margaret would only accept him if
Ella was intimately included in their married life. […] The exact moment
at which Newbolt became Ella‟s lover is not known. It is certain that she
began to spend nights at 14 Victoria Road about this time, and that
Margaret knew of the arrangement. (Matters were simplified by the fact
that she and Newbolt had separate bedrooms.) Neither woman appeared
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See Chapman‟s “Mary Elizabeth Coleridge and the Flight to Lyric” for more
information on the details of Coleridge‟s groups of female friends.
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jealous of the other, perhaps because their lover was careful to divide his
favours equally. Among Newbolt‟s papers there is an account sheet
covered with neat columns of figures. They represent the number of times
he slept with each of his women each month […]. (79, 82, 91)
One wonders how this new arrangement altered Margaret‟s relationship with Ella, and
whether each woman had a tally sheet of her own. Coleridge‟s relationship with the other
members of the Quintette, with their elaborate language system (i.e. “shaft of a venture”),
their use of coding through literary allusion, and their multi-faceted partnerships with
each other and with men in their lives, certainly warrants more critical attention.
Coleridge worked to maintain ambiguity in “The Witch” by avoiding quotation
marks and by leaving “witch” out of the body of the poem so that she never specifies
which character is so identified. Consequently, she forces the reader to judge which
character deserves the outsider status of “witch”—a term historically used to describe
women who dare to speak out, to pursue knowledge, and to express hostility—and
therefore she positions the reader to question the gendered schema such a judgment
requires. She reconfigures Christabel by giving the Christabel character more agency
and by making indefinite whether the Geraldine character is “very bad” or “not so very
bad.” At the same time, she dramatizes the position of the poem Christabel as a
seemingly innocuous entity, like Geraldine and the woman outside the door, that yet
threatens to consume her “fruits.” For Coleridge, it is this moment—when the door
swings open and the boundary becomes a threshold—that reveals a truth about life that
captivates her. Interpenetration is life at its highest intensity, the precarious balance of
the self and other, the bad and the good.
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The next encounter Coleridge describes in the letter to Hodgkin takes place in a
moment alone with Margaret‟s infant: “Friday, I sat alone in the little drawingroom at 14
for some time, until Margaret woke, holding the baby in my arms, & wondering,
wondering, wondering what it was that I held, — a conqueror or a shepherd” (87, f. 2b).
Immediately afterward, she refers to “The Witch”: “Is she very bad? or not so very bad?”
(87, f. 2b). In many ways, these questions are the same in both cases. Who is the victor
and who is the victim? What does it mean to be “good” in a relationship with other
people? Complicating this experience are implicit images of mother and child.
Coleridge sets the previous account of Helen Duckworth‟s declaration of desire to be
both mother and child to her against this account, signaling that Coleridge conceptually
links Helen‟s assertion to the emotions she has while holding Margaret Duckworth‟s
baby. The mother-child relationship seems simultaneously suggestive and precarious to
Coleridge.120 On one hand, the child depends upon the mother, who physically contains
the power of life for the child. On the other hand, the child requires the mother‟s full
attention, directing the use of her days and perhaps threatening her health and well-being.
In Christabel, Samuel Taylor Coleridge uses this image to describe Geraldine‟s power
over Christabel:
O sorrow and shame! Can this be she,
The lady who knelt at the old oak tree?
And lo! The worker of these harms,
120

See also Christine Battersby‟s description of Greek rituals relating to anodos,
“or spiritual „going up,‟” “whereby the daughter (spring) is birthed by the mother (the
period of sowing) and then takes the mother back into herself (ripening, harvest)” (266,
267).
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That holds the maiden in her arms,
Seems to slumber still and mild,
As a mother with her child. (296-301)
In the same way, the woman who pleas for entrance in “The Witch” vacillates between a
needful and harmless woman and a vampiric consumer.
In this letter, Coleridge frequently alludes to contemporary writers, particularly
Robert Browning, suggesting a profound connection among her poetry, her own readings
of Browning, and the interpretative community of her reading group (with M.
Duckworth, Coltman, and later Henry Newbolt). After describing the schoolroom
encounter with Helen, she first mentions the Brownings: “And then we watched the river,
& talked about the Brownings you & I read” (87f. 1c). After their walk together to the
abbey, Coleridge and Duckworth attended Ibsen‟s The Master Builder “& changed
opinions in the middle of it, she taking mine & I hers, which caused a want of unity at the
end” (87f 1c). Duckworth soon returned, surprising Coleridge: “I thought she wanted
[…] some terrestrial trifle […], but not at all. She put both of her hands on my shoulders
& fired her eyes straight into mine: „You don‟t still think Hilde (the Ibsenite heroine) was
wrong?” (87f 1d). Coleridge‟s description of Helen mirrors Browning‟s “Love Among
the Ruins.” In fact, just after describing the second encounter with Helen, Coleridge tells
Hodgkin that Helen has been rewriting Browning: “If you can, tell me a little of what you
feel about her „Love Among the Ruins.‟ Is it not the „agony of peace‟ beautiful, & the
part about „perfect vision‟ & „perfect embrace?‟” (87f. 2a). Helen Duckworth‟s embrace,
then, echoes “Love Among the Ruins” and her re-writing of it. In Browning‟s poem, the
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speaker imagines the moment when he will meet “a girl with eager eyes and yellow hair”
awaiting him:
When I do come, she will speak not, she will stand,
Either hand
On my shoulder, give her eyes the first embrace
Of my face,
Ere we rush, ere we extinguish sight and speech
Each on each.
[…]
Oh heart! oh blood that freezes, blood that burns!
Earth‟s returns
For whole centuries of folly, noise and sin!
Shut them in,
With their triumphs and their glories and the rest!
Love is best. (67-72, 79-84)
Duckworth and Coleridge re-create this scene in their own way, looking back on the
history of a war of sorts, each having taken a different side on the Ibsen play.
Furthermore, Duckworth has re-written this scene in her poem, which she performed for
Coleridge. Coleridge hopes she will perform it for Hodgkin, perhaps transferring the
“„perfect vision‟ & „perfect embrace.‟”
Poetry was so vital to this group that they constantly read and re-envisioned it,
adopting literary phrases as a coded language for their intimacies. Their constant literary
references and energetic re-writings suggest that Coleridge‟s group of friends did not
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merely extol the virtues of their literary predecessors. Instead, they employed intertextual
methods to refigure their relationships to each other and to their literary history. Like the
complicated relationship of mother and child, with inherent demands on both sides, their
active relationship dramatizes the shifts and strain of literary power that occur
particularly when competing generations of writers come into physical and intellectual
contact. As it does in the quivering balance achieved between conqueror and shepherd in
Browning‟s “Saul”—a poem Coleridge might have had in mind while holding Margaret‟s
child—literary song has the power to transform the relationship of type to antitype,
predecessor to progeny, and self to other.

“The life of what is dead terrifies. The death of what is living terrifies.”:
Boundaries, Thresholds, and Spiritual Crossings
At the end of the letter, Coleridge describes an experience at the home of William
Hamo Thornycroft, sculptor and son of Thomas Thornycroft. She reports to Hodgkin the
details of the visit, particularly the merging of life and death that she finds so captivating
in Thornycrofts‟s work:
There was a marble monument, the Angels Death & Immortality seated at
the feet & at the head of some unknown mortal or other; beautiful, great
winged “birds of God.” He said those 2 tremendous words in such a
matter-of-fact tone that it gave me a little shock of surprise. What
wonderful people are these, to whom they are daily bread & Bread of Life
at one & the same time! Their wings, apparently, were just “lines” to him,
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lines that “carried up the lines of the drapery.” He had had a model lying
in the same position, to do the robes from the other day, (there they still
were, horrible things! With gloved hands folded) & one of the workmen
thought he was dead & fled in terror when he saw him sat up. Whereat
everybody laughed, & I did something besides. The life of what is dead
terrifies. The death of what is living terrifies. How it makes one‟s head
whirl! But I can‟t convey to you any idea of what that ½ hour was to me.
(87f. 3a- 3c)
There are many versions of death and life at play in this excerpt. First, the angels Death
& Immortality represent “what is dead” and “what is living,” from a religious standpoint.
These statues are very much non-living, but they were made to guard a tomb to represent
the soul‟s life. Next, someone who has commissioned these statues must believe in the
version of life they represent—the life of the soul in Heaven—but the artist himself
thinks of them only as stone with a sort of aesthetic movement, but not imbued with life.
Finally, Coleridge adumbrates the models ambiguously: are they static, lifelike drafts of
the angels or people paid to model? Kristeva links such an experience to abjection:
It is thus not lack of cleanliness or health that causes abjection but what
disturbs identity, system, order. What does not respect borders, positions,
rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the composite. . . . The abject
confronts us . . . with those fragile states where man strays on the
territories of animal. (Powers of Horror 4, 12)
Coleridge‟s ambiguity heightens the horror of the moment when the worker sees the
model sitting and realizes that he is not dead but only death-like, an episode epitomizing
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the horror and deep truth Coleridge finds in threshold experiences. We might recall in
Rossetti‟s “After Death” the spirit of a woman looking down at her own dead body. For
Rossetti, such contemplation leads to a newfound openness and spiritual peace.
Coleridge does not want to escape the visceral humanity of such experiences.
The mixing of life and death “terrifies”—and art is best suited to capture this
fusion. Despite the sculptor‟s vision—Thornycroft‟s perspective of the wings as
“lines”—the art piece has a life of its own and pulls toward action. Consequently, it
inhabits the ambiguous, transitory territory between action and stasis, where the stone
contains the imaginary potential of flight and spiritual power. According to Whistler,
“The Garden of Ancient Palms,” Coleridge‟s favorite illustration from a book from her
childhood—The Story Without an End—features wings similar to the angels‟. “[T]he
trees of an oasis rise purple against a glowing, mystic sky,” Whistler explains, “and on
the roof in the foreground a dove with half-folded wings is just alighting or, it may be,
preparing to be gone. […] The scene might stand as a frontispiece to Mary‟s poems; it
has the same secrecy, the same sense of deep silence in which mysterious good and evil
move” (33). The same scene that might inspire quiet awe can easily produce terror. This
slippage seems to interest Coleridge most. In Gathered Leaves, a collection of her prose,
Coleridge describes “the sharp sensations of fear that broke the dull dream of my
childhood” (31), a fear that Whistler explains through a horrific story. When Coleridge
was very young, one of Millais‟s protégés began to paint a portrait of Mary and Florence
when he “seized up a knife in a demented fit, and was about to attack either the children
or the canvas, when luckily Millais came in” (31).
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Although Whistler notes that Coleridge never mentioned the event, one wonders
whether standing in an artist‟s studio—especially when discussing the opacity of the
boundaries of life and death in art and in human experience—might have resonated with
that shocking moment when the artist employed to capture the spirits of the young girls
rushed to dig them out of the children or the canvas. The “terror” in the Thornycroft
passage likewise results from defied expectations—the threshold moments shifting her
concept of how the world works. What one thinks is dead might yet live, what appears to
live might be insensate, and what seems innocuous might be deadly. On the other hand,
avoiding the threshold moments leads to the sort of spiritual ossification that occurs in
Browning‟s “The Statue and the Bust”: “You of the virtue (we issue join) / How strive
you? De te, fabula” (249-50). Art uniquely portrays the sort of interpenetration that
reveals our inherent interconnectedness and the hazardous balancing act we often
disguise through strict binaries of inanimate matter or life, good or bad, and self or other.
The “story” in the letter, then, “begins with Helen” and ends with Thornycroft.
Just before her descriptions of Watt‟s and then Thornycroft‟s studio, Coleridge writes:
“[H]ome again in the company of this Witch. What do you think of her? Is she very
bad? or not so very bad? The metre‟s all wrong any way. That brings the record down
to yesterday, & I must tell you about yesterday—only I can‟t. I‟ve been junking it all
along” (87f. 2b-c). She could mean that she has separated it from the rest of the letter,
but her phrasing also suggests that she has cut it into pieces that emerge through other
moments in the letter. In other words, she has distributed the core of this more recent
event in all of the other episodes, including those with Helen and with Margaret‟s baby.

204
Whistler describes Coleridge‟s work as a “personal form of what Keats called
„negative capability,‟” through which she “break[s] down the barriers that divide one
personality from another” (46, 47). Likewise Christine Battersby has argued, “Far from
having an (apparently) firm and autonomous ego that reassures itself of its own identity
by the rigorous exclusion of otherness (and then longs nostalgically for that other),
Coleridge is wildly variable in her attitudes to the „I‟ because she has never made a sharp
division between „I‟ and other” (269). Coleridge‟s letter to Hodgkin reveals how she
envisions the point of contact between self and other as the essence of human experience,
possibly horrific, but always exhilarating. Consequently, she employs allusive
techniques to trace the process of interpenetration. Coleridge carries Christabel into her
poem, although it threatens her creativity and poetic individuality, in order to bring her
forefather‟s voice into her own—to inhabit together the same literary space.
In the case of “The Witch,” the incorporative moment ends in alterity. In “The
Witch,” after all, the pronouns “I” and “she” are maintained through the end of the poem.
The echoes of Christabel, then, function as a force embodied in the witch, the other
allowed in, but forced to remain other. Recognizing alterity leads to a combination of
alienation and joissance that creates for the self a new experience of interconnected
existence, one Levinas calls “the idea of infinity” (52). This is the central moment of the
poem, as the first and second speakers engage in an oppositional relationship that changes
the original identities of each. Likewise, Coleridge builds an aesthetic project that
reaches out to past poetic power but keeps it at a distance, allowing her to maintain her
poetic identity. Rather than writing over her poetic precursors, she reconfigures this
encounter as a process of interpenetration that allows her to bring these earlier poems to
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bear on her own, a relationship with power to shape poetic composition and generic
development.
Coleridge‟s model of interpenetration, building upon Rossetti‟s experimental
work, will lead us to the final form of subjectivity that evolves through experimentation
with the genre, intersubjectivity. The next chapter will focus on two forms of
intersubjective poetry, intertextuality in the poems and polyvocality in the speakers.
While the poetry of abject subjectivity allows speakers to traverse boundaries, the poetry
of intersubjectivity gathers multiple discourses inside of one identity. The first focuses
outward and forever expands; the second focuses inward through a speaker who uses all
available modes of expressing the self to create many selves.
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Chapter Five:
Literary Intersubjectivity and Polyvocality

To accept this form of inclusion is a precondition of disrupting the
totalizing demand to make any voice absolute, even that of the
formerly excluded other, or to silence others, even the silencers.
This can only mean that the self as subject can and will allow all
its voices to speak, including the voice of the other within. Owning
the other within diminishes the threat of the other without so that
the stranger outside is no longer identical with the stranger within
us—not our shadow, not a shadow over us, but a separate other
whose own shadow is distinguishable in the light. (Jessica
Benjamin, Shadow of the Other 108)

As Yopie Prins describes in “Voice Inverse,” Robert Browning once faltered
when reciting his poetry into a phonograph, breaking free of his own text to listen to the
sound of his voice being recorded (46-47). This invention provided a new sense
experience of objectivity. With the other people present, Browning broke into a chorus
of “Hip hip hurray!” celebrating the magnificence of the “wonderful invention.”121 Prins

121

The Poetry Archive has recently made Browning‟s recording available to the
public at www.poetryarchive.com.
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uses Browning‟s recorded performance to argue for a new critical focus for readers of
Victorian poetry:
One path I envision for the future of Victorian poetry is a return to reading
Victorian meters, or what I would call “historical prosody.” […] [I]t
would mean coming to terms with Victorian poetry on its own terms,
taking into account its highly self-conscious mediations and wide range of
generic conventions rather than imposing our own ideas (or idealizations)
of poetry as a genre. (52, 54)
Through reading meter and focusing on the formations of voice, one can locate moments
of “self-conscious mediations” in order to hear how later Victorian writers responded to
their sense of literary history. Browning seems most distracted by the act of recording,
the “mechanical reproduction of voice,” according to Prins (49). Late Victorian poets
using the monologue experimented with the form to portray these moments of selfconsciousness in the relationship of self and other. Particularly, they blurred any divide
between speaker and interlocutor and between author and literary history. We have seen
a glimpse of this movement in the later Magdalen monologues by Levy and Mew,
especially through their development of multiple identities in the character. As we will
see, the intersubjective projects exemplified by “Circe,” “Woman‟s Future,” and
“Xantippe” differ through their concentrated development of the portrayal of internalized
intersubjectivity—even the inclusion of misogynistic discourses—through the mechanics
of poetic form. Late Victorian poets drew voices together to create polyvocality that
reveals an internalized, intersubjective form of relationship.
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We have seen two different models of subjectivity posited through Victorian
monologues: contrasubjectivity and abject subjectivity. The first involved defining the
self against the other, and the second involved defining the self as other. In contrast to
abject subjectivity‟s centripetal motion of the self that disperses, in intersubjectivity the
self absorbs other voices. This inclusive act requires accepting difference. This
acceptance is not the same as recognition of the other, such as what we see in Levinas‟s
work. As Steven Hendley explains Levinas‟s theories,
The “face of the other” that he evokes as the ground of our sense of moral
obligation is always essentially the face of my interlocutor, the one who
addresses me in speech. […]. To converse with another person is to find
oneself called into question, called precisely to question what one would
say in the light of what the other has said, to say only that which takes into
account what the other has said and, in this way, genuinely respond to the
other. (2, 3)
By contrast, Jessica Benjamin‟s construction of intersubjectivity allows for an ethical
relationship with the Other without the recognition of the Other‟s alterity or sameness:
To postulate a self who can assume both “goodness” and “badness,” both
recognition and negation of the other, is the only ground for a critique of
the subject‟s inability to recognize the other. . . . Politically, the
possibility of mutual intersubjectivity is predicated on the very difference
that also leads to continual misfiring of recognition, the very plurality that
strains subjectivity. Psychologically, the struggle to try to know the other
while still recognizing the other‟s radical alterity and unknowability has to
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be formulated not only as one between different identities, but as
disagreement and contradiction within identities. . . . This requires a
notion of self that need not aim at a seamless unity of consciousness by
exclusion, by mistaking a part for the whole. A self that allows different
voices, asymmetry, and contradiction, that holds ambivalence. (100, 101)
I would like to build upon Benjamin‟s work—which builds upon the work of Kristeva,
Derrida, Lacan, Levinas, and Bakhtin—to describe a third poetic conversation about
gender and subjectivity. This conversation posits through the monologue multiplicity of
identity, the self that “allows different voices, asymmetry, and contradiction.” Generic
experimentation with the monologue allowed late Victorian poets to place the poetic
Other into their poetry and to portray new theories of poetic subjectivity through these
reverberating voices.
The resulting poetry blended dramatized subjectivities. As we explored in the
first chapter, we could describe the monologue by using the form of the double helix—
which in this case, becomes a triple helix—where the reader enters into the poets‟ and the
speakers‟ minds through his or her own. Intersubjective poetry dramatizes this process
by extending the logic of the structure. For example, in “Circe,” the reader enters the
poem through the mind of Circe, created in the mind of Webster. The reader understands
the speaker through layers of criteria—i.e. the reader‟s expectations of the character, the
genre, and the author—and from his or her own subjective vantage point. Reading each
word, the reader enters into a sort of subjective harmony with the speaker, embodying the
speaker‟s voice in his or her mind. Because of the poem‟s intertextuality, the reader then
enters Caliban‟s mind—and Browning‟s—through Circe‟s mind—and Webster‟s. We
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can even enter the mind of Caliban from The Tempest and, thus, the mind of Shakespeare.
The resulting experience is that of reading Caliban through Shakespeare through Caliban
through Browning through Circe through Webster. Such intersubjective and intertextual
poetry brings literary subjectivities into spatial connection, thereby bringing authors into
conversation. As we shall see, we could read this poetic interconnectedness through
Bloom‟s agôn, a space for poetic competition in which a poet writes against a “father”
poet. Some poets, like Levy and Kendall, work to portray this moment of selfrecognition—of self-consciousness—primarily in their speakers. In this case, rather than
clearly electrifying allusive connections in their poems, they embody multiple voices in
their speakers. This polyvocal poetry is equally intersubjective; it internalizes this
process. Polyvocal poetry portrays the competing intersubjective voices. Of course, we
might read these voices as a single speaker‟s performance of multiple identities and thus
not intersubjective, but intrasubjective. We might point to a poem like “Soliloquy of the
Spanish Cloister” as an example of a poem that contains contrary blended identities in
one speaker: “Gr-r-r” (1). In such poems, the voices rise in succession to depict the
speaker‟s psychological struggle, but we can usually identify a central voice that carries
the strongest subjective force. In the polyvocal poetry I will examine in this chapter, no
such central voice exists; instead, the voices compete for dominance but reach no
common key. Furthermore, some of these voices clearly represent popular discourses
that undermine the speaker‟s other expressions. In this way, the voices represent
subjectivities impinging upon one another in the mind of the speaker.
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Benjamin describes intersubjectivity as the result of a process that we might link
to the conversations we have explored in the monologue. First, she explains the
“complementarities” that shape our psyche:
Subject and object, active and passive, observer and participant, knower
and known—these reversible complementarities have structured the
psychoanalytic relationship. The intersubjective perspective is concerned
with how we create the third position that is able to break up the reversible
complementarities and hold in tension the polarities that underly them.
Essential to that theoretical aim is the uncovering of the gender coding of
these complementarities, which as so successfully inscribed them in our
desire, in our psyches. (xiv)
Benjamin explains that the representation of the Other is fundamental to the process of
negotiation that shapes the relationship of these “complementarities.” Of course, this
complicated process is occurring in one mind. We might recall Shaw‟s “ghosts” here in
order to describe intersubjectivity as the ghosting of the other in the self. According to
Benjamin, the self craves “escape into merger with like-self beings, creating an identity
that demands the destructive denial of the different” (96).122 We might detect a kinship
between “the destructive denial of the different” and the process of contrasubjectivity
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Benjamin explains, “I have suggested that the early developmental route out of
projective-introjective assimilation turns out to be through recognition‟s opposing term,
negation, which has to be revalued” (96). She notes that she is building upon
“Winnicott‟s notion of destruction—the mental refusal to recognize the other, the
negation of the external—” by “contend[ing] that recognition practically, psychically
depends upon symbolic processing of destruction” (96).

212
explored in the third chapter.123 For Benjamin, the desire that leads to “destructive
denial” is a step in a greater process124 that can end in reconciliation:
Breakdown, full rupture, is only catastrophic when the possibility of
reestablishing the tension between negation and recognition is foreclosed,
when the survival of the other for the self, of self for other, is definitely
over. By the same token, recognition does not require a full
reconciliation, least of all an “extorted” one, as Adorno termed it, but
rather something that is both “tensed and unstable—never quite
aufgehoben or reconciled” (Bernstein, 1992). (96)
The breakdown, or “splitting,” is part of this process in which the individual separates
from the Other; “it can either be transformed in relation to the outside other or reduce the
other to a locus of the self‟s disowned parts” (97). For Benjamin, intersubjectivity does
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According to Benjamin,
Merely by living in this world, we are exposed to others and subjected to
unconscious, unwilling identification with others (on television, if not
begging on the streets). Whether we will or no, the world exposes us to
the different others who, not only in their mere existence as separate
beings reflect our lack of control, but who also threaten to evoke in us
what we have repudiated in order to protect the self: weakness,
vulnerability, decay, or perhaps sexual otherness, transgression,
instability—the excluded abject in either Kristeva‟s and Butler‟s sense. It
is not truly in our power not to identify; what we cannot bear to own, we
can only repudiate. (95)
124
This process is part of her proposed answer to a series of questions she asks
earlier in the text:
The question—Can a subject relate to the other without assimilating the
other to the self through identification?—corresponds to the political
question, Can a community admit the Other without her/him having to
already be or become the same? What psychoanalysis considers the
problem of overcoming omnipotence is thus always linked to the ethical
problem of respect and the political . . . problem of nonviolence. (94)
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not necessarily mean a loss of agency; rather, “Only such a self can own—assume
responsibility for containing—destructiveness in self and other rather than projecting it
into the not-I or turning it against the self” (99). As we saw with abject subjectivity, the
loss of a central identity does not result in the loss of agency or of identity. Instead,
identity can take another, multiple form in “a self that sustains difference and
contradiction” (104):
To include without assimilating or reducing requires us to think beyond
the binary alternatives of self-enclosed identity and fragmented dispersal
to a notion of multiplicity. . . . Difference, hate, failure of love can be
surmounted not because the self is unified, but because it can tolerate
being divided. (104, 105)
As I will argue, individual subjectivities that “can tolerate being divided” and ethical
relationships based on this “notion of multiplicity” are modeled by the generic
experimentation that results in intersubjective poetry and polyvocal speakers.
Although we might trace intersubjective elements in the work of many
Victorian poets—like Swinburne, Kipling, Bradley, and Cooper—Webster, Kendall, and
Levy seem most interested in using the monologue to shape polyvocal projects. Circe
defines herself against the unknown Other, the lover to come (Odysseus), who must be
great because she is beautiful. Both Browning and Webster set up a situation (“So he”)
in which the speakers define themselves by conceiving of the Other. Subjectivity
requires that the Other define the self, which is relegated to a refraction of a power
situated elsewhere. Yet at the same time, through this subjective and highly selfreflexive move—the declaration of “So he”—the speaker defines the self as the set of
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characteristics that reveals an outside power. Thus, the speaker gives shape to that power
through describing the self. I do not wish to equate Browning to Caliban and Webster to
Circe, although these speakers certainly share some traits with their creators. Instead, I
am arguing that Webster builds upon Browning‟s epistemological project, in which
Caliban understands himself as a reflection of the Other, by modeling Circe on Caliban.
That Webster brings Browning, through allusion, into her poetry perhaps says something
about the ways she negotiates the very same dynamic. At issue here is the weight of
literary history and the temptation for a poet to see herself as a refraction of a greater
body of poetic power. By facing the forces at play, however, by acknowledging the
dynamic, the poet gains a sort of power that begins to shape the representation of the
other. In their poetry, Kendall and Levy also incorporate other voices into the speaker‟s
subjectivity, revealing how female poets negotiated internalized sexist arguments about
women writers. We might also see such internalized sexism in Circe‟s character such as
in the way she describes her own body according to traditional models of women‟s
beauty. However, Circe‟s monologue does not move back and forth between disparate
voices. For Kendall and Levy, poetry embodies an agôn in which these discourses
compete, resulting in the polyphony of a multiplied subject position.
Bonnie J. Robinson argues that incorporation marks the poetry of female fin de
siécle authors. They incorporate the traditions before them, an aesthetic that offers a
counterpoint to Modernism‟s aesthetic of division (10). I wonder what happens when,
building upon this approach, we identify such experimentation as an extension of earlier
Victorian conversations. I would like to suggest that later Victorian generic
experimentation builds upon earlier models of subjective and objective theories of poetry,
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adding to them a self-conscious reenactment of incorporation in the modifications of
generic conventions. We could return here to Robert Browning‟s poetic ideal of
approximating “absolute vision” (17) by combining the “objective poet,” “one whose
endeavor has been to reproduce things external” (11) and the “subjective poet,” one
“impelled to embody the thing he perceives” (13). Aurora Leigh‟s description of the
importance of poetic “double vision” (V.184), necessary in this “full-veined, heaving,
double-breasted Age” (V.216), claims incorporating poetic vision for the female poet.
Later Victorian women poets built self-reflexivity into their poetry in order to position
the poems to reveal the process of incorporation and the ways that they envision their
own literary self-positioning. The use of poetic “double vision” seems vital to Victorian
poets throughout the period, but especially for later Victorian poets, who add another
layer—self-reflexivity—to the aesthetics of incorporation. They give voice to this
aesthetic project through polyvocal and intersubjective poetic form.

“So he”:
Echoes of Robert Browning‟s “Caliban upon Setebos; or, Natural Theology in the Island”
in Augusta Webster‟s “Circe”
Perhaps one of the most challenging aspects of studying a non-canonical female
poet is determining a methodology for reading of her work. Patricia Rigg, Angela
Leighton, Christine Sutphin, and Susan Brown have all begun to describe Webster‟s
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poetry, especially how it fits within and challenges our current ideas of poetic genre. 125
Rigg warns that “recent scholars of the dramatic monologue have continued the tradition
of defining the genre exclusively through reference to male poets, primarily Browning”
(“August Webster: The Social,” 75). 126 Rigg‟s desire to distance the two poets through
genre perhaps responds to the critical heritage that considers Webster style “derivative”
125

See Rigg‟s “Augusta Webster and the Lyric Muse: The Athenaeum and
Webster‟s Poetics” [Victorian Poetry 42 no. 2 (2004): 135-64], Rigg‟s “Augusta
Webster: The Social Politics of Monodrama” [Victorian Review 26 no. 2 (2001): 75-107],
Leighton‟s Victorian Women Poets: Writing Against the Heart [Charlottesville: UP of
Virginia, 1992, pp. 164-201], Sutphin‟s “The Representation of Women‟s Heterosexual
Desire in Augusta Webster‟s „Circe‟ and „Media in Athens‟” [Women‘s Writing 5 no. 3
(1998): 373-92] and Sutphin‟s “Human Tigresses, Fractious Angels, and Nursery Saints:
Augusta Webster‟s A Castaway and Victorian Discourses on Prostitution and Women‟s
Sexuality” [Victorian Poetry 38 no. 4 (2000): 511-31], and Brown‟s “Determined
Heroines: George Eliot, Augusta Webster, and Closet Drama by Victorian Women”
[Victorian Poetry 33 no. 1 (1995): 89-109].
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As we have seen, she argues that Webster‟s dramatic poems constitute
monodrama instead of dramatic monologues because “dramatic poetry by women tends
to be less specific in defining the speaker, thereby retaining an important attribute of lyric
poetry and delineating a rather transparent dramatic „mask‟” (75). Others like Angela
Leighton, however, place Webster‟s dramatic poems within the category of the dramatic
monologue (177). She maintains that Webster‟s poetic strength lies not in her lyric
poetry, but in her dramatic monologue form that “overtly expresses what the lyric
disguises: that the heart itself is another (or several others), and that language already
mediates it” (177-78). However, she describes the differences between Browning‟s and
Webster‟s approach to the form. The complex process of defining a genre like the
dramatic monologue proves inherently political, according to Scheinberg:
My hypothesis is that each time dramatic monologues by men have been
theorized as the „other‟ kind of poetic utterance, the „Others‟ of our
literary tradition (in this case, women), have been written out of the
theory. Likewise, critics interested in looking at the „difference‟ of
women‟s poetry have maintained a difference in women‟s poetic genres,
and so often ignored or obscured how women writers‟ use of the dramatic
monologue transforms the genre as it has been theorized through male
writers‟ work. (“Recasting „Sympathy and Judgment‟” 176)
Scheinberg explains, “My point in citing these passages is not to suggest that we must
never make comparison to male writers in our work, but simply that when we do make
comparison, we should resist discourses that depict certain authors, usually canonized
male poets, as „owning‟ certain genres” (186).

217
(Forman 173).127 Scheinberg cautions against a type of criticism that already considers
poetry by male authors as foundational and work by female authors as “other”
(“Recasting „Sympathy and Judgment‟” 176). Because of the very real gender dynamics
that Victorian women experienced, often including gender discrimination and violence,
we can see in their poetry the ways that they worked to establish their right to speak and
to negotiate their place in society. Indeed, as Scheinberg suggests, “we can speculate that
women writers may have had special insights and literary strategies with which to
address the problems of speaking „universally‟” (188). Their strategies include baring the
gendered conflict inherent in the act of writing, a conflict that surfaces through what
Isobel Armstrong calls the “double poem,” “two concurrent poems in the same words”
(12):
The double poem is a deeply skeptical form. It draws attention to the
epistemology which governs the construction of the self and its
relationships and to the cultural conditions in which those relationships are
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Harry Buxton Forman‟s chapter about Augusta Webster in Our Living Poets:
An Essay in Criticism in 1871 helps explain modern critics‟ reticence to compare
Browning and Webster. The chapter begins with an excerpt from Browning‟s “One
Word More” and he calls Webster a “disciple-poet” (171). Throughout this chapter,
Forman half-heartedly praises Webster‟s poetry, which he considers quite minor, and he
believes that while it exhibits “a compact proof of how firmly the analytic method is
taking root” and contains “a good knowledge of modern life and thought [and] a good
classical erudition,” it has “much sterling thought [but] no strikingly new ideas” (171).
Webster seems trapped in Browning‟s legacy and poetic legacies, in general, in Forman‟s
estimation: “these minor poems derive from Tennyson and Mrs. Browning, and in a
lesser degree from Browning and Miss Rossetti; and a derivative style wherein so many
prototypes are traceable will never give any piquancy of tone to poetry of any order”
(173).
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made. It is an expressive model and an epistemological model
simultaneously. (13)
Like Aurora Leigh‟s “double vision,” the “double poem” allows the poet to see
objectively and subjectively and to draw attention both to his or her epistemological
understanding with the world and to the expression of this vision. Contextualizing these
female non-canonical poets with their contemporary male poets does not cripple their
independence. Instead, it reveals the ways in which they created for themselves powerful
poetic positions that reveal “the epistemology which governs the construction of the
self,” personal and poetic. Intersubjective poetry provided such a position.
Webster built into “Circe” a system of allusions to Browning‟s “Caliban,” while
drawing the reader to notice Circe‟s agency. Both poets placed the poems just before the
openings of canonical works, “Caliban” preceding Shakespeare‟s The Tempest and
“Circe” preceding Homer‟s The Odyssey. Furthermore, both monologues occur
immediately before a storm that the speakers perceive as life changing. At the beginning
of “Caliban,” the sun shines brightly and Caliban looks out across the ocean, while
contemplating Setebos, who “dwelleth i‟ the cold o‟ the moon” (25). Circe also watches
the ocean, but the sun is setting and the storm is growing, events that do not occur until
the end of “Caliban.” The darkness, gendered female, dominates the light almost
sexually in Circe‟s world: “Darkness has raised her arms to draw him down / Before the
time, not waiting as of wont / Till he has come to her behind the sea” (2-4). The storm
seems caused by this premature sexual experience, which occurs “[b]efore the [correct]
time.” In “Caliban,” the storm comes suddenly, and Caliban worries that it is a
consequence of his talking openly about Setebos: “What, what? A curtain o‟er the world
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at once!” (284). For Caliban, darkness threatens his sight and his ability to protect
himself. For Circe, darkness symbolizes her power to satisfy her sexual desires and to
subvert natural order.128 Furthermore, the sudden darkness visually represents the end of
Caliban‟s monologue and the world outside of his understanding. Circe, by contrast,
appears knowingly and intimately connected to the natural world, perhaps even part of
the female, chaotic “darkness” that draws in the male “light.”
Through the speakers‟ descriptions of their environment, they begin to build their
conceptions of themselves. Caliban speculates that Setebos, lonely and unable to make
an equal partner or experience the joys of flight, “looks down here, and out of very spite /
Makes this a bauble-world to ape yon real” (146-47). Of course, for the reader, Caliban
has the creative power of Setebos to make a textual “bauble-world” ape and replace the
real, if only for the duration of the poem. Circe is equally concerned with her ability to
read her world correctly. She endeavors to determine whether each shipwrecked man is
her ideal partner and, frustrated, cries, “Will he not seek me? Is it all a dream / Will there
be only these bestial things / …These things who had believed that they were men?” (9293; 97) Though her power seems proportionately lessened by her desire for a man to
dominate her, the reader is always aware that she is both creating and deferring the figure
she longs to rule her. After all, her description fills the poem‟s frame, while the lover
never enters it. Thus, she rules herself—and the reader—as she controls her narrative‟s
past, present, and future. Webster assures this control by ending the monologue before
the assumed arrival of Odysseus. Caliban controls his narrative, too, but though he forms
128

Leighton reads this passage as a “wish-fulfilling sexual encounter in which
female „Darkness‟ draws down the male sun into her bed of storm” (194).
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Setebos in his mind, he fears a real consequence because he sees Setebos embodied in the
world around him. Webster allows Circe ask similar questions as Caliban‟s, building
upon Browning‟s textual structure. The questions they ask shape their poetic
characterization. For the speakers, these questions define them in the absence of the
answers they crave. However, only Circe finds power in the search for answers. The
more she claims to desire this coming lover, the more she seems to relish the seeking.
Webster, then, gives her speaker more power to create her world self-consciously, to
redefine—if not re-create—the “real.”129
Caliban and Circe both define the powerful Other—Setebos and the ideal lover—
in terms of themselves. They see themselves as types of the Other‟s antitypes. In this
way, both Webster and Browning used the dramatic monologue form to invert the power
structure. In other words, both Caliban and Circe vex and dislodge type from antitype to
form the powerful Other in their own images and form themselves in the process. As
Caliban considers himself a type of Setebos and Circe claims she is a type of her lover,
the dramatic monologue form shifts so that the absent figures of Setebos and the lover
129

A tension exists here between the power to control one‟s narrative and the
unavoidable power of the other. However, we could understand the first as a response to
the second. Solipsism would cut off any possible relationship between self and other,
isolating the self in the mind. Although perhaps the monologue itself can only
demonstrate what is in the mind, and thus lends itself to such a reading of solipsism, this
does not seem to be Webster‟s and Browning‟s project. The very construction of the
speakers‟ subjectivity (“So he”) depends upon reaching outward to the other. Benjamin‟s
explanation could help us differentiate the two approaches:
In order to go beyond a conception of a self-enclosed self, to recuperate
difference and respect for otherness along with agency, we have to
account for the impact of the other on the self. This impact provides a
negation that is at once indeterminate and irreducible to the subject‟s own
mental world, thus not the subject‟s own constructed, internal Other, even
though related and interdependent with it. (94)
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become the types, the impressions waiting to be filled. Caliban and Circe fill those
spaces with their own psyches. Caliban sees the world in terms of reflection, considering
himself a refraction of Setebos‟s psyche (“so He”). Caliban imagines Setebos‟s arbitrary
injustice as rooted in several different causes: because he was “ill at ease” (31), because
“he could not, Himself, make a second self / To be his mate” (57), or because he “envieth
that, so helped, such things do more / Than He who made them” (113). Of course,
Caliban also experiences these emotions, his logic rooted in self-reflexive reasoning.130
Circe has grown bored with “the sickly sweet monotony” of her life (32) and with
the beauty of the island. She has fashioned a mate in the form of the lover she awaits.
However, this mate does not materialize, remaining her mind‟s creation. Her creative
control proves limited—at least in her own mind—by her desire not to have absolute
power, but instead to fit within natural and traditional social structures. She claims not to
be a god, stating that her nymphs, “who have the souls of flowers and birds / Singing and
blossoming immortally” (67-68) are gods more than she. She argues that she does not
create the inhabitants of her island; she helps them transform into their “true” selves,
“false and ravenous and sensual brutes” (198): “Change? there was no change; / Only
disguise gone from them unawares” (188-89). However, self-definition proves elusive to
Circe. She surmises that her lover must come because she is intelligent, powerful, and
beautiful:
Nay, but he will come. Why am I so fair,
And marvelously minded, and with sight
130

Along these lines, Browning clarifies his project in his epigraph: “„Thou
thoughtest that I was altogether such a one as thyself.‟”

222
Which flashes suddenly on hidden things,
As the gods see, who do not need to look? (98-101)
Circe‟s circular logic (he exists because I exist and I exist for him) reveals that, for her,
the existence of the Other defines one‟s existence; the self represents the embodiment of
constructions related to that Other. Circe describes herself in terms of classical romance
with pale hair; blue eyes; a “sad sweet longing smile” (120); round, pale, flushed cheeks;
and “chiselled limbs” (125). She woos her image in her lover‟s name because to love her
image is to love him. Thus, he must come because she is beautiful and her beauty means
that he loves her: “But that my beauty means his loving it?” (130). The tension in these
poems derives from their simultaneous self-effacing and self-figuring in the shadow of
the Other. However, the poem is proof of a possible response to this tension, the
intersubjective incorporation of the Other. In other words, Circe and Caliban can gain
some control of the other by controlling the narrative and defining the other. The female
poet can do the same thing; while she might feel controlled by the male literary history
that precedes her, she can incorporate these texts and re-write the history. Webster builds
upon Browning‟s structure to prove the efficacy of this response.
The poems‟ formal elements express the speakers‟ differing sense of agency and
reveal how Webster‟s prosody builds upon Browning‟s. Circe surmises that a being other
than her lover cannot have power over her. She depends on fate, while Caliban believes
in a complex spiritual realm of figures competing for a power for which he can conceive
no fully trustworthy system. Caliban‟s voice is hesitant in response to his fear of Setebos
overhearing him, and the poem‟s punctuation accents this fear. Perhaps because of the
poem‟s punctuation that allows Caliban to talk in the third person, some critics consider
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Caliban a “half-savage man-monster” who “speaks in his own semi-animal version of
English” (Hawlin 81, 169). However, other critics like E. K. Brown131 and John
Woolford, after studying the language and punctuation, have discovered that its
intricacies reveal Caliban‟s psychology and the shifts in his emotions. The layered
structure of the poem adds to Caliban‟s ever-building and ever-deconstructing
perspective. According to Woolford, Browning added apostrophes to denote an absent
pronoun, capital letters to mark references to Setebos and the Quiet, apostrophes before a
verb to show that “Caliban is referring to himself,” and “brackets round the opening and
closing paragraphs of the poem” (96-97). Woolford believes that this construction
reveals important elements of Browning‟s approach to the monologue:
If my description of this sequence is accurate, a number of interesting
implications, about RB‟s compositional procedures and their reciprocation
within the thematic material of his poem, naturally follow. At one level,
this procedure implies a double movement of identification and
withdrawal within the compositional sequence. Or, one could find, in the
supersession of textuality upon oral utterance, a deconstruction of the
convention that dramatic monologue must be read as an excerpt from real
speech really uttered in the world. (98)
Browning breaks the regular iambic pentameter, substituting trochees and dactyls for
iambs when Caliban exhibits confidence, such as when he “thinketh” and wonders if
Setebos creates to “make what Himself would fain, in a manner be—” (62). He uses
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224
enjambment to cause the reader to focus on the images and to add to Caliban‟s narrative a
sense of confused forward progression, such as in lines 12-15:
He looks out o‟er yon sea which sunbeams cross
And recross till they weave a spider-web
(Meshes of fire, some great fish breaks at times)
And talks to his own self, howe‟er he please […].
However, the poem‟s structure primarily emphasizes Caliban‟s feeling of impotence
within his spiritual schema, revealing the psychological web through which he tries to
glimpse a reality outside of himself.
“Circe,” by comparison, is the fluid monologue of a confident speaker who does
not fear that a more powerful force will overhear her. Curiously, however, the last line of
the poem shifts from the singular pronoun “I” to the plural, “our” (210). One could
conjecture that she is thus speaking to the “silly beasts, / crowding around [her]” (178)
that “love [her] still” (179). However, near the end of the poem, she refers to the animals
without speaking to them directly: “Did I choose them what they are?” (184). Earlier in
the poem, she speaks once to her nymphs and once to the gods, but she does not assume
that they can hear or respond. Instead, these references help her to refocus her ideas
about herself and to gather the material and spiritual world to gaze at her as well. Thus, it
seems more likely that the plural pronoun in the last line refers to her divided personality,
one that both enjoys mastering and longs to be dominated. Like “Caliban,” “Circe” uses
blank verse and iambic pentameter. Webster changes the rhythm when Circe longs for
action, believes that her lover will come, declares her beauty, and talks of her “cup of
Truth” (172). As Browning does in “Caliban,” Webster accents Circe‟s confident
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moments by beginning certain lines with a trochee or dactyl. Almost half of the poem‟s
lines are enjambed, pulling the reader into the narrative fluidly and naturally. Thus,
because of her divided personality, Webster persuades the reader of Circe‟s dynamism
through the poem‟s form and structure.
At the end of the poems, both speakers await hope of discovering some pattern to
their lives: Caliban wants only to escape retribution (“Lo! ‟Lieth flat and loveth Setebos!”
[292]), while Circe prepares for her newest round of guests. Whether their anticipation is
laced with hope or dread, both await the same event: the physical entrance of the Other.
By bringing “Caliban,” The Tempest, and The Odyssey into the margins of her work,
Webster builds upon Browning‟s project to create a speaker who wrestles with defining
herself in the shadow of a powerful figure, while she defers the moment of their contact.
In the last line, Circe begins to “make ready for our guests to-night” (210; emphasis
mine), a statement that emphasizes her control over the length of the visit. Temporally,
this line immediately precedes the storm of The Odyssey and parallels Browning‟s
placement of “Caliban” just before the storm of The Tempest. Webster thus positions
“Circe” to suggest that these literary “guests” may be welcome, but they will be subject
to her “cup of Truth,” in this case, her literary reformulation process that reveals the
“Truth”: They have already been grafted into her poetic tale, and they form part of her
literary intersubjectivity.
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“When once we‟re enthroned, you shall never dethrone us—
The poets, the sages, the seers of the land!”:
The Agôn in the Poetry of May Kendall and Amy Levy
May Kendall and Amy Levy both celebrated the unique perspectives of poets
deemed minor, those excluded from major Victorian literary conversations or from the
literary canons. For example, in Kendall‟s “Shakespeare,” the speaker expresses relief at
the distance others see between canonical poetry and her poetry:

Because you are beyond us and above,
Therefore we need no longer fret
Our nature's shadowy limit to remove […]. (1-3)
As we have seen, Levy, in her literary criticism, praised James Thomson for his ability to
tell a very subjective, internal, individual truth “with intense eyes fixed on one side of the
solid polygon of truth, and realizing that one side with a fervour and intensity to which
the philosopher with his birdseye view rarely attains” (1358). Engaging in the larger shift
toward subjective art, Kendall and Levy employed poetic methods that differed from
Webster‟s in “Circe.” While Webster focused on incorporation through allusion and selfcreation in the shadow of the Other, Kendall and Levy dramatized the internalization of
discourses to portray polyvocal intersubjectivity in the speaker.
In Kendall‟s “Woman‟s Future” and Levy‟s “Xantippe: A Fragment,” the
speakers are women who bravely envision a role for themselves beyond that which
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society prescribes.132 Despite the consequences, these women take risks and advocate
change despite the society‟s narratives of women‟s capabilities and proper position in
society. However, rather than building in their poems pointed arguments for women‟s
advancement, Kendall and Levy revealed the process of negotiation that takes place in
order to create room for such a discourse.133 For Kendall and Levy, gender reform
necessitated re-imagining the physical spaces women inhabited and revealing gender
discourses. In “Woman‟s Future,” Kendall‟s speaker declares women “the poets, the
sages, the seers of the land!” (36), but fin de siècle women claiming such active roles in
the culture had to navigate the discourses that limited them ideologically. Joan Douglas
Peters argues that polyphony in Mrs. Dalloway “builds into the surface representation of
unity between characters an underlying representational opposition between them” (132).
Like Peters, I believe that polyphony produces a layered tone that a speaker can
manipulate into irony or even parody (130). However, I contend that the speakers in
“Woman‟s Future” and “Xantippe” do not unify the perspective by steering the
audience‟s sympathy so directly. Instead, the oppositional voices pervade the speaker‟s
132
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“A Pious Opinion,” “In a Toy Shop,” and “Otherworldliness” and Levy‟s “The Old
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Recent studies on Levy include Ana Parejo Vadillo‟s Women Poets and Urban
Aestheticism (2005) and Linda Hunt Beckman‟s article, “Amy Levy: Urban Poetry,
Poetic Innovation, and the Fin-de-Siècle Woman Poet,” in Joseph Bristow‟s anthology,
The Fin-de-Siècle Poem: English Literary Culture and the 1890s (2005), and her book,
Amy Levy: Her Life and Letters (2000). Additionally, Susan David Bernstein recently
published with Broadview Press two of Levy‟s novels. Kendall‟s work has not seen the
same level of critical attention, but Bonnie Robinson, Marion Thain, and Virginia Blain
have all directly responded to Kendall in their criticism and some critics consider her
fundamental to a revised canon of Victorian poetry. Diana Maltz‟s article on Kendall,
“Sympathy, Humor, and the Abject Poor in the Work of May Kendall,” published in ELT
in 2007, constitutes one of the only critical studies of Kendall to date.
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voice, revealing the inscription of the opposing discourses on her psychology. In this
way, the poem pits opposing discourses against one another not to unify, but to display
the complex process of discourse negotiation that proves necessary to those who want to
argue for social change. Polyphony in these poems has two radical effects: it challenges
the centrality of the speaker‟s coherent subjectivity, and it creates within poetry an
agonistic space of rhetorical positioning, revealing the poet‟s and speaker‟s movements
between discourses.

By reading this space of negotiation in terms of an agôn, I realize that I am
placing Kendall and Levy—within recent critical history—into a Bloomian paradigm,
with Oedipal overtones that tend to subvert female poets. A “strong poet,” according to
Bloom, “wrestle[s] [his] strong precursors, even to the death” in order “to clear
imaginative space” (Anxiety 5). Bloom also uses the image of the agôn to describe the
space of “misprision” (Agon 28), a defensive stance performed to “usurp” (29) through
the displacement of previous paradigms (45). However, I have derived my definition of
the agôn from Debora Hawhee‟s recent work on ancient Greek rhetoric.134 Hawhee
contends that the agôn was the space of contests that promoted social community and
allowed for the performance of aretē, a sort of civic virtue, rather than emphasizing
triumph in competition. For Hawhee, agonism provides a vehicle for aretē and for
describing rhetorical positioning (35).
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Kendall and Levy brought the agôn into their poetry, rather than merely choosing
a recognized position within it. They reveal the structure of the discourses at battle in the
space by portraying the ways that a liberated female voice fits within a polyvocal social
fabric. Furthermore, the speakers of these poems absorb opposing voices into their own,
accentuating the process of social inscription and revealing the tensions within the agôn.
Thus, my reading of agonistic positioning aligns more closely with Bakhtin‟s work on
hybridity, polyphony, and dialogism. As we have seen, for Bakhtin, “To express oneself
means to make oneself an object for another and for oneself („the actualization of
consciousness‟)” (110). Donald Wesling explains the importance of oppositional tension
in Bakhtin‟s writings:
For Bakhtin, we can never know ourselves or see ourselves as finished
beings, so we require the otherness of other people to define us in the
world (as we reciprocally define other people by seeing them from the
outside). Alterity is the defining condition governing the perception of
persons, but also defining the perception of whole societies. (31)
The agôn, from this perspective, can function as the inscription of the outer on the inner,
blending objectivity and subjectivity. This very specific form of incorporation unhinges
the individual‟s subject position, redefining it according to the Other.
Kendall‟s “Woman‟s Future” engages in subtle rhetorical shifts that include
acknowledging the popular science that regarded women as having a lesser intellectual
capacity and charging women to “rouse to a lifework—do something worth doing! /
Invent a new planet, a flying machine” (27-28). The poem begins with the speaker
delineating the misogynistic argument that women‟s intellects are “bound by a limit
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decisive” (3). The speaker responds to these arguments by calling them “falsehood[s]”
and “base innuendos” (5). However, she immediately uses the same type of discourse to
suggest that women will evolve: “We trust Evolution to make us amends!” (8). In this
contradictory discursive move, the speaker vacillates between condemning the
misogynistic discourse that assumes women‟s biological limitation and using the same
sort of argument to claim that women can evolve, but they just have not done so yet. In
the next section of the poem, the speaker focuses on a certain type of woman who wastes
her days away on “a rug or a screen” (26). She calls these women to evolve
psychologically into the abilities that she assumes they already possess. In this way, she
takes part in both discourses, using the rhetoric of women‟s evolution, while advocating
social revolution for women, who seem already able to accomplish it. The section ends
with a forceful rebuttal to the misogynistic claim at the beginning of the poem that
women‟s intellect can never rise “[t]o the level of Homer‟s” (4): “[T]he knowledge of
Newton will beam from your faces, / The soul of a Spencer will shine in your eyes” (3132). However, the argument does not move easily from an essentialist-oriented
misogynistic rhetoric to a rebuttal that restructures social forces to free women for
psychological development. Instead, the speaker leans these discourses against one
another, moving between them.
The Envoy complicates the agonistic discourses further. In lines 5-8, the speaker
first reveals the “falsehood” of the rhetoric of women‟s biological limitations, then uses
that discourse to claim that women will evolve. Finally, she rejects these previous
arguments to claim women‟s biological equality. The Envoy emphasizes the structure of
such interwoven discourses. In the first line, the speaker adds to the charges against
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scientific misogynistic discourse that of “jealous exclusion” (33). However, she
immediately, again, claims that women‟s evolution is nigh. Her prophecy of women‟s
active involvement in society, however, requires a disruption of a misogynistic,
biologically deterministic narrative. These women already are powerful, and they are
waiting to take their rightful place in the culture:
Oh, wait for the time when our brains shall expand!
When once we‟re enthroned, you shall never dethrone us—
The poets, the sages, the seers of the land! (34-36)
Kendall‟s title, “Woman‟s Future,” sets up the expectation for prophecy, but Kendall
does not merely forecast women‟s place in the society. Claiming roles for them of
fundamental importance, she structures the poem around the sorts of negotiation
necessary to the acceptance of woman‟s equality and leadership. Within the discourse of
women‟s biological limitation, Kendall buries charges against it of falsehood and jealous
motivations—“base innuendo” (5) and “jealous exclusion” (33). Woman‟s future reflects
a time of intense cultural change, a time for the discourse negotiation that initiates social
action.
Kendall‟s use of poetic form in the poem frames the negotiated discourses aurally
and strengthens her argument for women‟s intellectual capacity in its intricate design.
Through her prosody she proves women‟s intelligence. The poem‟s rhythm alternates
between a hypercatalectic line with one iamb and three anapests, and an acatalectic line
with one iamb and three anapests. She uses deviations from this form to draw the
reader‟s attention to specific lines. The deviations include the addition of an unaccented
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syllable. Three of these, lines 4, 20, and 31, change the initial iamb to an anapest. The
poem‟s arguments hinge on these three lines:
Our intellects, bound by a limit decisive,
To the level of Homer‟s may never arise.
……………………………………………
Can patchwork atone for the mind‟s inanition?
Can the soul, oh my sisters, be fed on a plaque?
……………………………………………
But the knowledge of Newton will beam from your faces,
The soul of a Spencer will shine in your eyes. (3-4, 19-20, 30-31)
Line 4 encapsulates the misogynistic view of women‟s intellectual—and thus poetic—
limitations. In line 20, the rhythmic deviation pulls the reader‟s attention to the word
soul as the speaker argues that women‟s household activities do not feed their souls. Line
31 claims most strongly women‟s innate capacity for inspiration, intelligence, and social
leadership, the altered meter emphasizing the word knowledge. Thus, she draws the
reader‟s attention to her argument through her poetic construction. In line 25, the
alteration of the second accented syllable changes the first anapest to an amphibrach, a
rocking syllable that propels the reader through the line in the same way that “Fashion‟s
vagaries” sweep women away from their intellectual abilities:
Is this your vocation? My goals is another,
And empty and vain is the end you pursue.
In antimacassars the world you may smother;
But intellect marches o‟er them and o‟er you.
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On Fashion‟s vagaries your energies strewing,
Devoting your days to a rug or a screen,
Oh, rouse to a lifework—do something worth doing!
Invent a new planet, a flying-machine. (21-28)
In line 36, the last line of the poem, the added unaccented syllable changes the ultimate
anapest to a pyrrhic and an iamb, slowing the verse and emphasizing the last word, land,
or the national province of the “poets, the sages, the seers”: the newly liberated Woman:
When once we‟re enthroned, you shall never dethrone us—
The poets, the sages, the seers of the land! (35-36)
She performs the roles of poet, sage, and seer, while proving women‟s intellectual
capacity through her careful attention to rhythm. Through this design, she emphasizes
the tensions between discourses, even as they become polyvocal entities inscribed within
the woman‟s subjectivity.
In Levy‟s “Xantippe: A Fragment,” the speaker, Xantippe, tells the maidens with
her in the weaving room the story of her marriage to Socrates, beginning with a
description of her independent spirit as a child, moving through her courtship and rocky
marital relationship, and ending with her life as a widow. The monologue seems quite
coherent, so to title it “A Fragment” accents the lacunae the text contains. Levy
frequently uses ellipses to mark these gaps, which draw attention to Xantippe‟s
psychology, especially her frequent suppression of subversive thoughts. We do not know
Xantippe‟s future, so perhaps in that way the poem is fragmentary, but primarily, the
fragmentation occurs in the rhetorical shifts of Xantippe‟s narrative. Like “A Woman‟s
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Future,” “Xantippe” works as an agôn, the space for diverse discourses to impinge on one
another, especially the competing arguments about women‟s biology and their place in
society. Xantippe embodies this agôn physically in her ultimate desire to keep from
Socrates her intellectual abilities and give him only the “household vessel” (237) he
desires. She claims to have “spun away / The soul from out [her] body, the high thoughts
/ From out [her] spirit” (245-47), yet she uses the opportunity to warn the maidens around
her about the dangers of marriage, revealing to them her enduring spirit. The poem ends
with her desperate command: “The casement, quick; why tarry?—give me air— / O fling
it wide, I say, and give me light!” (278-79) Xantippe vacillates between the ethos of
Socrates‟s traditional wife and the intellectual genius of Aspasia, weaving them together
in her re-creation of her identity.
The agonistic relationship of these discourses about women structures both the
poem and Xantippe‟s psychology. Twice she claims that she has “sinned” (273) by her
desire to violate the boundaries of what the gods have deemed “women‟s thoughts” (43).
These two occurrences mark the dramatic action of the poem. First, Xantippe rebels from
the apparent narrow-mindedness of the weaving women who mock her for her “high
thoughts” and “golden dreams” (37). Next, she responds in openly rebellion to
Socrates‟s declaration of women‟s innate intellectual weakness, maintaining this
rebellion in veiled form for the rest of Socrates‟s life through her performance of the
soulless woman he desires. Opening the poem into its rhetorical substructure, the ellipses
visually and aurally reveal Xantippe‟s psychological tensions, especially her powerful
sense of identity and her need to suppress it. The ellipses begin just before the courtship
section of the poem, when Xantippe parenthetically counters her conviction that she
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sinned when her “woman-mind had gone astray” (43) with the quiet suggestion, “(And
yet, ‟tis strange, the gods who fashion us / Have given us such promptings)…” (45-46).
Against the maidens‟ harsh direction, “bidding [her] return / To maiden labour” (35-36),
Xantippe declares her difference from them. Her soul has “yearned for knowledge, for a
tongue / That should proclaim the stately mysteries / Of this fair world, and of the holy
gods” (37-40).
The meter of the poem, a very regular iambic pentameter, remains even, hopeful,
and organized until the climax, when she flings the wineskin to the ground. She has just
exclaimed to Socrates, Aspasia, Alcibiades, and Plato that if the gods made women too
finely, they did so cruelly, forcing “their half-completed work / To bleed and quiver here
upon the earth” (184) and “beat its soul against the marble walls / Of men‟s cold hearts,
and then at last to sin” (185-87). Woman‟s “sin,” or her deviation from a “woman-mind”
(43), results from the gods‟ inadequate nurturing of her finely tuned senses and their act
of cruelly placing women in a world that suffocates them. Her life is evidence of this
cruelty. Although Xantippe first reacts with repulsion to Socrates‟s body, she enters into
a sort of courtship with Socrates because she sees it as means by which to grow
intellectually. However, he destroys her hopes when he values Aspasia for her ability to
parrot what Xantippe terms “glib philosophy” (228) while he maintains his contention
that knowledge “intoxicate[s]” (170) women, and leads to their rebellion:
She grows intoxicate with knowledge; throws
The laws of custom, order, ‟neath her feet,
Feasting at life‟s great banquet with wide throat. (170-73)
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Xantippe agrees that knowledge does necessitate rebellion for women, not because it
overwhelms their innate intellectual weakness, but because it allows them to realize their
strength. However, Xantippe is caught between the desire for freedom (“give me light!”
[279]) and the desire to teach the great Socrates a lesson. She starves her own soul to
deprive him of her true magnificence, which proves a very self-destructive act. However,
after his death she finally feeds it, demanding “light.” Even in this act, however, she
wavers between her declaration of rebellious victory and the haunting warnings against
deviant behavior that deem it a “sin.” She claims, even in these last lines, that she has
“sinned” against the gods (273). She seems finally able to reject these constructs,
shifting, with the rising dawn, to revere her own boundless soul that requires communion
with air and light.
Because these poems both work as dramatic monologues, defining the nature of
the speaker‟s voice proves complicated, as we have seen. In “Woman‟s Future,” the
speaker, in a traditional parlor—the setting—directs her call to a group of women who
symbolize to her all women. Elements of the setting serve as examples of the limiting
physical spaces of women‟s existence, especially because of their meager and timeconsuming tactile objects of production. The scale of the poem, a Woman to all women
speaking in women‟s spaces and prophesying about the future, resembles parts of “Saul”
or “A Death in the Desert.” After all, in titling the poem “Woman‘s Future” (my
emphasis), not “Women‟s Future,” she accentuates the interconnectedness of all women
and she emphasizes gender as a factor that will determine the quality of that future. In
“Xantippe,” the speaker‟s flashback constitutes the bulk of the poem. Like “Fra Lippo
Lippi,” she struggles to explain herself and her suffocating existence through her life
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story told beneath the clench of impending death. She is the failed revolutionary, the
powerless artist, and the martyr.135 Her polyphonic voice reveals her absorption of
misogynistic discourses that will always keep her morally at cross-purposes with her own
call for freedom. A Christ-like figure, she admonishes the “maids” who “too soundly
have . . . slept / [t]hat should have watched [her]” (8-9). So, although the precedence for
Kendall‟s and Levy‟s experimentation with the form certainly exists, the speakers‟
polyvocality is their true innovation. Though both poems end in a singular subject
position, one that advocates women‟s liberation, that position clearly mediates the
polyvocal tensions of various discourses about women‟s ontology and social freedoms.
These poets positioned strong, individualistic female speakers to look outward to
the culture and back at themselves through its misogynistic lens. W. E. B. Du Bois‟s
notion of “double consciousness” applies here, an experience Du Bois describes as “this
sense of always looking at one‟s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one‟s soul
by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his
twoness” (qtd. in Friedman 76). Although Levy‟s and Kendall‟s position as women
writing in a patriarchal society perhaps heightened their sense of “twoness,” they also
found freedom in allowing multiple discourses to meet in an agonistic fashion within
their texts and within their speakers‟ minds. Although the misogynistic discourse
fundamentally threatens to devalue and negate a female speaker‟s subjectivity, Levy and
Kendall seem to have felt that it was necessary that the female speakers confront these
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character.
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other voices, which originated in the culture and which were inscripted inside of
themselves. Webster similarly employed allusive techniques to confront literary voices
and through the process, to claim poetic independence. This sort of dialogic subjectivity
spun the poems centrifugally outward into the larger culture, providing a model for an
agôn with pragmatic importance for advocating change, one that argued for the ethical
necessity of polyphony in a diverse polis. As Benjamin explains,
Inclusion thus calls for difference, not synthesis. Politically, it cannot
mean anything but the principle of sustaining continual contest and
contradiction among differences. . . . As each different voice ascends to
the position of subject of speech, however contested, it has the chance to
attain the status of an outside other, rather than a repudiated abject that
threatens to contaminate or reabsorb the self. (108)
The move to intersubjective monologues is this kind of call for inclusion. Late Victorian
poets—particularly female poets—employed the monologue to portray for a new society
on the verge of radical gender reform a new form of ethics and a new form of subjectivity
that accepted “continual contest” and welcomed the introduction of newly-recognized
citizens.
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Conclusion: Literary Networks and Poetic Inheritance

In 1886, Katharine Bradley wrote about the warm friendship she and Edith had
with Robert Browning. One evening, in particular, ended in Browning‟s expression of
admiration and the sort of passing of the poetic flame from one generation to the next:
[H]e took us into the hall and said, “I believe poetry is the most glorious
thing in the world; you are beginning where I long ago ended. God bless
you! Then he suddenly & impulsively kissed Edith, & then me, with the
same like dictum—adding low as if apologetically—“You will be none the
worse for my good wishes.” Then he came with us to the gate, asked us if
knew our way home, & left us the divine perfected Spirit—giving God
thanks for him. Of his humility, of his exquisite dearness—oh he deserves
sonnets from the Portuguese! I cannot speak. I have never loved him till
to-day: now I love him dearly. (British Library, 46866, f. 230)
She titled the letter, “The Gospel According to St. Matthew,” perhaps in order to link
their experience with Browning to a type of calling, Jesus passing his spirit to Peter, an
event that occurs in the book of Matthew: “And I say also unto thee, That thou art Peter,
and upon this rock I will build my church; and the gates of hell shall not prevail against
it. And I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven” (16.18-19a). Browning
likewise passes down a “divine perfected Spirit,” giving them literary keys to the
kingdom: “you are beginning where I long ago ended.” Furthermore, he walks them to
the gate, a prepositional phrase Bradley underlines in the letter. Earlier in Matthew, Jesus
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has cautioned his listeners: “Enter ye in at the strait gate: for wide is the gate, and broad
is the way, that leadeth to destruction, and many there be which go in thereat: because
strait is the gate, and narrow is the way, which leadeth unto life, and few there be that
find it” (7.13-14). Bradley does not clearly explain whether Browning‟s gate is the wide
gate one or the narrow one, but rather—through the connection—she describes “Father
Poet,” a pet name they have for Browning, as a sort of Christ figure showing the way and
transferring his spirit, as Jesus does in Matthew: “Go ye therefore, and teach all nations,
baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost: teaching
them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you: and, lo, I am with you
alway, even unto the end of the world” (28.19-20).
On the other hand, Browning has already betrayed them by outing them, a fact
that gives the kiss other religious valences. Cooper tentatively had sent Browning their
work two years earlier, which sparked a relationship between the writers. She described
their writing together as “Shelleian” (ff. 10-11). Seven months later, Bradley wrote to
Browning,
Spinoza, with his find grasp of unity, says: “If two natures individuals of
exactly the same nature are joined together, they make up a single
individual doubly stronger than each alone,” i.e. Edith and I make
veritable Michael. And we humbly fear you are destroying this
philosophic truth: it is said The Athenaeum was taught by you to use the
feminine pronoun. Again some are named André Raffalovich, whose
earnest young praise & frank criticism gave me genuine pleasure, now
writes in ruffled distress he “thought he was writing to a boy—a young
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man… he has learnt on the best authority it is not so.” I am writing to him
to assure him the best authority is my work. But I write to you to beg you
to set the critics on a wrong track. We each know that you mean good
(ours[)];& are persuaded you thought by “our secret” we meant the dual
authorship. The revelation of that would indeed be utter ruin to us; but the
report of lady- authorship will dwarf and enfeeble our work at every turn.
Like the poet Gray (M. Arnold) we shall never “speak out.” And we have
many things to say the world will not tolerate from a woman‟s lips. We
must be free as dramatists to work out in the open air of nature,—exposed
to her vicissitudes, witnessing her terrors: we cannot be stifled in drawingroom conventionalities. . . . Besides, you are robbing us of real
criticism—such as man gives man. The gods learn little from the stupid
words addressed to them at shrines: they disguise, meet mortals
unsuspecting in the marketplace, & enjoy wholesome intercourse. (British
Library, 46866, f. 11)
A few days later, she wrote again, explaining her phrase “drawing-room
conventionalities”:
I do not care to speak to you again of our relations to our work: on one
point however your mis-apprehension is so serious that I cannot keep
silent. I did not speak of combating “social conventions.” It is not our
desire to treat irreverently customs or beliefs that have been, or are, sacred
to men. We hold ourselves bound in life & literature to reveal—as far as
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maybe—the beauty of the high feminine standard of the right to be.
(British Library, 46866, f. 11)
In just two years, then, they had overcome this rocky start in order to kindle a growing
friendship. By the time Bradley can declare that she loves him, she has created an image
of him that blends God (the “Father Poet” and “the old gentleman” [another pet name]),
Jesus (the one who leaves “the divine perfected Spirit”), and Judas (who “suddenly &
impulsively kisse[s]” them). By positioning herself against Browning in this way—as the
fulfillment of poetic promise—she and Cooper step into the role of Jesus, the one
betrayed, and Peter, the “rock” and receptacle of the spirit. Reverberating in her
description is Browning‟s “Saul.” As Michael Field, Bradley and Cooper take David‟s
role, able to see prophetically into the future, casting new light into dark places. Even
when writing about their time with Browning, Bradley layers her writing intertextually,
rewriting the Bible and Browning. For Bradley and Cooper, writing seems to have
required the delicate interfolding of textual voices. Many later poets, particularly female
poets, respond similarly to their literary history.
The literary history of the genre of the dramatic monologue records the movement
of time from Browning‟s early versions of the form to his passing of his poetic spirit to
Bradley and Cooper, whom he by this time referred to as “Field.” The conversations that
formed through the genre and the poetic networks they represent chart the genre‟s
history. Its evolution through earlier forms—Hemans‟s and Landon‟s, if we follow
Armstrong‟s argument, Browning‟s and Tennyson‟s, if we follow the traditional critical
account—to the polyvocal form used by Kendall and Levy reveal its flexibility to create
important works of poetry and to portray the human condition, even as that condition
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changes, particularly because of the movements for gender equality at the end of the
period. Victorian poets offer models of subjectivity through the monologue in
conversations, each of which differently defines subjectivity and objectivity, with
important implications for ethical relationships. Such endeavors permeate the Victorian
period, with its scientific breakthroughs, reform movements, and civil rights
advancements. It is difficult to imagine the Victorians without the monologue.
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Appendix A: “Mary”
Sweet Mary the first time she ever was there
Came into the Ball room among the Fair
The young Men & Maidens around her throng
And these are the words upon every tongue
An Angel is here from the heavenly Climes
Or again does return the Golden times
Her eyes outshine every brilliant ray
She opens her lips tis the Month of May
Mary moves in soft beauty & conscious delight
To augment with sweet smiles all the joys of the Night
Nor once blushes to own to the rest of the Fair
That sweet Love & Beauty are worthy our care
In the Morning the Villagers rose with delight
And repeated with pleasure the joys of the night
And Mary arose among Friends to be free
But no Friend from henceforward thou Mary shalt see
Some said she was proud some calld her a whore
And some when she passed by shut to the door
A damp cold came oer her her blushes all fled
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Her lillies & roses are blighted & shed
O why was I born with a different Face
Why was I not born like this Envious Race
Why did Heaven adorn me with bountiful hand
And then set me down in an envious Land
To be weak as a Lamb & smooth as a Dove
And not to raise Envy is calld Christian Love
But if you raise Envy your Merits to blame
For planting such spite in the weak & the tame
I will humble my Beauty I will not dress fine
I will keep from the Ball & my Eyes shall not shine
And if any Girls Lover forsakes her for me
I'll refuse him my hand & from Envy be free
She went out in Morning attird plain & neat
Proud Marys gone Mad said the Child in the Street
She went out in Morning in plain neat attire
And came home in Evening bespatterd with mire
She trembled & wept sitting on the Bed side
She forgot it was Night & she trembled & cried
She forgot it was Night she forgot it was Morn
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Her soft Memory imprinted with Faces of Scorn
With Faces of Scorn & with Eyes of disdain
Like foul Fiends inhabiting Marys mild Brain
She remembers no Face like the Human Divine
All Faces have Envy sweet Mary but thine
And thine is a Face of sweet Love in Despair
And thine is a Face of mild sorrow & care
And thine is a Face of wild terror & fear
That shall never be quiet till laid on its bier
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Appendix B: “The Witch”
I have walked a great while over the snow,
And I am not tall nor strong.
My clothes are wet, and my teeth are set,
And the way was hard and long.
I have wandered over the fruitful earth,
But I never came here before.
Oh, lift me over the threshold, and let me in at the door!

The cutting wind is a cruel foe.
I dare not stand in the blast.
My hands are stone, and my voice a groan,
And the worst of death is past.
I am but a little maiden still,
My little white feet are sore.
Oh, lift me over the threshold, and let me in at the door!

Her voice was the voice that women have,
Who plead for their heart‟s desire.
She came—she came—and the quivering flame
Sank and died in the fire.
It never was lit again on my hearth
Since I hurried across the floor,
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To lift her over the threshold, and let her in at the door.136

136

This is the published version of the poem from the Newbolt collection.
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